Welfare reforms and youth unemployment

Approximate read time: 30 minutes

The House of Lords is scheduled to debate the following motion on 11 June 2026:

Lord Evans of Rainow (Conservative) to move that this House takes note of the economic implications of the government’s approach to welfare reforms and the current levels of youth unemployment.

1. Statistics and indicators relating to welfare, employment and the economy

1.1 Welfare spending

According to the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), total UK welfare spending was £314.9bn in 2024/25, representing 10.7% of UK GDP.^[1] It is forecast to rise to £333.7bn in 2025/26 (10.9% of GDP) and to £408.6bn in 2030/31 (11.2% of GDP).

Welfare spending amounted to 24.4% of government spending in 2024/25, with this anticipated to increase to 25.4% in 2030/31.

The following charts show total UK welfare spending and forecasts in real terms (set at 2026/27 prices) and as a percentage of GDP from 2013/14 to 2030/31. (Please note that the Covid pandemic impacted the welfare, employment and economic time series statistics in this section of the briefing, particularly for the years 2020–21. For example, claimant numbers rose substantially during this period, as noted by the Department for Work and Pensions.^[2] Therefore, the graphs in this section of the briefing often display spikes around this period.)

Figure 1. Total UK welfare spending in real terms (£bn, 2026/27 prices), 2013/14 to 2030/31 (spending and forecast)

Figure 2. Total UK welfare spending as a percentage of GDP, 2013/14 to 2030/31 (spending and forecast)

The DWP stated that welfare spending for Great Britain (Northern Ireland welfare spending is a devolved matter) could be broken down as follows:

• Around 55% of social security expenditure goes to pensioners; in 2025 to 2026 we will spend £177.7bn on benefits for pensioners in Great Britain. This includes spending on the state pension which is forecast to be £146.1bn in 2025 to 2026.
• In 2025 to 2026 we will spend £145.0bn on working age and children welfare. This includes spending on universal credit and its predecessors, and non-DWP welfare spending.
• In 2025 to 2026 we will spend £77.1bn on benefits to support disabled people and people with health conditions, and £37.3bn on housing benefits.^[3]

The following charts show real terms spending and forecasts for some of these benefit areas between 2013/14 to 2030/31.

Figure 3. Real terms welfare spending (£bn, 2026/27 prices) on people of working age and children, and pensioners from 2013/14 to 2030/31 (spending and forecast)

Figure 4. Real terms welfare spending (£bn, 2026/27 prices) on disability and incapacity benefits from 2013/14 to 2030/31 (spending and forecast)

The following table provides figures for certain unemployed welfare claimants across three age ranges, 18–24, 25–49, and 55+, from January 2013 to April 2026. It covers caseload numbers for certain claimants of jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) and some universal credit (UC) claimants.^[4]

Figure 5. Claimant caseloads (thousands) for certain unemployment benefits by age group, January 2013 to April 2026

1.2 Employment statistics

According to the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) most recent labour market figures covering January to March 2026:^[5]

• The UK employment rate for those aged 16–64 was 75% (32.6 million). The rate was the same as last year, but 0.9% lower than the same period in 2019 (pre-Covid restrictions).
• The unemployment rate for those aged 16 and over was 5% (1.8 million).^[6] This was 0.5% higher than the previous year and 1.2% higher than 2019.
• The economic inactivity rate for those aged 16–64 was 20.9% (9.1 million).^[7] This was 0.5% lower than the previous year and similar to the 21% figure reported in 2019.

In addition, the claimant count was around 1.699 million in April 2026.

The following chart shows unemployment rates across different age bands in the January to March period from 2016 to 2026.

Figure 6. Unemployment rate (%) by age band, recorded annually in January to March from 2016 to 2026

On 28 May 2026, the ONS published its latest figures for young people not in education, employment or training (NEET).^[8]

It stated that:

There were 1,012,000 young people [aged 16–24] who were NEET in January to March 2026, an increase of 89,000 on the year and 55,000 on the quarter. This increase was largely among young men, with an increase of 55,000 on the year, as well as an increase among young women of 34,000 on the year. Of the total number of young people who were NEET, 553,000 were young men and 459,000 were young women.^[9]

The total represented 13.5% of all people aged 16–24 years, 14.4% of young men and 12.5% of young women. An estimated 400,000 were classed as unemployed NEETs for the period (therefore they were actively looking for work).

