Conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding: Role of the UN and UK

Approximate read time: 25 minutes

The House of Lords is scheduled to debate the following motion on 29 October 2026:

Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale (Labour) to move that this House takes note of the impact of mediation and conflict prevention globally, and the role of the United Kingdom in peacebuilding.

1. Key points

• The global security environment has been deteriorating in recent years. The UN reported a rise in armed conflicts over the past decade, while 2025 saw 65 active state-based conflicts across 35 countries, the highest number recorded since 1946. These trends have renewed international calls for greater emphasis on conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding.
• The UN has increasingly prioritised conflict prevention and sustaining peace, arguing that preventing conflict saves lives, protects development gains and is more cost-effective than responding after violence has occurred. In 2025, the UN completed a review of its peacebuilding architecture, resulting in reforms intended to strengthen peacebuilding institutions, support nationally led prevention strategies and improve financing arrangements.
• Successive UK governments have argued that instability overseas can affect UK national security through threats such as terrorism, organised crime, displacement and economic disruption. As a result, conflict prevention and peacebuilding have remained objectives of UK foreign, development and security policy, including through engagement with the UN and other international organisations.
• The UK continues to support UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities through diplomatic engagement and financial contributions. However, changes to the UK’s aid budget and the refocusing of conflict-related funding programmes have prompted debate about the UK’s future capacity to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding internationally.
• Commentators and parliamentary committees have generally described the UK as a longstanding advocate of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, but have raised concerns about reduced development spending, shorter-term funding arrangements and whether sufficient resources are available to sustain the UK’s influence and effectiveness in this area.

2. Geopolitical and security context

Calls for prioritising conflict prevention and mediation have grown as international organisations and governments face a prolonged deterioration in the global security environment. In 2023, the UN reported there had been a “surge in the number of armed conflicts in the past decade that reversed a 20-year decline”.^[1] According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2025 was one of the most violent years since the Cold War, with 65 active state-based conflicts across 35 countries, the highest number recorded since 1946.^[2] Interstate conflicts (conflicts between states) also increased: in 2025 there were eight international conflicts, a doubling of the number in 2024. However, there was a slight decrease in the number of non-state conflicts, with 79 reported in 2024 and 75 in 2025.

Reports from the UN and the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee argue conflicts are occurring against the context of geopolitical polarisation and competition, growing militarisation, weaponising of new and emerging technologies and the effects of climate change.^[3] Reports state this is exacerbated in many places by the increase of non-state armed groups connected to criminal and terrorist networks.

UN Secretary-General (SG) António Guterres has repeatedly called for states to prioritise conflict prevention, arguing the evidence is “staggering”: it saves lives, safeguards development gains and is cost-effective.^[4]

3. UN’s role in mediation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding

3.1 Development of the UN’s approach

The UN charter places the peaceful settlement of disputes at the centre of its system. Article 33 calls on parties to disputes which are “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” to seek resolution through “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement” and other “peaceful means”.^[5]

In ‘An agenda for peace’ (1992), the then UN SG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, introduced a framework comprising preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.^[6]

In 2016, the UN general assembly and security council adopted parallel resolutions introducing the concept of “sustaining peace” as a core principle of UN peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy.^[7] The resolutions expanded the understanding of peacebuilding beyond post-conflict recovery to include prevention of conflict outbreak, escalation and recurrence, and emphasised stronger links between peace, development and human rights.

Successive SG periodic reports reviewing the implementation of the sustaining peace agenda have reinforced this approach, most recently in the SG’s 2024 report. Information on the reforms recommended in the 2024 report can be found in section 3.3 of this briefing.

3.2 Current UN prevention and mediation activities and peacebuilding architecture

Preventive diplomacy and mediation

The current SG, António Guterres, has repeatedly stated his vision to centre the UN’s work on peace and security around prevention and through a “surge in diplomacy for peace”.^[8]

The UN defines preventive diplomacy as “diplomatic action to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur”.^[9] The security council is the UN organ with prime responsibility for peace and security, while the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) provides conflict analysis, planning and support to the work of peace envoys and oversees field-based political missions. The UN has regional offices covering central Africa, west Africa and central Asia with explicit mandates for preventive diplomacy.

