Table of contents
- 1. Current state of the conflict skip to link
- 1.1 Russian aggression on the eastern frontlines skip to link
- 1.2 Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory and wider combat operations skip to link
- 1.3 Impact of the conflict on Russian force levels skip to link
- 1.4 Munitions and personnel challenges experienced by the Ukrainian armed forces skip to link
- 1.5 Other notable developments in summer 2024 skip to link
- 2. Update on UK and international backing for Ukraine skip to link
- 3. Potential determinants for the future of the conflict skip to link
Approximate read time: 35 minutes
Recent months have seen fierce conflict in the east of Ukraine in particular, as Russia has aimed to secure key towns and cities in the Donestk region. At the same time, Ukrainian forces continue to occupy significant territory in the Kursk region of Russia following its surprise offensive. Both sides have seen significant casualties and the destruction/loss of military equipment. Russia has experienced particularly heavy casualties in terms of manpower. September 2024 saw the bloodiest month for Russian forces so far, with around 1,271 soldiers killed or badly injured per day. Ukrainian forces too have become stretched following delays in receiving American aid and ongoing recruitment challenges.
International partners, including the UK, continue to send significant aid to Ukraine in both funding and military equipment. The new Labour government has pledged to be steadfast in its support for Ukraine and has announced further measures designed to aid Ukraine’s military effectiveness. The EU, NATO, and the US—the largest donor to Ukraine—have also pledged additional assistance or delivered on earlier commitments.
The future of the conflict is likely to continue to be shaped by the evolving picture on the frontlines and significant international developments. The most significant among the latter is arguably the US presidential election. A second term for former President Trump could have profound implications for Ukraine given cooling Republican support for its cause, though the direction a Trump administration may decide to take is unclear. Russia’s developing relationships with China, Iran and North Korea are also a source for concern. Partly in response to these issues, as well as the ongoing challenges of fighting the war, the Ukrainian administration has reportedly developed a set of proposals for how they believe Russia can be forced to accept terms to end the conflict. Such plans have not yet been made public. Recent speculation indicates they may include proposals to use western-made long-range missiles to strike military targets deep inside Russia, and Ukraine becoming a full member of NATO.
Figure 1. Battlefield situation in Ukraine as at 11 October 2024
1. Current state of the conflict
1.1 Russian aggression on the eastern frontlines
Heavy fighting has continued throughout the summer of 2024 across almost the entire 1,000km-long frontline in Ukraine.[1] Alongside regular missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and population centres, Russian forces have been making a concerted push in the eastern Donestk region towards the strategically important city of Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk sits at the intersection of key roads and railways making it an important logistics hub for the Ukrainian military. After weeks of heavy fighting, local officials have reported that Russian forces have knocked out around 80% of critical infrastructure in the city.[2] Despite the daily barrage to which the city is being subjected, at the time of writing the advance of Russian forces appears to have been halted around six miles from Pokrovsk.[3] This is due both to Ukrainian resistance and, in part, to the reported redeployment of some Russian forces—though perhaps less than the Ukrainian military had hoped for—to combat the recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia. This is examined in further detail in section 1.2. However, some Ukrainian officials appear sceptical that they will be able to hold the city in the face of the Russian onslaught indefinitely. One frontline commander who spoke anonymously to BBC News voiced fears that the city could become another Bakhmut—fiercely defended at significant cost, only to be vacated in a subsequent withdrawal.[4]
Ukrainian forces have also withdrawn from the frontline town of Vuhledar after a hard-fought two-year defence.[5] Vuhledar sits on elevated ground near a railway line that brings in supplies from Russian-occupied Crimea. Its capture arguably marks the most significant battlefield victory since Russian troops took control of Avdiivka in February 2024. Analysts have warned that Russian forces will now be able to use the town as a launchpad to attack other Ukrainian strongholds to the west. Its occupation also deprives Ukrainian forces of a way to interrupt Russian supply lines.[6] Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskii has reportedly ordered defences to be strengthened in Donetsk as a result. The latest reports indicate that Russian forces have also reached the outskirts of the city of Toretsk, another key city in the Donetsk region.[7]
However, a Russian offensive towards the city of Kharkiv earlier in the summer appeared to largely fail in achieving its desired objectives. The offensive was one of the most significant ground assaults since the start of the war. It further stretched Ukraine’s frontline defences, which reportedly represented Russia’s largest territorial gains for 18 months.[8] The battle also took place during the four-month delay in securing future American financial support and munitions for Ukraine. This is examined in further depth in section 1.4. However, again because of Ukrainian resistance, Russian forces failed to bring artillery forces within range of the city.[9]
Overall, Russian forces have reportedly captured around 800 square km (310 square miles) of Ukrainian territory in 2024.[10] Recent estimates also suggest that, since 2022, Russia has destroyed or captured more than 50 percent of Ukraine’s power generation capacity. This has forced Ukraine to implement power outages with the winter of 2024 approaching.[11] However, Russian forces continue to experience significant loss of manpower and equipment. This is explored in section 1.3. Russia has also felt the impact of Ukraine targeting its fleet in the Black Sea and Ukrainian forces launching a surprise offensive into Russian territory.
