Threats to UK democracy: Disinformation, foreign interference and declining public trust

Approximate read time: 35 minutes

The House of Lords is scheduled to debate the following motion on 25 June 2026:

Lord Wallace of Saltaire (Liberal Democrat) to move that this House takes note of the threats to democratic institutions in the United Kingdom, including disinformation, foreign interference, and levels of public trust in politics.

1. Definitions and background: Disinformation, foreign interference and current levels of public trust in politics

Disinformation, foreign interference operations and declining public trust in UK politics are overlapping issues, with some foreign interference activities involving disinformation campaigns aimed at challenging and undermining public trust in UK institutions. Section 1 of this briefing provides introductory information on these terms.

1.1 What is disinformation?

Disinformation is a form of propaganda involving the dissemination of false information with the deliberate intent to deceive or mislead.^[1] It differs from misinformation, which can include the unintentional spread of false information.^[2]

The UK government has observed that disinformation may be created either to cause harm or for political, personal or financial gain.^[3] In practice it can include:^[4]

• fabricating new content
• manipulating existing content
• impersonating trusted sources
• using misleading context
• creating false connections
• using satire and parody to mislead

Disinformation is not a new phenomenon. However, social media and newer technologies such as artificial intelligence have made it easier, quicker and cheaper for both domestic and foreign actors to spread false information widely and target specific groups.^[5]

Reliable statistics are not available on the reach of deliberately shared disinformation, but the media and communications regulator Ofcom publishes indicative figures on the reach of misinformation. In its April 2026 report on UK adults’ media use and attitudes (based on a survey of 7,500 UK adults conducted in late 2025), Ofcom found that four in 10 (41%) adults aged 18 or over who were online reported encountering false information.^[6] The proportion was higher for social media users, with 56% saying they came across misleading or false news in the same period. Younger adults, who tend to spend more time online, reported even higher exposure to misinformation via social media, with 65% of social media users aged between 16 and 34 saying they had seen misleading or false news.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) is among the organisations to have warned of the risks posed by disinformation. In its most recent report on global risks published in January 2026, the WEF ranked ‘misinformation and disinformation’ as the second most severe short-term risk facing the world over the next two years.^[7] This was behind only geoeconomic confrontation and ahead of risks such as societal polarisation, extreme weather events and state-based armed conflict. However, the report argued the risks posed by disinformation were intertwined with those arising from societal polarisation, and were of particular concern in the online world:

In an increasingly fragmented world permeated by new technological capabilities, information is vulnerable to manipulation for influencing political outcomes or for economic gain. This can contribute to deepening societal and political fractures, worsening grievances, hardening beliefs, reducing critical thinking and amplifying extremist views. It can also lead to desensitisation. One of the strongest interconnections in the [WEF’s global risks perception survey] is between societal polarisation and misinformation and disinformation.

Misinformation and disinformation are of particular concern in the online world. The integrity of online news and broader information is increasingly under threat, as distinguishing between authentic and synthetic content, whether video, audio, or written, is becoming progressively more difficult.^[8]

The WEF had previously ranked misinformation and disinformation as the “top-ranked short- to medium-term concern across all risk categories”, commenting:

Efforts to combat this risk are coming up against a formidable opponent in generative AI-created false or misleading content that can be produced and distributed at scale.^[9]

1.2 What is foreign interference?

The government has contrasted “open and transparent influence activities, such as using diplomacy to shape and align policy to benefit shared interests”, with “covert and malign political interference activities” that are designed to “undermine our interests, such as using disinformation to manipulate our political debate or weaken the integrity of our democratic institutions”.^[10] The Rycroft review into countering foreign financial influence and interference in UK politics (covered further in section 2.1 of this briefing) reiterated this distinction:

There is a clear distinction between activity conducted transparently and within the norms of diplomacy, and interference that is often covert and malign and designed to undermine our interests, institutions and political debate and weaken our democracy. In short, while foreign influence may be legitimate, foreign interference is not.