The below graph shows the NEET rate over time.^[10]

Figure 7. Percentage of 16–24-year-olds who were NEET, recorded January to March from 2019 to 2026

1.3 Economic outlook

The Office for Budget Responsibility’s March 2026 ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’ contains commentary on the UK’s economic conditions. For example, it highlighted that the UK’s real GDP growth has been persistently weak since the initial recovery from the pandemic, and that “UK government borrowing and debt are currently at elevated levels compared to recent history and to the average of advanced economies”.^[11] The OBR did project some improvement in productivity and GDP growth over the forecast period:

We assume that productivity growth will pick up to 1 percent in the medium term, while labour supply growth declines from recent highs—driven by lower net migration and population ageing—to ½ a percent by 2030. Near-term cyclical weakness means we expect real GDP growth to slow from 1.4 percent in 2025 to 1.1 per cent in 2026, before averaging 1.6 percent a year over the rest of the forecast. A loosening labour market and falling energy and food price inflation contribute to inflation reaching its 2 percent target in late 2026.

Public sector net borrowing is projected to fall in the central forecast from 5.2 percent of GDP in 2024–25 to 4.3 percent of GDP this year and then to 1.6 percent of GDP in 2030–31. This is a slightly faster pace of decline than in the November forecast, with borrowing revised down by £8bn in 2030–31 compared to November, largely due to an improved receipts forecast. This includes the impact of the policies announced since the previous forecast which raise borrowing by an average of £4bn a year from next year onwards. Public sector net debt is expected to be broadly stable over the forecast and settle at a projected 95 percent of GDP in the early 2030s, which would be marginally lower than forecast in November.^[12]

The below OBR chart shows UK GDP growth over recent years and projections up to 2030.

Figure 8. OBR estimates for GDP growth (%) from 2000 to 2030

The OBR set out a number of risks and uncertainties affecting its projections, which included concerns about welfare spending and employment figures. On unemployment, it stated:

In our central forecast, the unemployment rate rises to 5 ¹⁄₃ percent before falling back to its assumed equilibrium rate of just over 4 percent. If unemployment fell more sharply and returned to its equilibrium rate in 2027–28, two years earlier than our central forecast, borrowing could be lower by £16bn a year on average from 2026–27. Conversely, if the peak were higher at almost 7 percent, borrowing could be an average of £20bn a year higher than our central forecast.^[13]

On welfare spending, it stated:

A further risk is the future costs of welfare spending following the sharp growth of disability and health caseloads since the pandemic. We continue to assume in the forecast that incapacity benefits caseloads will rise but at a slower pace than recently, with annual caseload growth falling to 1.3 percent in 2030–31 from the 3 percent expected over the next three years and the 7 percent average since the pandemic. This moderation in health-related caseload growth is highly uncertain.^[14]

Looking at the anticipated rises in welfare spending over the coming years (as highlighted by the DWP), the OBR said the main drivers were pension and health-related benefits. It stated:

• Larger state pension cohorts and the triple lock uprating together increase pensioner spending by 0.6 percent of GDP by 2030–31. This is partly offset by the rise in the state pension age from 66 to 67 between 2026 and 2028, which reduces pensioner spending by roughly 0.3 percent of GDP in 2030–31.
• Rising caseloads drive higher health-related spending. Between 2024–25 and 2030–31, incapacity caseloads are forecast to rise by 0.6mn (from 3.4mn to 4.0mn) and disability caseloads by 2.3mn (from 6.5mn to 8.8mn).^[15]

Other key risks and uncertainties for the UK’s economic outlook mentioned by the OBR included:^[16]

• geopolitics and global trading conditions (for example, its impact on inflation and GDP)
• productivity growth (the OBR stated that changes in productivity of 0.5 percent either way could significantly impact the government’s borrowing figures)
• equity prices and gilt yields (for example, a significant fall in UK and global equity prices would reduce UK GDP)
• a higher tax-to-GDP ratio could lead to behavioural changes reducing certain tax receipts
• factors impacting departmental spending (including, for example, increased defence spending, lower asylum accommodation costs and NHS workforce challenges)

In addition, the OBR’s November 2025 ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’ set out its latest projections on the government meeting its ‘welfare cap’. The cap, introduced in 2014, sets limits for government spending on certain social security benefits and tax credits, and is formally assessed in the final year of a given parliament.^[17] The cap, and the annual pathway to the cap, is set by HM Treasury.