1.2 Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory and wider combat operations
In early August 2024, Ukrainian forces crossed the border into the Kursk region of Russia. Those troops rapidly advanced around 18 miles (30km). After two weeks Ukraine’s officials claimed to control more than 1,200 sq km of Russian territory and 93 villages.[12] The regions of Kursk and Belgorod both declared a state of emergency. Almost 200,000 people were evacuated from areas along the border by the Russian government. Russian President Vladimir Putin said the Ukrainian offensive constituted a “major provocation”.[13]
As the Ukrainian incursion enters its third month, CNN reports that “scores of settlements [are] still firmly under its control”.[14] Russia has deployed an estimated 40,000 troops to defend and counterattack in the region. However, they appear largely constituted of conscripts and reservists, with Russian commanders reluctant to redeploy forces from the Ukrainian frontlines. Meanwhile, after Russia’s initial shock, CNN reports that the Kremlin and Russian authorities have sought to downplay the significance of the offensive. There are some reports the Russian public is becoming normalised to the incursion.[15]
Over recent days, Russian forces have reportedly intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. They have had some success in removing the smaller number of Ukrainian forces in the nearby Glushkovsky region.[16] The endgame for the incursion remains unclear. Some analysts believe Kyiv is trying to use its momentum for a morale boost and a potential bargaining chip, even as President Putin downplays its importance and limits the resources Russia’s war machine devotes to countering it.[17]
Hacker groups aligned with Ukraine may also have been responsible for what Russian authorities have called an “unprecedented” cyberattack against Russian state media infrastructure on 7 October 2024.[18] The All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) reported that unspecified actors hacked VGTRK’s online services. Pro-Kremlin Russian news outlet Gazeta reported that the attack took down broadcasts of four Russian state television channels, and roughly 80 regional television and radio companies.
By May 2024, Ukraine had also destroyed or damaged a quarter of the Russian Black Sea fleet, denying Russia control of the western Black Sea and pushing back much of the Russian navy from Crimea.[19] As a result, Ukraine has successfully resumed maritime exports from its Black Sea ports. Ukraine’s western allies have heralded the significance of those operations. Speaking in July 2024, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the UK chief of the defence staff, said “in the past year we’ve seen Ukraine—a country which barely has a navy—bring the Russian Black Sea fleet to heel through a combination of drones and long-range missiles”.[20]
1.3 Impact of the conflict on Russian force levels
Russia continues to experience significant losses of personnel and equipment as it prosecutes the war in Ukraine.[21] The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports that the Russian military has seen the destruction or critical failure of at least five divisions’ worth of armoured vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk since beginning its offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in the Donetsk Oblast in the summer of 2024.[22] These losses have led ISW analysts to speculate that the Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years. This is because of the constraints in Russia’s defence industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military’s failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanised manoeuvre.
Similarly, a statement delivered by UK representatives at the OSCE in May 2024—before the heaviest of the summer fighting—suggested that over 465,000 Russian personnel had been killed or wounded since the beginning of the conflict in February 2022.[23] The daily casualty rate (which includes those killed and wounded) had risen to 1,000 per day, or 30,000 per month. The statement also noted that Russian defence spending now accounted for 40% of public spending, or 6% of its GDP. Recent analysis by the BBC examined 70,000 deaths of Russian troops that it had been able to verify. [24] Of that total, the BBC noted that for the first time, volunteers—defined as civilians who have joined the armed forces after the start of the war—made up the highest number of people killed on the battlefield since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022. Mobilised soldiers, or citizens conscripted to fight, accounted for 13% of the casualty figures.