The DPPA’s mediation support unit (MSU), established in 2006, works with the department’s regional divisions to plan and support mediation efforts in the field.^[10] The MSU’s functions include advisory, financial and logistical support to peace processes; strengthening mediation capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations; and information and knowledge sharing.

The DPPA provides support to the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation, established by António Guterres in 2017. The board consists of current and former global leaders, senior officials and experts that back specific mediation efforts.

UN peacebuilding architecture

The UN’s peacebuilding architecture comprises:^[11]

• Peacebuilding Commission (PBC): Established by the general assembly and security council in 2005, it acts as an intergovernmental advisory body, bringing together member states, financial institutions and regional organisations.
• Peacebuilding fund (PBF): The SG’s principal financial mechanism to sustain peace in situations at risk. It supports activities related to conflict prevention, reconciliation and institution-building.
• Peacebuilding Support Office: Now integrated into the DPPA, it is responsible for managing the PBF, supporting the PBC’s work and helping to coordinate implementation across the UN system.

In 2025, the UN completed a review of its peacebuilding architecture (PBAR). This is a process undertaken every five years to “strengthen and refine UN peacebuilding efforts worldwide”.^[12] It is intended to provide member states, UN entities, civil society and other stakeholders the opportunity to contribute to discussions on the future development of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture.

The aim of the 2025 review was to further improve the implementation and impact of peacebuilding activities at the field level.^[13] The review resulted in twin resolutions of the UN general assembly and security council containing several new provisions aimed at enhancing the capacity of the UN’s peacebuilding institutions.^[14] Further information on these provisions can be found in section 3.3 of this briefing.

3.3 UN’s response to the geopolitical situation: Proposals for reform to the peacebuilding architecture

UN assessment of the geopolitical and global security environment

Recent UN reports argue the geopolitical landscape has shifted and become more fragmented. The UN contends the world is at an “inflection point”, where the post-Cold War period is over and a move to a “new global order is under way”.^[15]. It suggests that this “moment of transition” is characterised by:

• Increasingly fragmented power dynamics, as new centres of influence emerge, new economic blocs form, and existing axes of contestation are redefined.
• Greater competition among major powers and declining trust between the global north and global south, with a number of states seeking to enhance their strategic autonomy.
• National security doctrines that signal an intensification of geopolitical competition. The UN argues arms control frameworks and crisis management arrangements have eroded and there has been a re-emergence of nuclear conflict as part of public discourse.
• Geostrategic competition driving geoeconomic fragmentation, with growing fractures in trade, finance and communications; increasing concerns about the transfer of technologies such as semiconductors; and efforts to secure access to strategic commodities, including rare earth minerals.

The UN argues that more than in any previous era, states are unable to “insulate themselves from cross-boundary sources” of instability and insecurity.^[16] It suggests that in the changing geopolitical environment, new transitional threats are emerging, including:^[17]

• Changing nature of armed conflict, with interstate conflicts becoming increasingly internationalised and a rise in non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations. The UN contends the “growing complexity of the conflict environment” has made conflict resolution more difficult.
• Persistent violence outside of armed conflicts, with terrorism remaining a global threat and organised crime increasingly responsible for deaths.
• Weaponisation of new and emerging technologies, including drones, digital technologies, AI, quantum technologies, and software tools capable of spreading disinformation instantly.
• Rising inequalities within and among nations in areas such as finance, trade, technology and food security.
• Climate change emergency, with its effects creating “uneven suffering”.

The UN has argued that multilateralism must recognise the shifts in the world order and adjust to the increasingly fragmented geopolitical and security environment.^[18]

This assessment was echoed in the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report ‘The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage’ (21 September 2025). It argued multilateral institutions such as the UN have found themselves “exploitable” in an era of increasing “great power politics and geopolitical fragmentation”.^[19] The committee pointed to the increasing polarisation of the UN security council which it said had amplified the risk that crucial decisions on conflict prevention and peacebuilding were not made.