Commenting on the cap in November 2025, the OBR predicted it would be met by a margin of £1.9bn:

The government set a welfare cap of £194.5bn in 2029–30 at the October 2024 forecast, and a margin for the cap that rises each year to reach 5 percent in 2029–30. Spending within the welfare cap in 2029–30 has risen by £12bn in this forecast, largely due to the reversal of the welfare measures announced in March and increased disability caseloads. This results in the welfare cap being on course to be met but only narrowly (by £1.9bn) once the margin is included.^[18]

The previous cap, set for 2024–25 by the Conservative government, was breached (with the OBR forecasting an overspend of £8.6bn).^[19] As a result, the House of Commons debated a motion on the breach on 29 January 2025.^[20]

2. Government welfare policy and reforms

In its 2024 general election manifesto, Labour committed to reviewing UC and reforming the system of employment support. It stated:

Good work will be the foundation of our approach to tackling poverty and inequality. We will create more good jobs, reform employment support, and make work pay so that many more people benefit from the dignity and purpose of work.

Labour is committed to reviewing universal credit so that it makes work pay and tackles poverty. We want to end mass dependence on emergency food parcels, which is a moral scar on our society.^[21]

Regarding young people who are NEET, Labour pledged the introduction of a youth guarantee to provide training, apprenticeships and other support.^[22] The manifesto also committed to guaranteed work experience in schools and improved careers guidance.

Thus far, the Labour government has introduced welfare reforms including:

• Introducing a lower UC health element rate for new claimants of £217.26 per month from 6 April 2026 and freezing this rate from 2027/28 to 2029/30 (however, those with the most serious conditions would still receive the higher rate (£429.80 per month)). The government explained this was to tackle “perverse incentives that discourage work and trap people on long-term benefits”.^[23] For further information and background, see: House of Lords Library, ‘Universal Credit Bill’ (17 July 2025).
• Legislating to increase the UC standard allowance rates above the rate of consumer price index inflation for each year between 2026/27 and 2029/30. The government said this was to help those looking for work deal with recent increases in the cost of living.^[24]
• Removing the ‘two-child limit’ in the child element of UC from 6 April 2026. This means that, subject to benefit cap limits, households will be eligible for the child element of UC for third and successive children. For more information, see: House of Lords Library, ‘Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill’ (27 February 2026).
• Introducing the ‘right to try’ work, meaning that undertaking work or volunteering opportunities will not, on its own, lead to a reassessment of a benefit award. The government intends for this to support people testing their ability to work in a “safe and predictable way”, strengthening the protections for those with disabilities and long-term health conditions.^[25]

In addition, the government has introduced and is rolling out components of its youth guarantee. The youth guarantee includes:^[26]

• Jobs guarantee. This provides six months of paid work to eligible 18–21-year-olds who have been receiving UC and looking for work for 18 months. The government has committed to expand this to 18–24-year-olds from autumn 2026.
• Youth jobs grant. Businesses will receive £3,000 for every young person they hire aged 18–24 who has been on UC and looking for work for six months.
• Apprenticeships measures. The government has introduced measures to improve take-up of apprenticeships, including the introduction of foundation apprenticeships and a financial incentive of £2,000 for new employees aged 16–24 taken on by an SME.
• Improved education and careers support. This includes guaranteed college or further education places, dedicated support sessions for young UC claimants and investment in youth hubs that provide work coaches.

Most of the government measures highlighted above were initially set out in or link to the government’s ‘Get Britain working’ policies. This included a white paper published in November 2024, ‘Get Britain working white paper’, and a related consultation (launched in March 2025) on reforming work-related benefits and support.^[27] The government published its consultation response on 30 October 2025: ‘Government response to the pathways to work consultation’.

In these policy documents the government also set out plans to reform other health-related benefits and assessments. For example, it has said it plans to abolish the work capability assessment (which determines conditions and eligibility for elements of UC and employment support allowance) from 2028. Instead, as the government explained, any “extra financial support for health conditions in UC will be assessed via a single assessment—the personal independence payment (PIP) assessment—and be based on the impact of disability on daily living, not on capacity to work”.^[28]

In addition, the government had planned to make reforms to PIP eligibility.^[29] It initially intended to legislate to change the eligibility requirement so that a minimum of four points must be scored on one PIP daily living activity to receive the daily living element of the benefit.^[30] This would have meant that those who scored the lowest points on each of the PIP daily living activities would lose their entitlement. However, this planned change was dropped by the government due to opposition and criticism, including from many Labour MPs, during the passage of the Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Bill (the bill instead became the Universal Credit Act 2025).