These casualty rates are expected to have risen significantly over the summer as the fighting has intensified. British military intelligence said that in September the average casualty rate for the Russian army rose to 1,271 soldiers killed or badly injured per day.[25] The Ministry of Defence said this increase was “almost certainly due” to the extension of the combat zone to include both the Kharkiv and Kursk military operations. It contended that Russian losses may now have risen to almost 650,000 killed and wounded. Analysts said that the high casualty rate was linked to Russian mass infantry tactics, often involving so-called “meat wave” assaults where large numbers of troops are sent to storm Ukrainian defensive positions.[26]
1.4 Munitions and personnel challenges experienced by the Ukrainian armed forces
Ukrainian forces continue to report significant equipment and ammunitions shortages.[27] This is reportedly partly due to the delays incurred by the four-month pause in the US Congress approving the latest support package for the country. However, even with that aid now approved and with the support it has received from other key partners—including the UK—Ukraine has expressed concern that it is still getting defence material too slowly. It also lacks the advanced capabilities to adequately prosecute the war, such as long-range air defences to protect vital infrastructure.[28]
Two years into the conflict, the US Congressional Research Service notes that Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian artillery and rocket ammunition. This makes the Ukrainian military “almost entirely reliant” on western assistance for such systems and ammunition.[29] Ukraine’s domestic defence industry produces a wide variety of weapons but as yet has been unable to meet the country’s full wartime demands. In addition, Russian forces continue to target these production sites. Ukraine’s international partners, including the UK, have taken steps to strengthen Ukraine’s defence industry capacity. The Ministry of Defence reported that on 6 October 2024, a UK trade mission, formed of representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Business and Trade, and the defence trade association ADS, had visited Ukraine to hold meetings with Ukrainian government and industry representatives. The UK government described this as the “latest step in the growing relationship between the UK’s defence industrial sector and Ukraine’s”.[30] This followed the signing of an agreement in July 2024 which the Ministry of Defence said will “enable Ukraine to harness the power of UK industry” by drawing on £3.5bn worth of export finance to purchase further military capabilities (A summary of the range of assistance currently being provided to Ukraine by the UK is outlined in section 2.1 below.) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has hailed the progress made to date stating that Ukraine’s industry can now produce as many as 4 million drones (of all types) annually.[31] The Ukrainian industry has also ramped up production of howitzers, developing the capacity to make 20 2S22 Bohdana self-propelled howitzers per month.
Ukraine also continues to experience challenges in deploying combat personnel. As noted by the US Congressional Research Service, the need for immediate reinforcements creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training, yet the Ukrainian armed forces (UAF) also needs to train personnel to conduct complex operations and operate advanced weaponry in order to sustain combat operations.[32] The UAF are also experiencing recruitment challenges as the average age of soldiers increases. Reports have emerged of an apparent reluctance of some younger Ukrainians to join the UAF. Ukraine passed legislation in April 2024 to address some recruitment and rotation issues (including allowing some prisoners to serve in exchange for a reduced sentence), but Ukrainian officials have yet to implement elements of the legislation, including ordering new conscription or mobilisation. The UAF have also reportedly struggled to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. The US Congressional Research Service reports that the lack of trained staff officers has in some cases led to higher-level command staff coordinating and managing tactical operations, leading to “centralised and slower decision-making”. There are also reports that Ukraine continues to struggle with corruption related to the war effort. This includes false disability registration for men looking to evade military service.[33]
1.5 Other notable developments in summer 2024
Some other key developments that have taken place over recent months are summarised below:[34]
- 25 June 2024: The European Union formally launches accession talks with Ukraine.
- 27 June 2024: The European Union signs a security agreement with Ukraine.
- 21 August 2024: Ukraine’s Parliament votes in favour of joining the International Criminal Court (ICC).
- 2 September 2024: Putin arrives in Mongolia for a state visit, his first to an ICC member since it issued a warrant for his arrest.
- 11 September 2024: The US secretary of state and UK foreign secretary undertake a joint visit to Ukraine.
In addition, UK representatives have stated that evidence of Russia’s violations of international humanitarian law is “substantial and growing”.[35]
2. Update on UK and international backing for Ukraine
2.1 UK support to Ukraine and its effectiveness
To date, the UK has pledged £12.8bn in support to Ukraine since February 2022, of which £7.8bn is for military assistance.[36] This includes £3bn for military assistance in 2024/25. The UK is providing both lethal and non-lethal weaponry, including tanks, air defence systems and long-range precision strike missiles. While the UK has committed to training Ukrainian fast jet pilots, combat fighter aircraft will not be provided. The UK is also hosting a training programme, Operation Interflex, which is supported by several allies. Over 45,000 Ukrainian personnel have been trained so far.