This reflects approaches internationally. Other democratic states, including the US and Australia, draw a distinction between foreign influence activity that is open and transparent and activity by foreign state actors that is covert, deceptive, coercive or corrupting and which undermines sovereignty, democratic institutions and public trust.^[11]

The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), the government’s national technical authority for physical and personnel protective security, has warned UK-based elected politicians, candidates, members of the House of Lords and staff working for the institutions of UK democracy that disinformation operations are among the interference tools used by foreign states.^[12] The NPSA has cautioned that malign actors may use a range of other interference tools to undermine the UK. Its guidance lists and explains these as follows:

• Elicitation: Attempts to manipulate you into sharing information, for example through seemingly casual conversations or requests for ‘non-public’ or ‘insider’ information (in person, online or both). A threat actor could provide you with incorrect information, in the hope that you will correct them.
• Cultivation: The process of building long-term, deep relationships to gather information, recruit or manipulate—for example to influence deceptively towards a particular position. Cultivation begins with a simple introduction; shared interests and social gatherings are often leveraged. Even if you resist the manipulation, a threat actor may use any association with you to lend credibility to their approaches to others.
• Blackmail: The use of blackmail and/or threats represents one of the most aggressive forms of recruitment and coercion. Blackmail material could be garnered from information stolen via, for example, a cyber compromise. A threat actor may also seek to place you in a compromising situation, which they could then exploit.
• Online approaches: Threat actors act anonymously and/or dishonestly online to connect with people who have access to information, for example through online professional or social networking sites. They do this by obfuscating their real identity and intentions—for example posing as recruiters or talent agents and approaching you with enticing opportunities, when their real intent is to gather as much information as possible and/or recruit you to work for them.
• Financial donations: Threat actors seek to use financial donations to influence your decision making, public statements on policy issues or the questions you ask in debates. They may seek to use you as a proxy to conduct illicit financing on their behalf. Political parties and candidates may also receive funds seemingly from a UK national which may in fact have originated from a foreign actor. Foreign states may also donate indirectly—for example to a charity you are affiliated with or a project in your area—with a view to influencing your activity.
• Cyber compromises: Threat actors use spear-phishing and social engineering, in the form of highly personalised messages aimed at tricking specific individuals into revealing sensitive information or clicking malicious links, to compromise accounts and devices. The proliferation of commercial spyware has enabled a wider range of actors to compromise devices. Stolen information can be used—including via release into the public domain—to manipulate public discourse or undermine individuals and institutions.
• Exploiting overseas travel: When travelling abroad, you are easier to target—either because espionage and interference activity is more common or the environment is more conducive to it. Foreign intelligence services will try to access your data—assume everything could be of interest, but particularly that relating to your work—personal belongings, CCTV and telecommunications data. These can be exploited to collect information or provide opportunities to influence or coerce.^[13]

The government’s June 2025 strategic defence review said the UK was “already under daily attack, with aggressive acts—from espionage to cyber-attack and information manipulation—causing harm to society and the economy”.^[14] It characterised these attacks, which can include political interference, electoral interference and disinformation campaigns, as ‘sub-threshold’ attacks as they fall “beneath the threshold of war”.^[15]

The national security strategy (NSS) published later in June 2025 reiterated the threat:

The UK is directly threatened by hostile activities including assassination, intimidation, espionage, sabotage, cyber-attacks and other forms of democratic interference. These have targeted our citizens, institutions, journalists, universities and businesses. Adversaries threaten societal cohesion and seek to erode public trust through the spread of disinformation, malign use of social media and stoking tensions between generations, genders and ethnic groups.^[16]

The strategy cited China’s interference in the UK’s democracy, as well as recognising that “hostile activity on British soil from countries like Russia and Iran” was increasing.^[17] The NPSA’s guidance for those involved in the UK’s democratic institutions notes the UK:

[…] is a target of long-term strategic foreign interference and espionage from elements of the Russian, Chinese and Iranian states which, in different ways, seek to further their economic and strategic interests and cause harm to our democratic institutions.^[18]

On 16 June 2026 the former head of MI6 Sir Richard Moore warned the Russian state was “trying to intimidate” the UK with sabotage, arson and cyber-attacks.^[19] This followed the conviction of two men who were found guilty of conspiring to carry out arson attacks on property and a car connected to Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer. The men were recruited online by a Russian-speaking individual who it has been reported was likely a Russian diplomat.