The government has said it will await the findings of the Timms review before taking further action in this area.^[31] The Timms review, led by Minister for Social Security and Disability Stephen Timms, was launched in June 2025 and is looking into possible reforms to PIP to ensure it is “fair” and helps support disabled people, including through employment.^[32] The government has said it will also be working closely with disabled people, the organisations that represent them, and other experts on the development of policy in this area. The review aims to report in autumn 2026.

In addition, the government has stated that it is running a review of UC. Minister of State in the Department for Work and Pensions Baroness Sherlock gave further details on this in July 2025:

This government is committed to ensuring UC is fit for the future so that it drives up living standards, reduces poverty and makes work pay. Through this work, the UC review is considering the support across three themes:

• tackling poverty and helping people manage their money
• making work pay and improving work incentives
• and maximising UC’s potential and its impact on customers^[33]

3. Commentary and reports on welfare reform and youth employment

3.1 Milburn review of young economic inactivity

Due to concerns about the number of young people who are NEET, the government commissioned a review into the drivers of youth economic inactivity by Alan Milburn (former Labour MP and health secretary). An interim report from the review was published on 28 May 2026.^[34]

The report described the work situation for young people as getting worse, and said that is no longer “simply a question of temporary youth unemployment”.^[35] Instead, it said there was a deeper problem of “youth detachment from the labour market” and that the UK was “at risk of a lost generation”.

Some key facts and information flagged in the report included:^[36]

• Six in 10 young people who are NEET today have never had a job, up from four in 10 in 2005
• forecasts indicate the youth NEET rate could increase to over 16%, or more than 1.25 million young people, within five years
• 84% of NEET young people said they wanted to find a job, education or training
• there has been a 1.6mn decline in the number of lower and mid-level jobs over the past 20 years, disproportionately affecting younger people
• the UK’s situation has worsened compared to other countries: 10 years ago rates were similar between the UK and EU countries, but in 2025 only Romania recorded a higher youth NEET rate than the UK
• the cumulative annual cost of almost 1 million NEET young people was estimated at £125bn
• the report estimated that for every £1 that the DWP spent on employment support for young people in 2024/25, around £25 was spent on benefits for young people

The report highlighted possible reasons for the young NEET issues, including an increasing proportion of young people reporting a health condition, fewer entry-level roles, and a health, benefit and education system that is outdated and not doing enough to promote labour market participation. The report also stressed that it was not an issue with young people themselves. It said that the review’s work with young people had indicated they were trying hard to enter the job market and were frustrated by the barriers and rejections they were facing and the wider perception of them.

Specifically addressing the welfare system, the report stated that approximately £8bn a year was spent on UC or PIP for young people. However, it said that less than half the money spent on key benefits for young people had any participation support or requirements attached. The report described the negative impact this was having:

For a young person with a health condition who is unemployed and potentially seeking work, taking a pathway to inactivity can offer higher income, less hassle and lower risk. This is a perverse incentive. It is the polar opposite of what a participation-first welfare system should be providing and means more and more people are being trapped on benefits. Perhaps unsurprisingly their employment prospects are deteriorating as a result. Today, of those who first claimed a health and disability benefit aged 16 to 24 almost half are not in work or education fifteen years later. This is a catastrophic failure.^[37]

Overall, the report viewed the welfare system as inappropriately designed for younger people. It said that although financial support for those that need it was essential, the system was not doing enough to actively support work participation, despite the government taking some positive steps with its youth guarantee and pathways to work policies.

The report provided further detail on several areas it felt the welfare system was not working well for young people, including:^[38]

• failing to prioritise early intervention to prevent young people becoming NEET (for example, by identifying those who may be at risk at a young age—such as those awarded child disability living allowance—and acting upon it)
• the support for young people who are sick and disabled is not sufficient for their particular needs (for example, their needs are different to older people)
• the incentives and risks for those on certain benefits (such as health-related UC claimants) puts off work participation (for example, taking on work can seem “overwhelming” and some may fear the financial repercussions of employment not working out and having to try to go through the health-related benefits process again)
• assessment processes, particularly for mental health-related conditions, are not good enough and are resulting in more young people staying on those benefits “permanently”

However, the report stressed that welfare reform on its own would not resolve the issue. Instead, it reiterated that it required looking at the “whole system”.