The new Labour government has pledged that the UK’s military, financial, diplomatic and political support for Ukraine “will remain steadfast”.[37] Defence Secretary John Healey and Foreign Secretary David Lammy issued a plan for Ukraine whilst in opposition during a visit to Kyiv prior to this summer’s general election, which included commitments to do the following:
- ramp up military support throughout 2024 and beyond by increasing and sustaining aid, implementing the UK-Ukraine security cooperation agreement, extending UK training and creating a clear path for Ukraine’s NATO membership
- reboot the diplomatic drive to maintain western unity and hold Russian President Vladimir Putin to account, by working through the G7, the UN, NATO, the International Criminal Court and pushing for the creation of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression
- take immediate action against wider Russian aggression by enforcing sanctions, closing loopholes in the supply chain, tackling kleptocracy in London and reinforcing NATO allies on the Russian border
- boost UK industrial production by fast-tracking in full £2bn to restock UK armed forces and Ukraine
- get ready for Ukraine’s recovery with more de-mining help, and working with G7 partners on a plan to enable the seizure and repurposing of frozen Russian state assets in the UK to support Ukraine’s reconstruction[38]
John Healey visited Ukraine upon taking office and met President Zelensky. As part of that visit Mr Healey has pledged to fast-track military support committed for Ukraine in April 2024 to arrive within 100 days, and to commit new resources including:
- a quarter of a million 50 calibre ammunition
- 90 anti-armour Brimstone missiles
- 50 small military boats to support river and coastal operations
- 40 de-mining vehicles
- 10 AS-90 artillery guns
- 61 bulldozers to help build defensive positions
- support for previously gifted AS-90s, including 32 new barrels and critical spares which will help Ukraine fire another 60,000 155mm rounds[39]
The government has since contended that the UK had surpassed its pledge to deliver 12 AS90 artillery guns within 100 days of taking office. It stated that a total of 16 units are now on course to be delivered, with 10 already provided, and six more to follow “in the coming weeks”. [40]
On 19 July 2024, the UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, welcomed President Zelensky to Downing Street, the first foreign leader to visit No 10 since Mr Starmer became prime minister.[41] As part of the same visit, the prime minister also hosted President Zelensky and European Political Community leaders at Blenheim. Here 44 European countries and the EU signed a call to action to tackle Russia’s shadow fleet, which is enabling Russia to evade international sanctions.[42] The prime minister and President Zelensky also agreed a new defence industrial support treaty that will enable Ukraine to draw on £3.5bn of UK export finance. In addition, the UK, in coordination with several allies, has also established an international fund for Ukraine (IFU) to coordinate the purchase and transport of military equipment to Ukraine from third countries and/or industry.[43]
John Healey provided an updated overview of UK support to Ukraine in the House of Commons on 10 September 2024, including the signing of a new contract on air defence missiles:
In the weeks since, we have stepped up support even further. We have signed a new £3.5bn defence industrial support treaty, hit the £1bn milestone for the ‘International fund for Ukraine’, advanced the UK-led maritime and drone capability coalitions, and agreed a new £300mn contract for artillery shells. At the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting in Ramstein on Friday last week, I announced a new £160mn production contract for air defence missiles. I also announced that the UK’s Operation Interflex, which has trained 45,000 Ukrainian troops since 2022, will extend beyond this year and throughout 2025. Our support is both short term and long term, entailing immediate provision and long-term production. We are training troops today and developing Ukrainian forces for the future. This approach gives the Ukrainians the confidence to plan, and it sends a signal to Putin that the UK and our allies will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.[44]
As noted in recent analysis from the House of Commons Library, several countries including the UK have said that weapons donated to Ukraine could be used, in self-defence, to strike legitimate military targets inside Russia.[45] However, those permissions do not extend to the use of western-supplied long-range missiles against targets deep in Russian territory, although that operational caveat is currently under review. President Putin has recently claimed the use of long-range missiles against Russian targets was a ‘red line’ that would amount to direct NATO participation in the conflict.[46]
President Zelensky visited the UK again on 10 October 2024 for talks with Keir Starmer and the NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, ahead of a planned heads of government summit due to take place in Germany on 12 October 2024. As explored in greater depth in section 3.1, President Zelensky has reportedly been seeking support for his proposals to bring an end to the war. However, due to US President Joe Biden staying in the US to oversee the response to Hurricane Milton, this summit has now been postponed.[47]
Meanwhile, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee has issued a report examining interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and considering the implications for the UK government and the UK’s armed forces.[48] Published on 26 September 2024, ‘Ukraine: A wake-up call’ contended that Russia’s invasion appears to represent a failure of NATO’s deterrent posture (though it added that the invasion may yet prove to be a strategic miscalculation on Russia’s part). Further, notwithstanding some notable responses from individual nations including the UK, the committee argued that the war has “exposed fundamental weaknesses in both UK’s and NATO’s military strength”.