1.3 What are current levels of public trust in UK politics?

Trust can be defined as:

The attitude of expecting good performance from another party, whether in terms of loyalty, goodwill, truth, or promises. The importance of trust as a kind of invisible glue that binds society together is most visible when it is lost.^[20]

However, trust does not have a universal definition and usage of the term can vary depending on context.^[21] For example, political scientists use the terms ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ to differentiate between trust in the political system as a whole and trust in individual political actors. The terms mistrust and distrust may also be used to refer to a scepticism or unwillingness to immediately trust political systems, institutions, and actors, and actively negative attitudes towards these, respectively. Both terms may reflect low levels of trust.

Researchers have associated declining levels of public trust in politics with decreased formal political engagement, reflected for example in lower turnout at elections.^[22] A number of bodies have aimed to measure changing attitudes and a selection of these findings are summarised below.

The Electoral Commission has monitored public attitudes towards elections and democracy in the UK since 2007. In its latest online study of a representative sample of 6,000 respondents, conducted in December 2024, the commission found that trust in politicians remained low, with only 14% of respondents saying they trusted politicians.^[23] It observed this was a slight increase on its previous study, when only 10% of respondents said they trusted politicians. It also found:^[24]

• There had been an increase in satisfaction with the administration of elections. Satisfaction with the process of voting and registering to vote, and confidence that elections were well run, were close to an all-time high.
• Over half of respondents felt that elected representatives did not care about people like them. Only one in five felt that elected representatives did care about people like them.
• Concerns remained high about threats to democracy. Many people, especially young people, believed that elections in the UK were manipulated in some way. However, trust in institutions did not decline and perceptions of threats to democracy did not increase.
• There had been an increase in positive perceptions about party finance. This included both transparency around finances and the belief that those who break the rules would face suitable punishment.
• Support for voter ID had increased. Perceptions around the ease of voting remained consistent with pre-voter ID levels.
• Social media was now the second most common news source (up from fifth last year). Television remained the most common news source. Trust in news from social media had increased. This was despite a rise in the proportion of people reporting seeing misinformation.
• People were less likely than in previous years to say that bullying behaviours towards politicians were unacceptable. In addition, only 25% of 18 to 24-year-olds said it was totally unacceptable to verbally threaten a politician in public, compared with 71% of those aged 75 and over.

The National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) has identified “record low levels of trust and confidence in how Britain is governed” through its British social attitudes survey.^[25] In June 2025 it observed:

• just 19% of the British public think the current system of governing Britain needs little or no improvement; unchanged from the record low registered before the [2024 general] election
• only 12% trust governments to put the country’s interest before their party’s interests ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the time’, even lower than the previous record low of 14% registered in 2023

The Office for National Statistics has found similarly low levels of trust in Parliament and political parties when compared with other institutions. In March 2024 it observed:

The most trusted parts of government were the national and regional civil service, with 45% and 42% of people, respectively, saying they trusted these institutions. A third (34%) trusted local government and a quarter (27%) trusted the UK government. Parliament, including both the House of Commons and House of Lords, and the political parties were the least trusted, with 24% and 12% trusting, respectively.^[26]

Analysis published by the Policy Institute at King’s College London in 2023 had found, based on a survey of 3,000 UK adults aged 18 or over, that the UK had “internationally low levels of confidence in its political institutions, with confidence in Parliament in particular halving since 1990”.^[27]

The WEF has attributed decreasing public trust in democratic countries at least in part to “rising societal and political polarisation”, which it recognised can be exacerbated by disinformation and misinformation.^[28]

2. Recent reports on threats to UK democracy, including disinformation and foreign interference

2.1 Rycroft review

In December 2025 the government announced an independent review into countering foreign financial influence and interference in UK politics.^[29] The review followed the sentencing of Nathan Gill, a former MEP, for accepting bribes linked to the Russian state while he held elected office.

Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government Steve Reed said the review would be led by Philip Rycroft, a former permanent secretary. Mr Reed said its findings would inform a future bill concerning elections and democracy.^[30]

The review’s terms of reference were as follows:

• examine the effectiveness of political finance laws and current checks and balances within the UK’s political regulation in identifying and mitigating foreign interference and bribery
• consider whether political finance laws could be strengthened in light of recent case studies on covert funding and foreign interference, including specific consideration of strengthening criminal enforcement measures
• specifically consider safeguards against illicit funding streams including the use of difficult-to-trace assets such as crypto-currencies, cash and third parties using foreign funding for political campaigns and advertising
• review the rules governing the constitution and regulation of political parties, and the Electoral Commission’s enforcement powers^[31]

The government published Mr Rycroft’s review on 25 March 2026.^[32] In the report’s summary, Mr Rycroft said the country faced a “persistent problem of foreign interests seeking to exert influence on, and to interfere in, our politics”. He added that “too much of this is malign and seeks to sow distrust and exacerbate divisions in UK society, with the ultimate aim of undermining confidence in our democracy”, before continuing:

This review is timely. A combination of heightened geo-political tensions and new technology enabled routes of access to the British public has created the incentive and the means for hostile states and other actors to increase their efforts to interfere in UK politics.

How much impact this interference has had to date is difficult to ascertain. At one level, the public can be credited with sufficient common sense to see off the more egregious attempts to suborn their opinions. Moreover, many indicators show that British democracy remains robust. With at least five or six parties in serious contention for seats in forthcoming elections across the UK, political debate is as vigorous as ever and the political choice for more voters wider than it has been for many years. Recent democratic events, elections and referenda, have commanded broad losers’ consent.

The UK enjoys a vibrant, free press and, through social media and other sources, more information is available to voters on political issues than ever before. Our democracy has always been open to, and has benefited from, good ideas and positive influence from overseas; this remains the case today.

Trust in the actual mechanics of our electoral system also remains high. Very few politicians fall on the wrong side of the high standards rightly expected of them; most are hard-working, conscientious and deeply committed to the public good.

There is, then, no immediate crisis of democratic legitimacy in the United Kingdom. But there is no guarantee that this will persist. In particular, there is a long-term and worrying loss of trust in our democratic system and processes. That is not solely caused by, but correlates to, public unease in the way in which our politics is financed. Many of the people I have spoken to, notably politicians, point to a coarsening of the political debate in a toxic online environment that is allowing the normalisation of the public expression of deeply unpleasant attitudes.^[33]

Mr Rycroft observed that foreign actors sought to exploit this situation. He added that while the “overall effect of their activities might still be containable”, in the context of the UK’s “newly volatile politics even marginal impacts could have a disproportionate bearing on the civility of democratic discourse, on democratic outcomes and, ultimately, on confidence in our democracy”. He further said a loss of confidence “could in turn lead to a rapid downward spiral in the integrity of our democracy as people seek other means to settle political differences”. Mr Rycroft continued:

Foreign financial influence and interference comes in two broad domains: attempts to directly infiltrate our politics by gaining direct leverage over political parties and political process; and attempts to create division and distrust among the wider public through activity on social media and other vectors.

Neither problem is new but both are now arguably more acute. Many wise heads have proffered potential solutions to these problems, not least the Committee on Standards in Public Life whose 2021 report^[34] gave a comprehensive and well-researched overview of this landscape. It is to the credit of the current government that it is now taking action through the Representation of the People Bill to enact a number of the critical recommendations put forward by the committee.

I am glad to endorse the contents of that bill; it will do much to plug the apparent loopholes in the governance of our political life through the regulation of the way in which political parties access finance. Nevertheless, there are a number of areas where I believe the government should go further and I make recommendations accordingly in this review.

Mr Rycroft concluded his summary with a warning that the UK, along with other countries, faced a “radically new technology of information dissemination through social media”. He said that while much of the changes enabled through this development were beneficial, some of it was not. He continued:

Where those adverse effects are the consequence of hostile foreign interference, the public should expect the state to take robust action to counter the threat. There is, I believe, more that the government should be doing in this space and I so recommend in this report.

I am not pressing the panic button in this report; that would serve the purposes of those who would undermine the trust in our democratic processes. But I am ringing the alarm bell. If government does not act swiftly to gear up to counter these threats, there is a real risk they will run away from us. Recent allegations of attempted foreign interference in the electoral process in Moldova and Romania should serve as cautionary tales. It is a truism, but one apt for our times: the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.^[35]

The report made 17 recommendations regarding countering foreign financial influence and/or interference grouped around a number of themes, summarised below.

