Ukraine: A wake-up call—Lords committee report debate

Approximate read time: 20 minutes

On 6 March 2025, the House of Lords is scheduled to debate the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee report ‘Ukraine: A wake-up call’.

1. Overview of committee’s key findings

The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee launched an inquiry in February 2024—two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for UK defence.^[1] The report was published in September 2024.

The committee said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked “the return of conventional warfare to Europe”.^[2] This represented a challenge to “the strategic assumptions that have shaped Western and UK defence for decades”.

The committee’s first key conclusion was that “the invasion represented a failure of NATO’s deterrent posture towards Russia”. It said this called for “a clear-eyed examination of why our policy of deterrence was unsuccessful and a systematic re-assessment of the assumptions that underpinned it”. Secondly, the committee concluded that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had “exposed fundamental weaknesses in both the UK’s and NATO’s military strength”. The committee believed this raised serious questions about “the preparedness of government, society and the defence industrial base to support conventional warfighting at scale”. It said the UK is “under-prepared to respond to the heightened global threat environment and, in particular, meet the growing threat from Russia”.

2. Context to the inquiry

2.1 Strategic defence review

The committee made its recommendations against the backdrop of the government’s ongoing strategic defence review (SDR). Between the start of the committee’s inquiry and the publication of the report, the new Labour government came into power in July 2024 and launched its SDR.^[3] The government described it as a “root and branch review of UK defence”. It is being conducted by three external reviewers, including the lead reviewer Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Labour), former defence secretary and former NATO secretary-general. The review’s purpose, as set out in its terms of reference, is to:

[…] determine the roles, capabilities and reforms required by UK Defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century, deliverable and affordable within the resources available to Defence within the trajectory to 2.5%. The review will ensure that Defence is central both to the security, and to the economic growth and prosperity, of the United Kingdom.^[4]

The terms of the SDR require the reviewers to submit their final report to the prime minister, the chancellor of the exchequer and the defence secretary in the first half of 2025.^[5] The government has said it is now expecting the final report in spring 2025.^[6]

The International Relations and Defence Committee welcomed the SDR.^[7] As well as making recommendations in its report directed towards the government, the committee also submitted the report to the external reviewers for them to consider as part of the SDR.

When the government published its response to the committee’s report in November 2024, it emphasised that the SDR was still under way.^[8] It said the SDR process would “determine the roles, capabilities and reforms required by UK Defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century”. This would be done in a way that was “deliverable and affordable within the resources available to defence within the trajectory to spending 2.5% of GDP”.

2.2 Defence spending

Debates over UK defence spending also form an important piece of the backdrop to the committee’s inquiry. “The trajectory to 2.5%” mentioned in the SDR’s terms of reference relates to the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) that goes to defence spending. In 2014, NATO heads of state and government agreed to commit 2% of their national GDP to defence spending to help ensure NATO’s continued military readiness.^[9] According to mid-2024 estimates from NATO, the UK’s defence spending (according to NATO’s agreed definition of defence spending) was 2.3% for 2024.^[10]

Labour’s manifesto promised that it would “set out the path to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence” when in government.^[11] This was similar to a commitment made by the previous Conservative government in April 2024 to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030,^[12] but Labour did not commit to achieving the spending target by a specific date. The terms of the SDR said that “the path to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence” would be “dealt with at a future fiscal event”.^[13]

In its report, the committee said the government needed to “commit to spending more on defence [and] spending it better”.^[14] The committee suggested that “an increase to 2.5% of GDP may not be enough to meet the UK’s growing defence needs” unless there were “significant efficiencies”, “laser-sharp priorities” and “hard trade-offs”.^[15] It also highlighted that any increase “should be seen in the context of decades-long defence cuts and recent inflationary pressures on the defence budget”.

