UK global position: Defence, international partnerships and influence

Approximate read time: 50 minutes

This briefing has been prepared for the 13 March 2025 House of Lords debate:

Lord Howell of Guildford (Conservative) to move that this House takes note of the United Kingdom’s global position.

It provides brief details on the UK’s involvement with select international organisations and partnerships and on the country’s foreign affairs, defence, international aid and economic reach. The last section of the briefing summarises a recent Chatham House paper on the UK’s global status and provides additional further reading sources.

Lord Howell is a former chair of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the Soft Power Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee in the House of Lords. He is also a former president of the Royal Commonwealth Society.

1. UK involvement in international organisations

1.1 United Nations and UK role on the security council

The UK is a founding member of the United Nations and was heavily involved in its establishment at the end of the second world war.^[1] It participates in the UN’s work and offices in many areas, including human rights, peacekeeping, international development and climate change.^[2] It is also a signatory to many UN treaties, including the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change.^[3]

The UK is a permanent member of the UN security council, along with China, Russia, France and the United States.^[4] The UN security council’s focus is on international security and it can issue binding obligations on other member states for the purposes of maintaining peace.^[5] As a permanent member of the council, the UK is granted a ‘right of veto’, meaning it has the power to unilaterally vote down any resolution or decision.^[6] However, the UK has not used its veto since 1989, when it (along with France and the US) vetoed a draft resolution criticising US military operations in Panama.^[7] Indeed, the UK has said that the veto power should be used responsibly. Speaking about this in April 2023, the UK’s representative stated:

The United Kingdom is clear: the veto is a heavy responsibility, to be used to avoid and resolve conflict. The veto should be used responsibly—and with accountability […]

For our part, the United Kingdom has not exercised our veto since 1989. We listen carefully and negotiate with security council partners to try and find agreement.

The UK also remains committed to never voting against a credible draft resolution on preventing or ending a mass atrocity, as a proud signatory of the accountability, coherence, and transparency group’s code of conduct. We encourage all member states, including the other permanent members of the council, to support this initiative.^[8]

The representative criticised other countries’ use of the veto, particularly citing Russia. Each of Russia, China and the United States have used the veto on multiple occasions in the last five years.^[9]

The UK also has a ‘penholder’ role at the security council, meaning it often leads on the drafting of resolutions and the council’s activities regarding certain international crises.^[10] For example, it has been acting as penholder for the situations in Sudan and Myanmar in recent years.^[11]

In February 2025, several resolutions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were considered at the UN general assembly (the forum involving all UN members) and the security council.^[12] The UN security council resolution was drafted by the United States and called for an end to the conflict. However, it contained no criticism of Russia, and therefore the UK and France sought to amend the resolution to include this. These attempts to amend the wording were rejected. As a result, the UK and France abstained from the vote agreeing the resolution.

Commenting on these developments, Dame Barbara Woodward, the UK’s permanent representative to the UN, spoke about the importance of upholding the UN charter.^[13] She said this was particularly important for members of the security council. She was critical of there being any “equivalence” in the council’s wording on the actions of Ukraine and Russia and spoke about the importance of protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders.

A week earlier, on 18 February 2025, Dame Barbara outlined the UK’s commitment to the United Nations and the security council.^[14] However, she did say the UK acknowledged and agreed with the need for reforms to the council’s membership.

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer also gave a speech to the UN general assembly in September 2024 stressing the UK’s commitment to global leadership and working with international partners on peace, progress and equality.^[15] His speech highlighted a range of global issues, including global conflicts and climate change. Sir Keir committed to UK involvement to address these challenges. In addition, he said the UK accepted the need for reform of the security council and how the UK operates on the international stage:

[The security council] has to change to become a more representative body, willing to act—not paralysed by politics. We want to see permanent African representation on the council, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany as permanent members, and more seats for elected members as well.

Finally, to support this we will also change how the UK does things. Moving from the paternalism of the past towards partnership for the future. Listening a lot more—speaking a bit less. Offering game-changing British expertise and working together in a spirit of equal respect.^[16]

Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘UK at the United Nations: How the UN works’, 28 April 2021
• House of Lords Library, ‘UK’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations’, 17 December 2024
• Council on Foreign Relations, ‘UN security council’, 9 September 2024

1.2 NATO and UK defence spending

The UK is also a founding member of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). NATO was established in 1949 and its purpose is to “guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means”.^[17] It currently has 32 members, including many European nations, Canada and the United States.