The committee argued that the UK was ill-equipped to meet the challenges the conflict presented:
Within the UK, [Russia’s invasion of Ukraine] has raised serious questions regarding the preparedness of government, society and the defence industrial base to support conventional warfighting at scale. We are under-prepared to respond to the heightened global threat environment and, in particular, meet the growing threat from Russia.[49]
For example, the committee argued that the UK was unprepared for types of attack on critical infrastructure that Ukraine has suffered. It said that the war had “underscored the need for an agile industrial base” to meet the demands of a dynamic battlefield. The committee argued that the UK’s procurement methods remained “cumbersome” and lacked the agility required to keep pace with the rapidly evolving nature of modern warfare, particularly in cases where conflict is between states that are technologically evenly matched. The committee argued a cultural shift around risk across both government and industry was necessary, and that the government needed to transform its approach to procurement to keep pace with accelerating development cycles.
The committee also noted that Russia was attempting to offset its decline in relations with the west by developing closer ties with China, Iran, North Korea and key global south countries (explored in section 3.3). It argued that the UK should be “deeply concerned” by this development and be more proactive in building relationships with those countries in the global south where Russia (and others) are seeking to extend their influence. The committee contended that the UK should harness its respected soft power as a diplomatic force and international development actor in support of alliance building.
In conclusion, the committee said the war should put the UK on alert for the changing dynamics of future conflicts and highlighted the limits of the UK’s own power and influence:
Our overarching conclusion is that the war in Ukraine is a wake-up call to the UK’s relative decline as a full-spectrum military power. In truth, we are a medium-sized regional power, but our commitment to retaining global influence, particularly through our nuclear and maritime capabilities, makes some of our other military aspirations unaffordable. We now lack a coherent model to augment our relatively small armed forces with the capabilities needed to sustain or deter warfighting. Such a comprehensive model should be a key aspiration of the strategic defence review and will undoubtedly rest on an ability to better leverage technology, industry, the reserves, allies and wider society.[50]
The head of MI5, Ken McCallum, has also separately warned that Russia’s intelligence agency has been on a mission to generate “sustained mayhem on British and European streets” following the UK’s backing for Ukraine.[51]
2.2 Support for Ukraine from other key international partners
The United States is the largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine. At present, the total level of military assistance provided by the US since the start of the Biden administration stands at $56.6bn.[52] The latest funding levels reflect new commitments announced after the US Congress approved a $60.8bn funding package for Ukraine towards the end of April 2024, after several months of delay as observed above.
NATO has been helping to coordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian government and has been supporting the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid through its pre-existing ‘comprehensive assistance package’.[53] In July 2024, a summit of NATO members in Washington DC agreed to take on a greater role in the coordination of military assistance and training among NATO allies and to providing baseline funding of €40bn to Ukraine over the next year.[54] The declaration from the summit announced:
A pledge of long-term security assistance for Ukraine for the provision of military equipment, assistance, and training to support Ukraine in building a force capable of defeating Russian aggression. Through proportional contributions, Allies intend to provide a minimum baseline funding of €40bn within the next year, and to provide sustainable levels of security assistance for Ukraine to prevail.[55]
The European Union is also providing non-lethal and lethal arms and training through its European Peace Facility (EPF).[56] To date, the EU has committed €11.1bn of EPF funding for military support to Ukraine, including €5bn for a dedicated Ukraine assistance fund which was agreed in March 2024. On 9 October 2024, the EU Council also reached an agreement on a financial assistance package to Ukraine, including an “exceptional macro-financial assistance (MFA) loan of up to €35bn” and a loan cooperation mechanism that will support Ukraine in repaying loans for up to €45bn provided by the EU and G7 partners.[57]
2.3 Latest sanctions measures
Russia remains the most sanctioned country in the world. However, doubts remain over the effectiveness of those measures given Russia’s usage of alternative markets, trade routes and methods for circumventing western sanctions, including the use of a ‘shadow fleet’ of tankers (ageing vessels with obscure ownership which are uninsured and often environmentally unsound, to transport sanctioned Russian crude oil).[58]
As of 10 October 2024:
- 1,707 individuals and 339 entities are subject to UK sanctions under the Russia regime.[59]
- Over 2,200 individuals and entities are subject to EU sanctions against Russia.[60]
The UK has also announced specific sanctions on Russian troops deploying chemical weapons on the battlefield. On 8 October 2024, a joint release from David Lammy and John Healey stated that Russia’s Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence (CBR) troops and their commander have been sanctioned for the deployment of “barbaric chemical weapons” in Ukraine.[61] The statement also criticised what it called Russia’s “flagrant violation” of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), urging Russia to immediately cease all such activity. The government has also announced the formation of a new unit to help companies comply with trade sanctions and penalise those who do not.[62]
The EU Council has also established a new framework for restrictive measures in response to “Russia’s destabilising actions abroad”.[63] It will reportedly allow the EU to target individuals and entities engaged in actions and policies by the government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the fundamental values of the EU and its member states, their security, independence, and integrity, as well as those of international organisations and third countries.