Political finance

• Overseas voters: There should be an annual cap on political donations from British voters living abroad.
• Corporate donations: The corporate donation test in the Representation of the People Bill should be amended to one based on post-tax profits, and no corporate donor should be able to donate more than their post-tax profits into UK politics in any given year.
• Cryptoassets: The government should legislate in the Representation of the People Bill to introduce a moratorium on political donations made in cryptoassets.
• Transparency of campaign donations and spending: Non-party campaigner and candidate campaign spending should come from permissible donors and reporting and transparency requirements should apply to these groups year-round.

Political parties

• Checks on donations: ‘Know your donor’ provisions in the Representation of the People Bill should be further developed to more closely mirror the customer due diligence provisions in the anti-money laundering regulations.
• Internal policies and procedures: The Electoral Commission should work with political parties and the Ethics and Integrity Commission to develop a non-statutory code of conduct to ensure that robust procedures are in place within parties to equip party officials better to deal with the threat of foreign financial interference.
• Standardising reporting: The Electoral Commission should mandate political parties to submit their annual reports and accounts and campaign spending returns in a standardised format.
• Information sharing: The Electoral Commission should coordinate with government, the security services and the police to ensure that political parties receive regular updates on the threat landscape, so that they have a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the risks around foreign financial interference.

Effective enforcement

• Investigatory and other powers of the Electoral Commission: The information-sharing powers of the Electoral Commission should be extended, so that it can not only share information with other agencies, but also require information of them; and the powers of the commission should be extended to allow it to require information from any person or organisation who may hold relevant material that it reasonably requires for the purposes of carrying out its functions.
• Investigation and prosecution of offences: The government, as part of the forthcoming reform of police structures, should ensure the creation and resourcing of a centre of police excellence to pursue the investigation of complex criminal offences under electoral law involving foreign interference in UK politics.
• Burden of proof and sentencing limits: The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 should be amended to reduce the burden of proof for criminal offences to show that an offender might have ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ that they were committing a crime and the sentencing associated with each criminal offence under the act should be reviewed, to ensure it matches the seriousness of the offences.

Wider influencing environment

• Foreign interference and the online world: Dealing with hostile state online interference should be a far higher priority for government. There should be clear lead accountability at ministerial and senior official level for leading the work to combat foreign online political interference, with resources commensurate to the challenge this poses to our democracy.
• Online political advertising: The government should further tighten the regulation of online political advertising by banning foreign-funded adverts outright and ensuring that imprints include who has paid for them.
• Lobbying, think tanks and other channels of influence: The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 should be amended to remove the VAT exemption for all foreign based entities which would otherwise fall under the provisions of the act; and consideration should be given to broadening the scope of the Ethics and Integrity Commission’s review into lobbying, disclosure and access to government so that it also examines potential channels for foreign money to flow into the wider political ecosystem.

Government prioritisation

• Given the on-going challenge to the integrity of our democracy, the cabinet secretary should give a clear signal of the priority to be afforded to this agenda by allocating to a permanent secretary lead responsibility for sustaining our democracy and coordinating the response to the threats to it.^[36]

In connection with the recommendation on foreign interference and the online world, Mr Rycroft cited how France and Sweden had established capabilities and structures to combat the threat of online foreign interference.^[37] The report noted that France had established, under its General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, a technical and operational department responsible for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference known as VIGINUM.^[38] VIGINUM’s main missions are to detect and characterise foreign digital interference affecting the public debate in France and the report observed the service had played a key role in identifying and exposing a range of operations, including Russia‑linked manipulations around the Paris Olympics. The report also noted that Sweden had established a Psychological Defence Agency whose main task is to offer support to agencies, municipalities, regions, companies and organisations, and help to strengthen the resilience of the Swedish population.^[39] The agency also identifies, analyses and provides support in countering malign information influence and other misleading information operations directed at Sweden or Swedish interests.