In response, the government restated its “firm commitment” to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP and said the pathway to this “will be set at a future fiscal event”.^[16] It also said that spending beyond 2025–26 would be subject to the spending review. The government’s multi-year spending review is due to conclude in late spring 2025.^[17] This will set spending limits for all government departments for the next few years—three years for resource budgets and five years for capital budgets.^[18] The government has said that defence is one of the priority areas for reform in the spending review.^[19]

3. Committee recommendations and government response

3.1 Deterrence

Responding to the committee’s conclusion that there was a need to “re-establish credible deterrence in the UK and across Europe”, the government argued that “the UK nuclear deterrent does deter the most extreme threats to the UK and our NATO allies”.^[20] However, it agreed with the committee that the current security environment posed challenges to “deterrence credibility”. The government said it was committed to “deeper integration of the UK’s conventional deterrence posture, bringing together all levers of state power; political, diplomatic, economic and military”. It said this was underpinned by a “triple lock on renewal and modernisation” of the UK’s nuclear forces. The government set out its nuclear deterrent ‘triple lock’ policy in September 2024, consisting of building four new nuclear submarines, maintaining the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent and delivering all future upgrades needed.^[21]

In its response to the committee, the government also highlighted that it is spending £3.3mn between 2024 and 2027 on the ‘Nuclear deterrence fund’, a pilot programme to “stimulate wider UK expertise in the field of nuclear deterrence”.^[22]

In January 2025, the government announced an eight-year deal with Rolls-Royce, worth £9bn, to deliver design, manufacture and support services to nuclear reactors to power the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet.^[23] The government said the contract delivered on its nuclear triple-lock commitment.

3.2 Building mass

3.2.1 Personnel

The committee concluded that the evidence it had heard “points to the current size of the British army being inadequate”.^[24] It acknowledged that “size is not the only measure of capability”. However, it expressed concern about whether the army could, “as currently constituted, make the expected troop contribution to NATO” and whether it was “prepared to meet the growing threat posed by Russia to European security”.

The government agreed that “the army, and UK forces more widely, are not in the state that the country would wish”.^[25] Nevertheless, the government said it believed the UK meets its expected contributions to NATO. It said the UK’s strength “lies fundamentally in our position in NATO, rather than in the provision of sovereign capability alone”. It said the UK’s defence plan aligned with NATO’s plan, and the structure of the UK army is “NATO-first and allied by design”.

The committee called on the government to address recruitment and retention challenges, including issues with the “overly cautious and risk averse” process of medical evaluations for potential recruits.^[26] In its response, the government said it had made recruitment and retention a departmental priority.^[27] It set out ways it had improved its offer, including a 35% pay rise for new recruits and additional financial incentives for specific groups of service personnel. The government also set out ways the Ministry of Defence (MOD) had been working with the Department of Health and Social Care to improve the medical assessment process for candidates, and how the MOD had revised medical entry standards to remove “outdated policies”.^[28] The government said it knew there was “more to do” on recruitment and retention and promised the SDR would “ensure our people are at the heart of plans”.^[29]

In February 2025, the government announced that a new combined armed forces recruitment service would launch in 2027, replacing the separate recruitment schemes run by the army, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.^[30] The new system will enable candidates to complete one application and one medical application via a single digital system.

In its report, the committee also called on the government to “prioritise reinvigorating reserves” to help build the size of the army.^[31] The government said the minister for veterans and people would be reviewing the reserve forces to “better determine how Defence can utilise their expertise and experience whilst also increasing social mobility and a higher return on investment”.^[32]

3.2.2 Defence industry

The committee also considered the role of the defence industry in “building mass” for UK defence. It concluded the UK’s defence industry was “unprepared for high-intensity, prolonged conflict due to decades of budget cuts and reduced industrial capacity since the end of the Cold War”.^[33] It also found a “significant trust deficit” between the defence industry and the government. It recommended a “more agile” procurement process with a “culture change around risk”. It also said the government needed to “facilitate a ‘broad church’ of industry engagement” to bring in non-traditional defence suppliers, such as start-ups, small and medium enterprises and tech companies. At the same time, it argued the government would need to mitigate the risks of collaborating with commercial partners who lacked previous experience in defence.^[34]

The government said it was already committed to bringing forward a defence industrial strategy.^[35] The government published a green paper on its industrial strategy in October 2024 which identified defence as one of eight priority “growth driving” economic sectors.^[36] The full industrial strategy and sector plans for each of the eight sectors are due to be published alongside the spending review in spring 2025.^[37] The sector plan for defence will take the form of a defence industrial strategy commissioned by the secretary of state for defence.

In December 2024, the government published a statement of intent outlining the approach and processes the MOD will follow in developing the defence industrial strategy.^[38] The government explained it wanted to use the strategy to fix problems that had previously held back growth in the defence sector and led to poor outcomes for UK Defence, including strategic incoherence, inefficient spending, falling behind on exports, skills shortages, the pace of innovation, a lack of long-term partnerships and institutions, and investment bottlenecks. It said the strategy would be structured around six priorities: prioritising UK businesses, creating partnerships, certainty and stability, seizing the future, spreading prosperity, and deterrence.