3. Potential determinants for the future of the conflict
3.1 President Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’
President Zelensky and Ukrainian officials have developed a set of proposals, named in press reports as a ‘victory plan’, for how they believe Russia can be forced to accept terms to end the war.[64]
As above, President Zelensky had reportedly been due to air the proposals at a meeting of heads of government in Germany on 12 October 2024, but this summit has been postponed. As a result, full details of the proposals have yet to be made public. However, Ukraine’s request to be able to use western-made long-range missiles to strike military targets deep inside Russia is widely thought to be one element.[65] BBC News reports that also thought to be in the plan is a plea for more robust security guarantees, including a long-desired invitation for Ukraine to join NATO. Overall, BBC analysts suggest the proposals are a pitch “to bolster Ukraine’s position on the battlefield and push Putin towards a diplomatic peace”.
During an interview with the New Yorker on 22 September 2024, President Zelensky provided an insight to how Ukrainian thinking has evolved on the shape of the conflict.[66] President Zelensky said that on the subject of defining victory, there had been “no change” in his mindset. He remained of the view that “victory is about justice” and “a just victory is one whose outcome satisfies all—those who respect international law, those who live in Ukraine, those who lost their loved ones and relatives”. He acknowledged that justice “does not close our wounds” but does provide “some closure”. However, he argued that the Ukrainian desire for a “just victory” was “not the issue”. Rather, the issue was “that Putin has zero desire to end the war on any reasonable terms at all”. He dismissed any suggestion that President Putin was open to dialogue or negotiation as “empty rhetoric, a fiction, that keeps the world from standing together with Ukraine and isolating Putin”. He said that Ukraine amended its approaches to ending the war in response to “the games [Putin] is playing”, and where Putin offered “empty rhetoric”, Ukraine offered “a real formula for bringing peace, a concrete plan for how we can end the war”.
President Zelensky was asked whether he was now willing to consider if negotiations were worth pursuing, in contrast to his stance in 2022 and 2023 where he had signalled a “categorical refusal” to negotiate. In response, he said that over the last two years, he had been “consistent in saying that the Russians have blocked all our initiatives from the very beginning, and they continue to do so”. He maintained that “any negotiation process would be unsuccessful if it’s with Putin or with his entourage”. He suggested it was “misguided” and “a potentially fatal mistake” to believe that Putin wanted to end the war. At the same time, he believed that Ukraine had to show its partners its desire for dialogue was genuine and it was willing to be constructive. He suggested Ukraine was willing to draw up a plan to present to the Russians and then enter into rounds of dialogue. However, he said that for dialogue to happen, a plan had to be prepared without the Russians “because, unfortunately, they seem to think that they have a kind of red card, as in soccer, that they can hold up and block everything”. He stated that Ukraine was preparing its plan.
There remains strong opposition in Ukraine to the idea of ceding any land to Russia should a negotiated peace involve such a proposal (and Ukrainian officials have repeatedly rejected the suggestion that they are willing to cede any Ukrainian territory).[67] Some commentators such as Mariya Zolkina, a Ukrainian political analyst and research fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE), believe this could change, however, if meaningful security guarantees were on the table:
If Ukraine was promised membership of NATO or if Ukraine signed a really strong security agreement with a big international player, this discussion about a possible tactical ceasefire would turn in a different way and the political resistance would not be as strong as it [is] now.[68]
Others such as Nona Mikhelidze and Riccardo Alcaro, writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, believe such a deal would only result in an effectively ‘frozen conflict’:
What would such a settlement look like? Surely, it would not be a peace treaty. Russia would not agree to withdraw its troops from territory it has formally annexed. Ukraine would never recognize Russia’s territorial acquisitions, which would continue to be Ukrainian land under international law. The west would keep the sanctions regime in place. The frontline would remain militarised.