On 11 June 2026 VIGINUM accused the Israeli firm BlackCore of having conducted digital interference operations ahead of the recent Scottish parliamentary elections, although it was unclear who had commissioned the activity.^[40]

On the day of the report’s publication, Mr Reed said the government would, “in advance of the Commons report stage of the Representation of the People Bill […] provide a comprehensive, line-by-line response to all the report’s recommendations”.^[41] The bill’s report stage has yet to be scheduled.^[42]

2.2 Selected parliamentary committee reports

A number of parliamentary committees have considered the issues of disinformation and/or foreign interference over the past year.

Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy

On 27 March 2026 the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) published a report on the ‘National security strategy’.^[43] The report said that while the government had identified the need for a “whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation”, it was “not evident that this message is getting through to the public”.^[44] It concluded there was a “long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security”. The committee recommended the government “provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different government departments responsible for its delivery”. The government has yet to formally respond to the report.

Earlier in March 2026 the JCNSS published a report on ‘Political finance and foreign influence’.^[45] It warned the UK could:

[…] no longer rule out the possibility of foreign states mounting a serious effort to influence political processes, or doing just enough to cast lasting doubt on their integrity. Our evidence suggests the system would be too brittle, permissive, disjointed, slow, retrospective and underpowered to respond adequately. Public trust is already low; it would not take too much to fracture. The government must therefore seize this opportunity to fix key shortcomings.^[46]

The committee made a range of recommendations, including for a clear national lead for protecting UK democracy, changes to the Representation of the People Bill and stronger powers for the Electoral Commission. The government has also yet to respond to this report.

House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published a report entitled ‘Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy’ on 27 March 2026.^[47] The committee argued the “scale and sophistication of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is increasingly recognised as an existential threat to democratic societies”. It said the government should increase its coordination with European and other allies and its funding for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s (FCDO) work in this area. The committee also called on the government to increase funding for the BBC World Service to help counter a potential loss of influence that would “significantly diminish the UK’s soft power and undermine our ability to counter information warfare”. In addition, it recommended the government enhance its public communications on the need for a whole-of-society approach to resilience and establish a centralised National Counter Disinformation Centre to improve coordination and response, similar to the bodies in France and Sweden identified in the Rycroft review.

The committee published the government’s response on 8 June 2026.^[48] The response said the FCDO’s hybrid threats directorate, which leads the department’s work countering disinformation, had been allocated a budget for the current spending review period that “enables sustained and more effective action to counter hybrid threats”. The response also said the government was confident the BBC World Service’s funding allocation would enable the service to “continue to operate effectively and efficiently”. In addition, the government said it would take into account the committee’s recommendation for a dedicated response body within the UK, alongside the conclusions of the Rycroft review.^[49]

House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee

In its 25 July 2025 report on ‘Media literacy’, the House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee argued that “social cohesion is at risk and democracy itself is threatened by inadequate media literacy”.^[50] It called for media literacy to be embedded across the national curriculum, a specific senior minister to drive the delivery of media literacy priorities across government, and a public awareness campaign with simple messaging to boost public understanding of the importance of media literacy.^[51]

In its response to the report, the government agreed about the “importance of clear, overall direction for media literacy work across government” and said it would publish a media literacy vision statement.^[52] It subsequently published a media literacy action plan for the period 2026–29 entitled ‘A safe, informed digital nation’.^[53]

3. Government policy on protecting UK democracy

In addition to the documents cited in section 2 of this briefing, the government has set out a range of policies for countering foreign interference in recent months. These include:

• ‘Restoring trust in our democracy: Our strategy for modern and secure elections’, published in July 2025, included a section focused on protecting elections from interference.^[54] The strategy listed measures the government said it would take forward via the Representation of the People Bill, later introduced in the House of Commons in February 2026.^[55] For overviews of these measures, see: House of Commons Library, ‘Representation of the People Bill 2024–26’, 8 June 2026; ‘Representation of the People Bill: Progress of the bill’, 8 June 2026; and House of Lords Library, ‘King’s Speech 2026: Constitution’, 7 May 2026, pp 3–6.
• The government has said that since March 2025 the Online Safety Act 2023 has “required services to take steps to remove illegal disinformation content”.^[56] It added: “Illegal disinformation content includes state-sponsored disinformation in scope of the foreign interference offence, and disinformation aimed at disrupting elections where it is a criminal offence in scope of the regulatory framework”.
• In a statement made in April 2025, the government said it would bring the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act 2023 into force from July 2025.^[57] The government said the scheme “provides transparency on foreign state influence in the UK; gives the police and MI5 a critical new disruptive tool, with criminal offences for those who fail to comply; and deters those who seek to harm the UK”. For further information, see: Home Office, ‘Guidance on the foreign influence registration scheme (FIRS): Enhanced tier’, 1 April 2025.
• In 2025 the government confirmed Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer had renewed the mandate of the defending democracy taskforce, which “brings together government ministers, representatives from law enforcement and the intelligence community, to coordinate work to protect UK political parties, elected officials and electoral infrastructure”.^[58]
• In November 2025 the government said it had developed a “new counter political interference and espionage action plan to disrupt and deter spying from states like China”.^[59] In June 2026 the government said implementation of the plan continued.^[60]
• In December 2025 Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper reiterated that the UK had sanctioned organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russia’s information warfare.^[61]
• A command paper entitled ‘Protecting what matters: Towards a more confident, cohesive, and resilient United Kingdom’, first published in March 2026, said the government would “increase and improve mechanisms for join-up across government to tackle foreign information manipulation and interference directed at the UK and our partners overseas, from whose experience we can learn important lessons”.^[62] The document said the FCDO would lead on this activity.^[63] It also emphasised the media literacy action plan would “set out cross-government actions to build resilience to misinformation, disinformation and harmful online content”.^[64] The government added that a refreshed national curriculum would also “equip all children with the digital and media literacy skills they need to think critically, challenge false information and engage responsibly online”, with this work being led by the Department for Education.^[65]
• In the May 2026 King’s Speech the government confirmed it would introduce a ‘Tackling State Threats Bill’ to allow ministers to designate organisations as being associated with foreign state threat activity, and make it an offence to support or benefit from them.^[66] The government has since introduced the National Security (State Threats) Bill to Parliament.^[67]

4. Read more

4.1 Recent parliamentary business

• Oral question on ‘Foreign interference in UK democratic processes’, HL Hansard, 17 June 2026, cols 241–4
• Private notice question on ‘Donations to political parties’, HL Hansard, 1 June 2026, cols 640–5
• Oral question on ‘Iranian state-sponsored cyber attacks: Mitigation and preparation’, HL Hansard, 11 March 2026, cols 273–7
• Statement on ‘China: Foreign interference arrests’, HC Hansard, 4 March 2026, cols 813–28; and Statement on ‘Security update’, HL Hansard, 4 March 2026, cols 1306–18
• Oral question on ‘Public trust in national politics’, HL Hansard, 29 January 2026, cols 1058–62
• Oral question on ‘Defending democracy taskforce’, HL Hansard, 12 January 2026, cols 1516–9

4.2 Earlier parliamentary committee reports

• House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, ‘Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms’, 11 July 2025, HC 441 of session 2024–26; and ‘Government and Ofcom responses’, 17 October 2025
• Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘Iran’, 10 July 2025, HC 1116 of session 2024–26; and ‘Reports’, accessed 16 June 2026
• House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee, ‘The future of news’, 25 November 2024, HL Paper 39 of session 2024–26; and ‘Government response’, 29 January 2025
• House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Trusted voices’, 12 April 2024, HC 175 of session 2023–24; and ‘Government response’, 4 November 2024

4.3 Selected parliamentary briefings

• House of Commons Library, ‘Iranian state threat activities in the UK’, 16 June 2026; ‘Chinese state threat activities in the UK’, 10 December 2025; and ‘Countering Russian influence in the UK’, 13 March 2025
• House of Commons Library, ‘What is misinformation?’, 5 May 2026; and ‘Disinformation and its effects on society’, 16 July 2024
• House of Lords Library, ‘Reforming the law on donations to political parties’, 5 February 2026; and ‘Parliamentary democracy and standards in public life in 2023’, 21 December 2023
• House of Commons Library, ‘The impact of foreign interference on security, trade and democracy’, 5 December 2025
• Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘Trust, public engagement and UK Parliament’, 21 May 2025; and ‘Disinformation: Sources, spread and impact’, 26 April 2024

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