3.2.3 Involving the whole of society in defence

Another element of “building mass” the International Relations and Defence Committee identified was “engaging the whole of society in defence” to build “a resilient and prepared nation”.^[39] It called on the government to build understanding about the role of the general population in contributing to national security and resilience. In response, the government said it was planning to implement a ‘home defence programme’ that would take a “whole of society approach to the resilience and security of the UK”.^[40] It said it would communicate more about this programme and its timeline in due course. It also highlighted the government’s ‘Prepare’ website which gives the public information about preparing for emergencies in their area.

3.3 Nurturing partnerships

The committee observed that following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was attempting to “offset its decline in relations with the West” by developing closer ties with China, Iran, North Korea and key ‘Global South’ countries.^[41] It called on the government to “aim to maintain the broadest possible coalition of countries to counter Russian narratives”, to be more proactive in engaging the Global South, and to have a comprehensive strategy to take account of the potential for a deepening Sino-Russian relationship.^[42]

The government shared the committee’s concerns about Russia’s increasing cooperation with China, Iran and North Korea.^[43] It said it was working closely with allies to be ready to coordinate on necessary responses to any behaviour that posed a threat to collective security. The government said it was committed to resetting relations with the Global South and was currently undertaking work to ensure that its defence diplomacy was “fit for purpose in an increasingly competitive world”.^[44]

The committee said the UK had shown leadership in providing military support for Ukraine and developed a good level of cooperation and coordination with its European partners.^[45] It welcomed the Labour government’s commitment to negotiate a new security pact with the EU, which it believed “could represent an important step towards rebuilding credible conventional deterrence”. As part of this negotiation, the committee recommended the government should discuss the EU’s rules on participation by non-EU member states in EU defence initiatives.

The government said its partnership with the EU would “drive closer cooperation and complement our unshakeable NATO first commitment which will remain the foremost vehicle for European security”.^[46] It also said it shared the committee’s concerns about the terms of participation for third countries in many of the EU’s defence and industrial capability development initiatives. The government described how it was engaging with the EU to encourage it to “consider fairer terms” for third country participation.^[47]

3.4 Countering aerial threats

The committee concluded that the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that air defences are “critical to avoiding an attritional ground conflict”.^[48] It recommended prioritising investment in integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), collaborating with NATO allies and investing in the development of drone technologies.^[49]

The government said it was incorporating lessons from Ukraine about the importance of air and missile defence into its future plans and operational design.^[50] It said the SDR would make recommendations about IAMD, suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (S/DEAD) and their relative priority in the context of the UK’s other capability plans. It recognised the role the proliferation of drones had played in “shifting the character of warfare” in Eastern Europe and said it was committed to “capitalising on our considerable knowledge” gained from the UK’s investment in drones to support Ukraine.^[51]

3.5 Space, cyber and the electromagnetic environment

The committee found that space, cyber and electromagnetic warfare (EW) are “closely interlinked” and “will likely form an integral part of future warfare between technologically capable states”.^[52] It explained that satellites have critical civilian and defence applications and that attacks on satellites have featured heavily in the war in Ukraine, mostly through cyber and electromagnetic attacks.^[53] Broadly speaking, cyber attacks use hacking techniques to infiltrate and disrupt targeted computer systems, whereas electromagnetic attacks disable systems by blocking signals. The committee recommended it was “imperative that the UK enhances its space, cyber and EW capabilities”.^[54] It said the ability to conduct cyber and electronic warfare, and to take countermeasures, should be seen as a core capability for the UK’s armed forces. It recommended the government work with the private sector to attract high-tech talent to the defence sector and ensure that relevant technologies are fully integrated into the new defence industrial strategy.^[55]

The committee also said it was essential that the government focused on building greater resilience against cyber and electronic attacks into the UK’s critical national infrastructure (CNI). It suggested the UK’s “fragmented police forces and limited military resources may struggle to handle the increased civil defence burden in the event of hostile action, such as sabotage of CNI”. It therefore proposed the government consider whether to establish a centralised civil defence agency.

The government agreed with the committee’s assessment of the importance of cyber and electronic warfare and the need for it to be a core capability for the armed forces.^[56] It said the MOD would continue to invest in these capabilities and that it was working with industry to develop agile logistics and “support the rapid manufacture and adaptation at a scale and capability able to deliver operational advantage for our armed forces”.