The committee warned the UN had become less central to conflict resolution processes and mediation.^[20] It attributed this partly to the rise in bilaterial and regional conflict resolution. However, the committee believed UN’s structures should continue to be used. It argued the “international community is strongest together” and a peace agreed by “consensus of the many is one which is firm and lasting”.

Recent UN policy approach: Universality and national ownership

UN General-Secretary António Guterres has repeatedly called on member states to prioritise conflict prevention. He has argued there needs to be a shift in approaching prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace that is grounded in two interlinked principles: universality and national ownership.^[21] The SG’s 2024 report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace reasoned this shift responds to the “reality that instability, violence and the potential for conflict are not restricted to only a few states”. The report argued member states have primary responsibility to prevent conflict and build peace because as sovereign entities they have the “prerogative to define the legal, institutional and strategic framework”. The UN has argued the new approach to prevention and peace building should include:^[22]

• Member states developing prevention strategies with cross-border dimensions. These should include global partnerships and the development of “robust” regional frameworks and organisations.
• A focus on building national capacities and infrastructures for peace, including community-driven approaches through partnerships, education and sharing of good practices.
• Strengthening the “toolbox for networked multilateralism”. The UN calls for a universal and more effective approach. It states the UN, regional partners and other actors have developed a diverse toolbox consisting of mediation support, action to promote disarmament and arms control, promotion of human rights and engagement of peace operations. It argues the “driving force” for a new multilateralism must be diplomacy.
• Comprehensive approaches centred on a political strategy at the “core” of responses to violence, prioritised over securitised responses.
• A key role for young people and women in identifying solutions and participating in decision-making processes.
• Financial investment in prevention both by member states and international financial institutions.
• An effective and impartial UN secretariat.

The UN says such approaches should be underpinned by sustainable resources, national ownership and leadership, “all the while being guided by a strong commitment to human rights to effectively address the root causes of crisis”.^[23]

At the September 2024 UN ‘Summit for the future’, world leaders committed to adapting peace operations to “better respond to existing challenges and new realities”.^[24] The ‘pact for the future’, adopted at the summit, included the following measures:

• calling on the UN security council to ensure that peace operations are “guided by political strategies, deployed with clear, sequenced and prioritised mandates that are realistic and achievable, exit strategies and viable transition plans, and as part of a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace in full compliance with international law and the charter”
• taking “concrete steps” to ensure the safety and security of personnel on peace operations and improve their access to health facilities, including mental health
• requesting that the UN SG undertake a review of the future of all forms of peacekeeping operations

UN proposals for reform to the peacebuilding architecture: 2025 review

The formal process for the UN’s 2025 ‘Peacebuilding architecture review’ concluded on 26 November 2025, when the UN general assembly and security council unanimously adopted twin resolutions.^[25]

Under the review’s terms of reference, its purpose was to conduct a comprehensive review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture and look at further improving the UN’s work on peacebuilding and sustaining peace with an emphasis on implementation and impact at the field level.^[26]

The UN resolutions adopting the review recognised:^[27]

• investing in conflict prevention is “a highly-cost effective solution and results in saving lives, stabilising economies and reducing the need for costly military responses”
• the vital role of the UN in preventing conflicts, in assisting parties to end hostilities and post-conflict reconstruction
• conflict prevention should be nationally led and owned
• peacebuilding is an “inherently political process”

The resolutions set out several recommendations made by the review to strengthen the peacebuilding architecture, including:

• Strengthening the PBC: The resolutions emphasised aims to enhance the PBC’s mandate, particularly its convening and advisory roles. It included language advocating closer cooperation with UN organs including the security council and general assembly, as well as more “systematic engagement” with regional and subregional organisations. In addition, the resolutions called for the PBC to establish a “detailed, predictable and flexible annual programme of work”. It also decided there would be an annual “peacebuilding week”, which would take place in June.
• Supporting national prevention strategies: The resolutions called for the PBC, in line with its mandate, to assist member states in promoting, developing and implementing their national strategies; inviting international institutions and regional banks to engage on these strategies at the request of the country concerned; monitoring and assessing the implementation of these strategies.
• Peacebuilding financing: The resolutions encouraged the PBC to establish regular, strategic dialogue with the PBF to support improved alignment and information sharing. It also called on the SG to consider how the PBF can enhance its support to relevant countries transition from peace operations in accordance with their priorities and to use the PBF to support countries on the basis of the principles of national leadership and ownership.

Since the adoption of the UN’s 2025 peacebuilding architecture review, commentary has generally welcomed its renewed emphasis on conflict prevention while highlighting challenges to its implementation.

Following the inaugural annual peacebuilding week in June 2026, the International Peace Institute (IPI) suggested the review has helped consolidate a consensus around prevention and sustaining peace but warned that translating commitments into practice will require greater political support and financing. It argued prevention was “not only a technical discipline of frameworks and finance”: it required “political commitment, coalition building, mutual accountability, and the capacity to sustain collective action over time”.^[28]

In further analysis following the peacebuilding week, the IPI argued discussions during the week revealed the importance of linking top-down, nationally led peacebuilding approaches with bottom-up, community-level efforts.^[29] It argued the PBC has had limited success in this area and “will need to explore ways to address this challenge”. At a general assembly meeting, timed to coincide with the peacebuilding week in June, the Norwegian representative called for greater support for locally led peacebuilding, stronger national ownership and increased use of UN country teams and resident coordinators. They described the review as a “baseline for ambitions, not a ceiling”. At the same meeting, Australia’s representative (also speaking for Canada and New Zealand) argued the PBC was uniquely placed to provide “sustained political accompaniment” to national peacebuilding efforts and to keep international attention focused on at-risk situations.^[30]

Germany’s representative, a former chair of the PBC, argued a key achievement of 2025 was the strengthening of the commission’s advisory role.^[31] He stated the PBC has provided written advice to the security council on issues such as adaptability in peace operations, electoral processes, and women, peace and security. It also increased its engagement with the general assembly and the Economic and Social Council, “demonstrating its growing role as a bridge across the United Nations”.^[32]

4. UK’s approach to peacebuilding

4.1 Strategic framework

Successive UK governments have argued that instability overseas directly affects UK national security and domestic interests through threats such as terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, migration and economic disruption.^[33] Several governments have therefore identified conflict prevention as a priority and highlighted the UK’s commitment in supporting peacebuilding efforts globally.

The 2021 ‘Integrated review’, published by Boris Johnson’s Conservative government, identified reducing conflict and instability as a government priority. It committed the UK to a more integrated approach, placing “greater emphasis on addressing the drivers of conflict (such as grievances, political marginalisation and criminal economies), atrocity prevention and strengthening fragile countries’ resilience to external interference”.^[34] It placed a focus on “political approaches to conflict resolution”. The 2023 ‘Integrated review refresh’, published by Rishi Sunak’s Conservative government, updated the 2021 review and reiterated the UK’s commitment to an open and stable international order based on the principles of the UN charter and international law.^[35]

Under Sir Keir Starmer’s premiership, the Labour government reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to conflict resolution and prevention. In evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in April 2025, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) said the government’s approach integrated development, diplomacy and security.^[36] It said the UK government sought to “leverage the whole UN system”, including on risk monitoring and early warning, the deployment of mediation, and peacebuilding. The FCDO said outside the UN, the UK government engaged with other international and regional organisations, including the EU, the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In addition, it stressed its work as part of the “coalition of the willing” to “support peace, the resolution of conflict, and help raise awareness and increase pressure” in regard to Ukraine.