The result would be a frozen conflict, in which the parties would continue to pursue their original objectives—for Ukraine, liberation; for Russia, conquest—with different tactics. Russia would likely resort to subterfuge, provocation, intimidation, and influence operations meant to hamper Ukraine’s economic reconstruction and political democratization, which in turn could weaken western support for Kyiv. Kyiv and Moscow would remain at loggerheads.[69]
Daniel Szeligowski, head of the Eastern Europe programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, also argues that “too many western policymakers still delude themselves that a compromise with Russia is possible”.[70] Similarly, Selim Yenel, president of the Global Relations Forum in Turkey, argues that the war can only end if Russia is defeated militarily.[71] However, others such as Professor Charles Kupchan, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the door to negotiation must remain open. Indeed, Professor Kupchan contends that talks may be “ultimately Kyiv’s best option given that Ukraine has a better chance of restoring territorial integrity at the negotiating table than on the battlefield”.[72]
3.2 US presidential election
Speculation continues over the potential impact of either a Democratic or Republican victory in the November 2024 US presidential election on the war in Ukraine. The consensus among many analysts is that Kamala Harris will largely continue with the Biden administration’s strong support of Ukraine should she win. Ms Harris has consistently echoed Joe Biden’s rhetoric on Ukraine, saying she will stand with the country and seek continued military aid.[73] However, the Economist notes that she has said little about whether or how she might divert from or build upon President Biden’s approach, which it argues “has been tempered by his fear of an escalating conflict between NATO and Russia”.
In contrast, the Economist contends that Kyiv will likely “feel the chill” if Donald Trump should retake the White House, stating:
Republicans, particularly in the House of Representatives, where they are in the majority, have become notably cooler towards Ukraine. If Democrats win back the House and the presidency, aid to Ukraine is likely to keep flowing, even if control of the Senate shifts to Republicans, as is probable, according to the Economist’s forecast model. Full Republican control in Washington would prove more difficult for Mr Zelensky. If Mr Trump is elected, another uncertainty is whether he will empower internationalists like Mike Pompeo, the former CIA director and secretary of state, or ideological isolationists like J D Vance, his vice-presidential running-mate.[74]
Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations suggests the election could have “profound consequences” for the war, arguing that both candidates have “distinctly divergent views on the war that reflect their different visions for US foreign policy”.[75] In particular, the authors note that former President Trump has given vague and sometimes contradictory responses on the question of Ukraine, creating significant ambiguity should he get a second term:
[…] Trump has been vague about the level of future US support for Ukraine if re-elected. He has twice publicly refused to commit to backing a Ukrainian victory over Russia. At a CNN town hall in May 2023, Trump said he does not “think in terms of winning and losing” but of getting the war “settled” to end the bloodshed and avoid further escalation. He echoed this sentiment in the recent presidential debate, repeating his intent to quickly negotiate a peace agreement. In combination with his close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his statements have raised fears that he will pressure Ukraine to reach a settlement to end the conflict on terms that would favour Russia and compromise long-standing US foreign policy principles. However, in a post on his social media platform Truth Social in April 2024, Trump wrote that Ukraine’s survival is not only important to Europe, but also to the United States.[76]
Writing for the Lowy Institute, Mick Ryan suggests that Donald Trump may “surprise” on Ukraine, arguing particularly that if he cannot achieve a “quick solution” he may “turn on Putin and increase US support to Ukraine”.[77] Meanwhile, in an article for the Wilson Center, Mykhailo Minakov argues that, depending on the outcome of the election, the result may see a resumption in domestic political manoeuvring in Ukraine which has largely “been on hold” since 2022, particularly should opposition groups seek to capitalise on a changing US-Ukraine dynamic.[78]
Domestic pressures also appear to be growing among the US electorate for an end to the conflict. In an article for Chatham House, Professor Michael Cox contends that many Americans now want to see a negotiated settlement despite ongoing support for the Ukrainian cause:
It is true that the majority of Americans stand with Ukraine against Russia. However, Trump’s brand of isolationism has struck a chord with part of the American electorate who believe that there is little point backing Ukraine militarily if this extends a conflict to which there appears to be no end in sight. In 2021, Biden controversially decided to call a halt to what he termed a ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan. Could Trump do the same in Ukraine?