NATO operates on the principle that an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all and will therefore instigate a collective response. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (part of the establishment of NATO) states:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the security council. Such measures shall be terminated when the security council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.^[18]

NATO guidelines call for each member to spend 2% of its GDP on defence to “help ensure the alliance’s continued military readiness”.^[19]

According to NATO’s estimates for 2024 (which are based on its own definitions of defence spend), the UK spent around 2.3% on defence.^[20] This put the UK ninth among NATO members for defence spending as a share of GDP. However, in cash terms, NATO calculated the UK spent the third highest on defence, estimated at $82.1bn (or £64.6bn).^[21] The two countries with spend higher than the UK were Germany ($97.7bn, 2.12% of GDP) and the United States ($967.7bn, almost 3.38% of GDP).

However, Sir Keir Starmer pledged on 25 February 2025 to increase UK defence spending to 2.6% of GDP in 2027 (including spend on intelligence services), with the additional ambition of increasing defence spending to 3% in the next parliament.^[22] He said this would be achieved through a cut in aid spending from 0.5% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.3%. The 2024 Labour manifesto had pledged to pursue an increase in defence spending as a share of GDP to 2.5% and also to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid “as soon as fiscal circumstances allow”.^[23] Sir Keir highlighted the unstable global landscape and the changing nature of warfare as the drivers behind the planned increase in defence spending.

As part of the announcement, Sir Keir also stressed the importance of NATO, stating it remained the “bedrock of our security”.^[24] He said the increased investment would “strengthen [the UK’s] position as a leader in NATO and in the collective defence of our continent, and we should welcome that role”. The defence secretary, John Healey, had earlier stated that the upcoming defence strategy (see section 2 of this briefing below) “will ensure that we have a NATO-first policy at the heart of Britain’s defence plans for the future”.^[25]

Earlier in February, NATO’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, commended the UK’s commitment to NATO and to Ukraine, noting its provision of “billions in military and humanitarian aid as well as vital training and security guarantees”.^[26]

Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘What is NATO?’, 14 March 2024
• Royal United Services Institute, ‘What does ‘NATO first’ mean for UK defence?’, 7 October 2024

1.3 Commonwealth

The UK is a member of the Commonwealth, a voluntary association of 56 independent and equal countries spread across multiple continents. King Charles III is head of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth website explains the association of states:

[…] is home to 2.7 billion people, and includes both advanced economies and developing countries. 33 of our members are small states, including many island nations.

Our member governments have agreed to shared goals like development, democracy and peace.^[27]

The Commonwealth has a charter setting out its values and principles. The charter emphasises a commitment to the development of “free and democratic societies and the promotion of peace and prosperity to improve the lives of all the people of the Commonwealth”.^[28] It also acknowledges the role of civil society in supporting the Commonwealth’s goals and values. The Commonwealth has stressed its increased importance at a time of growing global challenges:

Recognising that in an era of changing economic circumstances and uncertainty, new trade and economic patterns, unprecedented threats to peace and security, and a surge in popular demands for democracy, human rights and broadened economic opportunities, the potential of and need for the Commonwealth—as a compelling force for good and as an effective network for cooperation and for promoting development—has never been greater.^[29]

In particular, the Commonwealth Secretariat (which coordinates much of the projects and formal work done through the Commonwealth) states that it works to:

• protect the environment and encourage sustainable use of natural resources on land and sea
• boost trade and the economy
• support democracy, government and the rule of law
• develop society and young people, including gender equality, education, health and sport
• support small states, helping them tackle the particular challenges they face^[30]

In October 2024, Sir Keir Starmer attended the Commonwealth ‘Heads of government’ meeting in Samoa and cited the opportunities for growth across the Commonwealth. The government also highlighted the UK’s trade with Commonwealth countries and the reductions in bilateral trade costs experienced by its members.^[31] As part of the visit, the UK made a number of announcements to partner with and support Commonwealth countries, including supporting countries with food security, trade, and climate mitigation funding.^[32]

Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘Commonwealth’, 7 March 2023; and ‘Statistics on UK trade with the Commonwealth’, 13 December 2024
• Commonwealth, ‘Publications’, accessed 4 March 2025; and ‘Commonwealth at 75’, 2024
• Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Is the Commonwealth under King Charles III still relevant?’, 3 May 2023

1.4 European relations

Although the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, it still maintains relations with the bloc. These relations are principally governed by the Withdrawal Agreement (which came into force immediately following the UK’s withdrawal) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA, which took effect May 2021), and the committee structures created by these agreements.^[33] For example, the TCA included provisions covering free trade arrangements, law enforcement cooperation and the continued participation in certain EU programmes (such as Horizon Europe, the EU’s research and innovation programme).^[34]

In its 2024 general election manifesto, Labour set out its ambition for the UK to be “a leading nation in Europe again, with an improved and ambitious relationship with our European partners”.^[35] It argued that a “strong and connected Britain” was a necessary response to a “more volatile and insecure” world, exemplified by war having returned to Europe, violence in the Middle East, and geopolitical tensions exacerbated by rapid technological change and a changing climate.