The FCDO also pointed to the UK’s “broader toolkit to prevent and reduce the scale of conflict” which included the disbursal of international finance through the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, regional development banks and private sector investments.^[37]

During Sir Keir Starmer’s premiership, the government’s stated priorities included:^[38]

• Europe: A “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine in line with the UN charter and long-term stability in the west Balkans.
• Middle East: An end to conflict in Gaza, de-escalation and resumption of peace talks in Yemen and inclusive political transition in Syria.
• Africa: An end to conflict and famine in Sudan, de-escalation and a ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo, advancing the political process in Libya, a stable Somalia free from Al-Shabaab.
• Asia: Pushing the Taliban to make progress on its international commitments, especially on women and girls in Afghanistan and ending violence in Myanmar.
• Americas: Support for the peace process in Colombia and for a restoration of stability in Haiti.

Since becoming prime minister in July 2026, Andy Burnham has confirmed the Labour government’s commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.^[39] In a speech at the UN, Mr Burnham argued there needed to be “harder” work to “fight forces of division and instability” and called for “new ways” to bring countries together to overcome these forces.

4.2 UK institutional arrangements

The FCDO is the principal department responsible for UK conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding policy overseas. The primary cross-government fund for conflict-related activity is the UK integrated security fund (ISF).^[40] It replaced the conflict, stability and security fund (CSSF) in 2024.^[41] The ISF is managed from the Cabinet Office and supports programmes delivered by the FCDO and other departments.

In February 2026, the Starmer government said that from 2026/27, it would amend the ISF framework and re-focus its work on five challenges: Russia; Iran; threats emanating from the Asia Pacific region; serious and organised crime; and terrorism.^[42] The government also announced a transfer of responsibility for funding of the UK’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and other multilateral commitments to the FCDO and Ministry of Defence. It said this was “in line with the ISF’s sharper strategic focus on UK national security”. However, it said the ISF would continue to fund wider programming to prevent and/or resolve conflict and instability “where there is a direct link to UK national security”.

4.3 UK support for UN peacebuilding programmes

UK government’s role within the UN

In evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, during Starmer’s premiership, the FCDO said the UK’s priorities in the UN, including in the security council, were “driven by, and align with” the UK government’s priorities.^[43] However, the department noted the “increasing polarisation” within the council made securing agreement “challenging”. The FCDO said the use of the veto had increased, citing Russia’s veto of a draft resolution on the protection of civilians in Sudan, tabled by the UK and Sierra Leone, as an example of the difficulties such actions can pose for peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the FCDO said the council remained able to “agree action on a significant number of conflicts globally”.

It said the UK’s main interactions with the UN peacebuilding and prevention system were multilateral missions to the UN, including projects on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, stabilisation and security and on women, peace and security.^[44]

In its 2025 report on the UK at the UN security council, the committee argued the UK government needed to use the council as a platform to exert influence and that it had a responsibility to “further the resolution of global conflict”.^[45] The committee recognised the rise in bilateral conflict resolution, and the need for the government to adapt to the existing “geopolitical realities”. It recommended the UK government enhance its bilateral partnerships with states such as Qatar and Turkey and that it leverage its relationships with regional groupings. However, the committee stressed that its “first priority” would be to advocate the use of UN mediation, peace and security structures to resolve conflict.

UK funding of UN peacebuilding programmes

In April 2025 the FCDO said the UK government made both voluntary and mandatory contributions to UN programmes.^[46] Between 2013 and 2024, the UK provided an average of about £630m per year in contributions to the UN’s main institutional budget and its Department of Peace Operations (UN-DPO).^[47] Member states are required to make contributions to fund the UN-DPO and are used for peacekeeping missions.^[48] However, states also make voluntary contributions, which include resources such as transportation, as well as financial.

Further information on UK contributions to the UN’s main institutional budget and UN-DPO budget, both mandatory and voluntary, can be found in the House of Commons Library briefing ‘UK funding to UN agencies and potential reforms in 2025’ (29 October 2025). Further information on UK contributions to UN peacekeeping, both financial and personnel, can be found in the House of Lords Library briefing, ‘UK’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations’ (17 December 2024).