The report said that the review was not making recommendations at this stage. Instead, the review’s author, Alan Milburn, stated:

The conclusion I have reached is stark. Britain has institutions for young people, but it does not have a participation system that is capable of taking young people from the world of education into the world of work. The labour market does not provide enough early entry opportunities. The education system produces qualifications but does not guarantee transitions. The health system is configured for treatment, not participation. The welfare system replaces income but does not build pathways.

[…]

This interim report does not pretend to contain the final answer. It is a diagnosis. It sets out who young people who are NEET are, what they face, why the systems around them fail, and what the consequences are. It follows the journey from risk to detachment: through family and early years, school and skills, the labour market, health, welfare and the architecture that is meant to join them together. Too much past policy has leapt to programmes before facing the deeper design failure beneath them. The final report will set out what a coherent participation system for early adulthood should look like.

Britain has had no shortage of initiatives. Many have helped the individuals they reached. Some have been excellent. But none has altered the architecture that produces sustained disengagement. Another short-term programme layered on top of fragmentation will not be enough. We need to change the way the system works.^[39]

3.2 Youth Futures Foundation report on youth guarantee

In September 2025, the Youth Futures Foundation (a charity focused on youth employment and marginalised young people) published a report considering youth employment in the context of the government’s youth guarantee. As with Alan Milburn’s report, it highlighted high youth NEET numbers, including:^[40]

• around 250,000 young people who were claiming UC and wanted better support to find work
• nearly 200,000 who were claiming benefits but assessed as too ill to work; it said these young people had little or no contact with Jobcentre Plus or wider help
• around 400,000 NEET young people who were not claiming benefits and risked missing out on support altogether
• disparities in claimant and NEET numbers across areas; for example, there were higher youth claimant levels in Blackpool and Hartlepool

In addition, the report also noted that some of the rise in youth NEET numbers was being driven by increases in those claiming certain health-related benefits.

The report said the benefits system would play a key role in the success of the youth guarantee. However, it highlighted some issues in the benefits and employment support system that needed addressing, including negative experiences of young people dealing with Jobcentre Plus staff (it noted the high caseloads and turnover the organisation faced, and said this often led to a lack of consistency and adequately tailored support for young people) and a lack of cross-departmental working between the DWP and other departments or government agencies.

The report then set out some recommendations to support the success of the youth guarantee, including:

• improving the support that can be provided by work coaches at Jobcentre Plus; for example, by introducing designated leads focused on the support provided to young people or specialist youth employment coaches
• reviewing young people’s journeys and engagement points through the benefits system to identify possible areas of improvement
• running a positive marketing campaign about the youth guarantee, that is aimed at and focuses on the strengths and potential of young people
• improving the consistency of support provided through the benefits system so it is less affected by age, health conditions or geography
• scrapping proposals to delay access to the health element of UC until someone is aged 22 (this was part of the government’s ‘Pathways to work’ consultation and it has not confirmed whether it is pursuing this idea)
• improving how the benefits system supports skills and progression by enabling and recognising participation in longer-term learning or training

3.3 Centre for Policy Studies report on welfare reform

A November 2025 report from the Centre for Policy Studies, chaired by the Conservative MP and former work and pensions secretary Ian Duncan Smith, expressed concern about welfare spending and urged “serious reform”.^[41]

Although it welcomed some of the government’s policies on apprenticeships and the youth guarantee, it said these changes were undermined by the youth NEET numbers, failure to reduce health-related benefit claims and the abolition of the two-child limit in UC.^[42] For example, it claimed:

The prime minister’s decision to back down from tightening the eligibility criteria for PIP costs the Treasury £3.9bn in 2029/30. Consequently, spending on welfare will now be £91.5bn higher in 2030/31 than it was in 2024/25, largely due to a significant rise in disability and incapacity benefits, with working-age spending for such benefits £22.2bn higher.^[43]

The report argued that although the government had successfully increased fiscal headroom and “satisfied markets”, it had done so by “drawing more revenue from working households, while boosting the incomes of welfare recipients”.^[44] The report also warned of the harm and “waste in human potential” of those spending their lives on welfare.^[45]

The report called for the government to:^[46]

• Help more young people into work by speeding up the offering of youth guarantee-related work placements and introducing a “£700mn effective tax cut worth 30 percent of a NEET’s salary to the businesses hiring them”.
• Reduce or remove welfare support for those with milder anxiety, depression or ADHD. It estimated this would save £7.4bn by 2029/30 and said that £1bn of this should be “reinvested in radically expanded NHS talking therapies, social prescribing and employment support”.
• Tackle homelessness by better utilising Housing First,^[47] a homelessness intervention strategy, which it claimed gives a 2:1 return on investment.
• Use international student levy funds to pay for a priority apprenticeship bursary supporting apprenticeships in key shortage occupations within the construction industry.