The government said the Cabinet Office’s ‘Home defence programme’ would include ensuring that the UK was prepared for increased targeting of cyber infrastructure and CNI.^[57] The ‘Home defence programme’ would also consider the need for a new civil defence agency, guided by the outcome of the SDR. The government said this would take into consideration the UK’s existing resilience structures including the civil reserve, local government, emergency services and civil society organisations.

In February 2025, the government announced a new ‘cyber pipeline’ through which armed forces recruits would be fast-tracked into specialist operational cyber roles in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by the end of 2025.^[58] The army is set to join for subsequent recruitment campaigns from 2026.

4. Recent developments

4.1 Prime minister’s comments on NATO and UK-EU security partnership

In February 2025, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer outlined his view of the UK’s role in European security during a visit to Brussels where he met the secretary general of NATO and EU leaders. Mr Starmer said there was a need to “see all allies stepping up—particularly in Europe” to support Ukraine, put pressure on Russia and “keep working together to bolster NATO”.^[59] He said Europe “must shoulder more of the burden now—because it is our burden to carry”. He reiterated that the principle of “NATO first” would be at the heart of the SDR, and said the government was “working hard to set the path to 2.5%”. Mr Starmer’s remarks followed comments by US President Donald Trump in January 2025 that he was “not sure [the US] should be spending anything” on NATO as NATO members were not protecting the US.^[60] President Trump has called for NATO members to spend 5% of GDP on defence, although the US does not meet this threshold with its defence spending.^[61]

During his trip to Brussels, Sir Keir also set out some headline details about what he hoped to achieve from a new UK-EU security partnership, which he intended would “bolster NATO”. He said he wanted it to cover military technology and research and development, improving the mobility of forces across Europe, protecting CNI and deepening industrial collaboration to increase defence production.^[62] An EU-UK summit is now expected to take place on 19 May 2025.^[63] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the EU was “ready to discuss deeper cooperation, notably in security and defence” at this summit.^[64] However, commentators have suggested the EU may seek to link any agreement on security and defence to other issues such as fishing rights and a youth mobility scheme.^[65]

4.2 US government comments on NATO and Ukraine

The US government has made recent statements setting out its position on European defence and the war in Ukraine. Pete Hegseth, the US defence secretary, said on 12 February 2024 that the US would “no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship” with its allies.^[66] He reiterated US calls for NATO members to spend much more on defence, including that European nations must provide the “overwhelming” share of funding for Ukraine. He said a return to Ukraine’s borders as they stood prior to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea was “an unrealistic objective”. Mr Hegseth was speaking at a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, chaired by the UK and held at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The UK announced a new £150mn military support package for Ukraine at the meeting.^[67] UK Defence Secretary John Healey said that Russia “remains undeniably dangerous” and that Ukraine’s allies must “step up further—and secure peace through strength—together”.

Also on 12 February 2025, US President Donald Trump said he had agreed in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin to “work together, very closely” and to begin negotiations immediately to end the war in Ukraine.^[68] He said he would begin the process by calling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to inform him of the conversation with President Putin.

In response, the UK issued a joint statement with France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain and the European Union, stating that they were ready to enhance support for Ukraine and to discuss the way ahead with the US. The statement said that “Ukraine and Europe must be part of any negotiations”.^[69] It also stated that “the security of the European continent is our common responsibility” and the signatories were “therefore working together to strengthen our collective defence capabilities”.

Following his conversation with President Trump, President Zelensky said that “together with the US”, Ukraine was “charting [its] next steps to stop Russian aggression and ensure a lasting, reliable peace”.^[70] President Zelensky has said that he does not believe Europe could offer security guarantees to Ukraine without the US.^[71]

5. Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘The forthcoming strategic defence review: Frequently asked questions’, 29 November 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘UK defence spending’, 4 December 2024
• House of Lords Library, ‘UK defence spending: 2.5% of GDP target’, 28 October 2024
• House of Lords Library, ‘Deterrence as part of the UK’s defence policy’, 25 October 2024
• House of Lords Library, ‘Strategic defence review’, 2 October 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘Defence procurement reform’, 13 September 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘UK defence personnel statistics’, 13 August 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘What is the Joint Expeditionary Force?’, 6 August 2024

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