The PBF, the SG’s principal financial mechanism for peacebuilding, is primarily funded through voluntary contributions from member states.^[49] As of 1 October 2026, the UK was the seventh largest donor since 2020, having committed a total of $53,109,167.^[50] The largest donor was Germany, which had committed $236,997,762 since 2020. The UK makes contributions to other UN peacebuilding initiatives such as the joint UN Development Programme-DPPA programme on ‘Building national capacities for conflict prevention’.^[51] In 2025, the UK was the third largest contributor to the programme.

4.4 Assessment of UK peacebuilding policy

Analysis of the UK’s approach to and investment in peacebuilding has generally characterised the UK as historically a leading international advocate of conflict prevention and a key supporter of peacebuilding and post-conflict development. However, commentators have also expressed concern that this agenda has become less prominent in recent national strategies and that funding for international development programmes has declined.

In 2022 the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) published an assessment of UK peacebuilding policy. The ICAI found the UK had a long record of addressing the drivers of conflict and investing in peacebuilding and concluded that its programmes had contributed meaningfully to peace and stability.^[52] It also found the UK retained significant expertise.^[53] However, it argued that aid budget reductions had reduced the FCDO’s capacity to lead cooperation efforts and called for greater accountability in the UK’s peacebuilding work to affected people and implementing partners.^[54]

In 2024, the ICAI published a follow-up to its review. It highlighted improvements in cross-FCDO and cross-government coordination, greater attention to learning and specialist expertise, and stronger strategic direction.^[55] However, the ICAI judged the overall response to its peacebuilding recommendations to be mixed. Its principal concerns were that conflict-related programming continued to operate largely on short-term annual funding cycles despite the need for long-term engagement, that the government lacked sufficient strategic focus on countries where it had strong relationships, and that progress on accountability to affected communities had been limited. On funding, the ICAI argued the “unpredictability” after the FCDO’s rounds of budget reductions added to the “uncertainty and short-termism of some programmes, diminishing the potential for results”.

The 2023 Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy report on the CSSF also expressed concern that reduced spending on conflict prevention programmes could affect the UK government’s role in peacekeeping globally.^[56] It argued reduced spending on official development assistance (ODA) would likely “impair the ability of the UK government to anticipate conflict, prevent escalation, and respond effectively to areas of known instability across the world”. The committee argued the government’s approach may be a “false economy”.

Parliamentarians have expressed further concerns about the UK’s future role on global peacekeeping and conflict prevention following the announcement in February 2025 by Sir Keir Starmer’s government that UK aid spending would fall to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI) by 2027 to fund greater spending on defence.^[57] Reflecting these concerns, a number of members speaking during a House of Lords debate on UK diplomacy and conflict resolution in January 2026 argued that development assistance was one of the UK’s most effective instruments for promoting stability and development, thereby helping to prevent conflict.

Baroness Featherstone (Liberal Democrat) argued soft power was one of the “most cost-effective ways to strengthen national security”.^[58] Lord McConnell, the UK government’s special representative for peacebuilding during Gordon Brown’s premiership, advocated a “dedicated budget for conflict prevention”.^[59] He urged the government to prioritise soft power, peacebuilding and conflict prevention within any cuts to the FCDO budget. Lord Bates (Conservative), a former minister at the Department for International Development, suggested the cuts in overseas aid could not only harm the UK’s international reputation but also “undermine the health of our international institutions”.^[60] Closing the debate, minister Lord Lemos said the government’s commitment remained firm but that in the existing geopolitical and security environment, there had to be a change in approach.^[61] He said the government was “backing multilateral development organisations” because that is how “we make the biggest difference”.

In September 2026, Andy Burnham’s government said it continued to review fiscal forecasts and would consider whether conditions allowed a return to the statutory target of spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA in the future.^[62]

The House of Commons Library briefing ‘UK aid: Reducing spending to 0.3% of GNI by 2027/28’ (10 August 2026) provides further information on the planned reduction in aid spending to 0.3%, the government’s plans on managing the cuts and responses in Parliament and the aid sector.

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