3.4 Work and Pensions Committee

The House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee is currently conducting an inquiry on youth employment, education and training.^[48] At the time of writing, it had not published a report but had published some evidence and correspondence. In addition, the committee has published other reports on different aspects of welfare and employment support; these can be found on the committee’s webpages.^[49]

One of the committee’s reports, published in July 2025, considered the government’s ‘Get Britain working’ and ‘Pathways to work’ proposals.^[50] Commenting on the background to the policies, the committee noted “widespread concern about the growing cost of health-related welfare”.^[51] It agreed this was concerning and that the benefit system “urgently needs reforming, especially given the very low rate at which those on UC health move into employment”. However, the committee also said it could not ignore the fact that non-health-related, non-pensioner welfare spending “fell as a share of GDP from 4% in 2009–10 to 2.6% in 2023–24 and that overall non-pensioner welfare spending is not much higher than it was in 2007”.

The committee also agreed that aspects of the incapacity benefits system did not work well enough at encouraging people into work. It said the system focused too much on what people cannot do and on assessing eligibility for benefits, rather than supporting them into work. The committee acknowledged that “disparity in rates and conditionality rules has no doubt impacted on economic inactivity”.^[52] It said that a major factor in dealing with this issue was addressing the barriers for engaging with employment support or attempting to move into work, and believed this was recognised by the government.

The committee then considered some of the government’s proposals for reform.^[53] For example, it discussed the government’s initial plans for UC and PIP changes, and welcomed the fact these were scaled back. It also looked at plans to review the PIP assessment and abolish the work capability assessment (WCA).

The committee agreed PIP assessments needed modernising and reported evidence that claimants found them traumatic and that assessors lacked expertise in the conditions being assessed. The report noted the government’s commitment to co-produce the PIP review with disabled people and said the committee would follow these developments carefully.

The committee said the most impactful change could be the decision to abolish the WCA in 2028 and link UC health to receipt of the daily living component of PIP. It stated this move was generally opposed in evidence; partly on the grounds that the WCA and the PIP assessment were designed to measure different things and that the PIP assessment could not therefore perform both functions. However, the committee noted the government’s explicit plan to “decouple access to UC health from an assessment of a person’s capacity for work” and said it was “cautiously supportive of this ambition”.^[54] The committee detailed its and the government’s stance as follows:

The government says that once a person is found to have limited capability for work or work-related activity after undergoing a WCA, they are simply “parked” on benefits and not required to engage with work coach support. Once it has removed the WCA, it says nearly all disabled people will be expected, as a condition of their benefit, to attend ‘support conversations’ to discuss what support is available. This was interpreted by much of the evidence as a significant extension of conditionality for disabled people. The government appears to be conscious of how unhelpful strict conditionality can be, however, and says disabled people will never be required to undertake work or work-related activity. The minister repeatedly told us as well that employment support would only ever be voluntary. On this basis, we are cautiously optimistic that this reform will be a positive one, although we recommend that the government still clarify its precise intentions for the new conditionality regime, particularly by spelling out exactly what requirements beyond support conversations a disabled person might have to meet.^[55]

The government published its response to the report in October 2025. It said it supported the committee’s view that the incapacity benefit system was not working well enough and said it remained committed to its principles for reform.^[56] It stressed that work was ongoing about how many of these proposed reforms would be progressed.

4. Read more

• Debate on ‘Youth unemployment’, HC Hansard, 17 March 2026, cols 789–809
• Oral question on ‘Welfare spending: Economic impact’, HC Hansard, 8 December 2025, cols 2–3
• House of Commons Library, ‘Youth unemployment statistics’, 19 May 2026
• Office for Budget Responsibility, ‘Welfare trends report: October 2024’, 10 October 2024
• Institute for Fiscal Studies, ‘Why has the NEET rate risen? Understanding trends and drivers using administrative data’, 19 May 2026
• Youth Futures Foundation and RAND Europe, ‘What works in reducing NEET rates: A comparative study’, November 2025

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Image by J J Ellison on Wikimedia Commons.