The party’s manifesto said Labour would seek to reset the UK-EU relationship, without the UK returning to the single market or the customs union.^[36] It stated that a Labour government would instead strive to improve the UK-EU trade and investment relationship, for example by negotiating a veterinary agreement, helping touring artists, and seeking mutual recognition agreements for professional qualifications. The manifesto also included pledges to pursue an “ambitious new UK-EU security pact” and increased security cooperation with allies such as France and Germany.^[37]

Labour has reiterated this stance since the 2024 general election, highlighting a new bilateral defence agreement with Germany and its ongoing commitment to negotiate a security pact.^[38]

Further information on UK-EU relations can be found in:

• House of Lords Library, ‘UK and Europe: Cultural, diplomatic and security relations’, 1 October 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘UK-EU relationship after Brexit’, accessed 4 March 2025
• European Parliament, ‘EU-UK relations: Towards a stronger partnership in uneasy times’, December 2024

The UK is a founding member of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe was established in 1949 and consists of 46 member states across Europe (it also has several other international observers, such as Canada, Japan and the United States).^[39] The council’s primary focus is the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law across the continent.^[40] Member states must be a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Council of Europe also runs the European Court of Human Rights which oversees the convention’s implementation.^[41]

Baroness Chapman of Darlington, parliamentary under secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), has said the government is committed to the UK playing a “leading role” in the Council of Europe.^[42]

Read more

• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Brexit, bridges, and barriers: Where next for EU-UK relations?’, 29 January 2025
• Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘UK-EU relations and European security’, 7 October 2024

1.5 G7 and G20

The UK is a member of both the G7 and G20 groups of countries.

The G7 is an “informal bloc of industrialised democracies” that meets annually to discuss issues such as “global economic governance, international security, and, most recently, artificial intelligence (AI)”.^[43] Its members are the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, which are considered seven of the world’s largest and most advanced economies. Russia was a member (when the bloc was the G8) from 1998 to 2014. However, it was then excluded due to its annexation of Crimea.^[44] In 2022, it was estimated that G7 countries accounted for approximately 42% of global GDP. However, in 2002 this share had been estimated at 65%.^[45]

G7 members hold regular meetings, including annual summits, and the G7’s presidency rotates on an annual basis. The UK last held the presidency in 2021. The 2024 summit, held in Italy in July 2024, included an agreement to provide $50bn in additional funding to Ukraine from frozen Russian sovereign assets and also a discussion of energy cooperation with Africa.^[46]

Similarly, the G20 is an informal group of major economies, comprising industrialised and developing countries. The G20 is made up of 19 countries and two regional bodies: the EU and the African Union. Countries include G7 members plus countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey.^[47] It is estimated that G20 members make up over 85% of global economic output, around 75% of exports, and about 80 percent of the world’s population. In addition, unlike the G7, the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) states that these proportions have remained relatively stable over the last 25 years.^[48]

The G20 was formed in 1999 with the goal of discussing global economic issues, but in recent years has also been a forum for discussion of climate change and health. As explained by the CFR:

[The G20], originally a collection of 20 of the world’s largest economies, was conceived as a bloc that would bring together the most important industrialized and developing economies to discuss international economic and financial stability. Its annual summit, a gathering of G20 leaders that debuted in 2008, has evolved into a major forum for discussing economics as well as other pressing global issues. Bilateral meetings on the summit’s sidelines have occasionally led to major international agreements.^[49]

For example, the CFR highlighted positive progress on climate change made at the summits, with the US and China notably announcing their accession to the Paris Climate Agreement during the 2016 summit. However, recent years have seen increasing tensions among G20 states due to geopolitical tensions, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

At the G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, Sir Keir Starmer spoke with G20 members about climate change and growth and investment partnerships with the UK. He also held meetings with a number of G20 leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, and called for the cessation of hostilities in a number of regions, including Gaza.^[50] More recently, Chancellor Rachel Reeves attended G20 meetings in South Africa in February 2025 to discuss trade and investment opportunities between South Africa and the UK.^[51]

Further publications on the G7 and G20 can be found on the Chatham House webpage, ‘G7 and G20’ (accessed 4 March 2025).