While the stakes in Ukraine may be higher, there are many (or at least enough) Americans who seem prepared to vote for someone like Trump who has promised to end this other ‘forever war’ by negotiating some kind of peace deal with Putin. Among a reasonably large swathe of Americans, pressure is growing to call it a day.[79]
Similarly, writing for the Guardian, senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre Paul Taylor contends that there appears to be ebbing support for Ukraine on “both sides of the Atlantic” and that this could empower Russian President Vladimir Putin in pursuing further aggressive action.[80] Mr Taylor writes:
One senior western official told me it may take a “second shock” of the magnitude of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to jolt western countries out of their funk, and spur Europeans to take more radical steps to boost and integrate their own defences. That shock may involve a sudden collapse of Ukrainian frontline defences, another Bucha-style massacre by Russian forces, or perhaps victory for Donald Trump on 5 November. Any of those would be a disaster for Kyiv.
[….]
Ukraine can ill afford to wait for such a “second shock” to jolt western governments as its forces are bleeding out daily in the war of attrition imposed by a bigger enemy. “You can’t expect Ukraine to sustain another 30 months when our own country is the battlefield and subjected to daily strikes,” Mykola Bielieskov, a senior analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, told the same EPC panel. “What we don’t see is a long-term strategy of sustained support. Otherwise, the Russian victory scenario will progress.”
For European governments, regardless of their domestic predicaments, the choice ought to be clear. Support Ukraine more decisively now, including with deep-strike capabilities, or face a far worse strategic position next year, with an emboldened Putin rearming for his next war of conquest.[81]
3.3 Increased cooperation between Russia and international allies
2024 has seen evidence of growing military cooperation between Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK). UK officials have highlighted evidence that Russia is receiving ballistic missiles from Iran for use in Ukraine.[82] The transfer is likely to increase Russia’s capability to launch short-range attacks on the frontlines, enabling it to use more of its long-distance missiles to strike deeper inside Ukraine. Despite sanctions measures, Russia also continues to purchase significant quantities of weapons for use in Ukraine from North Korea.
UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN James Kariuki has warned that the cooperation between the three countries presents a growing threat to both regional and global security:
This increased military cooperation between Russia, Iran and DPRK poses an unacceptable threat to not only European security, but to global security. In return for weapons needed to prolong its illegal war, Russia is violating sanctions endorsed by the UN Security Council and building the capabilities of, and emboldening, both the Iranian and North Korean regimes. This contributes to further destablisation in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.[83]
Russia’s purchase of Iranian missiles was condemned in a statement from G7 foreign ministers on 14 September 2024.[84]
Russia also continues to strengthen ties with China. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell argues that this is not a partnership of convenience, but a concerted effort to shift the geopolitical centre of gravity towards Asia. He told NATO representatives in May 2024:
This is a sustained, comprehensive effort that is backed up by the leadership in China that is designed to give Russia every support behind the scenes that will allow them to reconstitute elements of their military force, their long-range missiles, their UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones], some of their capacities to track movements on the battlefield, long-range artillery and the like. This is an effort that has been designed to be largely out of view.[85]
For Callum Fraser at the Royal United Services Institute, this is not an equal partnership. Rather, “Russia is now firmly the weaker partner in the relationship, with China exploiting the Kremlin’s situation for its own ends”.[86] Mr Fraser writes that, with Russia’s economy concentrated on supporting the war effort in Ukraine, its exports have become focused on shipping fossil fuels and other raw materials to eastern partners. Meanwhile, imports from China now cover a diverse field of industrial and consumer goods, providing essential resources to sustain both Russia’s economy and the conflict in Ukraine. He contends that this asymmetrical balance is forecasted to increase over the coming years as Russia struggles to survive on its war economy. Consequently, he argues that China will become an ever-more important lifeline for the Russian state.
Mr Fraser contends that China would be happy to see a prolonged war in Ukraine so long as it continues to benefit, despite its stated desire for a negotiated solution:
[W]hile China continues to seek a ‘political solution’ to the conflict in Ukraine, it seems more than happy to put up with a protracted conflict. China has typically remained neutral on external matters, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has presented Beijing with a narrow path through which it can prioritise its interests without suffering secondary sanctions from the west. On the surface, Beijing is fostering a growing trade relationship with Russia in a very particular manner, through the export of components with both civilian and military applications such as machine tools, satellite equipment, and drone technology—enough to turn a nice profit and maintain the status quo in the conflict, without overtly support[ing] Russia.
However, Campbell’s [US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell] words suggest that China is providing much greater support in terms of materiel to help reconstitute Russian forces, kept out of sight to avoid western retaliation. Ultimately, this situation seems likely, and Russia’s aggressive revanchism in Ukraine serves as an exemplary case study of the limits of western resolve. […]
Ultimately, China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suits a very particular purpose for China, distracting and draining the west. As long as this status quo continues, we can expect China to keep exploiting Russia’s position.[87]
Cover image by Karollyne Hubert on Unsplash.
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