1.6 Other international bodies

The UK is also a member of a range of other international bodies, including:

• The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which focuses on policies benefiting prosperity, opportunity and equality and wellbeing. It has 38 member countries.^[52]
• The International Monetary Fund, which is a global organisation working to “achieve sustainable growth and prosperity for all of its 191 member countries”.^[53] It supports and promotes economic policies for financial stability and monetary cooperation, stating these are essential to “increase productivity, job creation, and economic wellbeing”.
• The World Bank, which is an international development organisation “owned” by 187 countries.^[54] It works to reduce poverty through lending to poorer nations, with the goal of improving living standards and economic conditions in those countries.
• The World Trade Organization, which operates the global system of trade rules, helps developing countries with trade, and provides a forum to negotiate trading agreements or to resolve disputes. It has 166 members, accounting for 98% of world trade.^[55]

The UK is also involved in several international organisations or partnerships focused on security. This includes:

• A trilateral defence and security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS). AUKUS was first announced in September 2021 and consists of two pillars.^[56] Pillar 1 focuses on supporting Australia to acquire its first conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Pillar 2 focuses on cooperation in eight advanced military capability areas, including AI, quantum technologies, and cyber, undersea, hypersonic, counter-hypersonic and electronic warfare capabilities. The government reaffirmed its commitment to AUKUS via a joint statement from the three countries’ leaders in September 2024.^[57]
• The International Criminal Police Organisation—commonly known as Interpol—which facilitates worldwide police cooperation and crime control.^[58] Areas covered include terrorism, cybercrime, organised crime and financial crimes. The government has particularly highlighted the importance of Interpol in attempts to tackle organised crime groups, including those involved in immigration crime, and violence against women and girls and child sexual abuse.^[59]
• The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which features 57 states across North America, Europe and Asia. The OSCE describes itself as a “forum for political dialogue on a wide range of security issues and a platform for joint action to improve the lives of individuals and communities”.^[60] Its work includes observing elections, facilitating attempts at conflict resolution and the promotion of tools to combat terrorism.^[61] At the OSCE meeting in December 2024, the UK’s representatives highlighted the ongoing importance of the OSCE, stating that its “democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights institutions are globally renowned”.^[62]
• The Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, which facilitates intelligence-sharing between the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Founded in 1946, the alliance cooperates in ‘signals intelligence’ (intelligence gathering from electronic signals or systems used by other states).^[63] The UK Defence Journal claims it is “widely regarded as the world’s most significant intelligence alliance” and that it helped build and consolidate the relationship between the UK and the US, particularly during the cold war.

2. UK defence and security

Despite its relatively modest size and population, the UK is still considered by many to be a significant military power. For example, writing for the UK Defence Journal, George Allison highlighted the UK’s defence spend compared to other countries (such as other NATO countries) and also its nuclear capabilities and experience.^[64] On the latter points, the author explained:

London fields advanced military capabilities that few nations possess: a nuclear arsenal, a world-class Royal Navy (including two new aircraft carriers), a modern air force operating fifth-generation jets, and highly trained special forces.

Crucially, the UK is one of only two European nuclear powers (alongside France) and has decades of combat experience, from the Gulf war to Afghanistan. These assets underpin Britain’s role as a leading NATO member and a permanent seat holder on the UN security council.^[65]

Statistics on many aspects of UK defence can be accessed at:

• Ministry of Defence, ‘MOD accredited official and official statistics by topic’, updated 8 October 2024; including personnel statistics as of 1 January 2025 and equipment statistics for 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘UK defence spending’, 4 December 2024
• Ministry of Defence, ‘UK Defence in numbers 2023’, 2 April 2024

For example, the ‘UK Defence in numbers’ publication estimated that (based on the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ definition) the UK defence budget was the fourth largest in the world, behind the United States, Russia and then China.^[66] It also highlighted the presence of UK regular forces around the world, as shown on the below map:

Figure 1: Numbers of UK regular forces stationed in different areas of the world

Notably in recent years, the UK has provided significant military assistance to Ukraine. As of 28 February 2025, the UK government stated it had provided £7.8bn in military support to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in 2022.^[67] It said that its military support included:

• Around 400 different capabilities to Ukraine, with a new £150mn package including drones, tanks and air defence systems announced on 12 February 2025; a £225mn package including drones, boats and munitions announced on 19 December 2024; and 650 lightweight multirole missiles announced on 6 September 2024.
• 30,000 new attack and surveillance drones to be delivered to Ukraine via the UK and Latvia-led drone coalition (9 January 2025). £7.5mn was invested by the UK (19 November 2024).
• A new rapidly-developed bespoke air defence system called Gravehawk, jointly funded by the UK and Denmark. Two prototypes of the air defence capability system were tested in Ukraine in September, and a further 15 to follow this year (16 January 2025).
• Trained over 51,000 Ukrainian personnel in the UK under Operation INTERFLEX and the training scheme has been extended until at least the end of 2025.^[68]

On 2 March 2025, the UK held a summit involving many leaders from Europe and Canada to discuss ongoing support for Ukraine. Sir Keir Starmer announced they had agreed a “coalition of the willing” to continue supporting Ukraine and that they would continue working with the United States on its involvement.^[69] Sir Keir said leaders had agreed a four-point plan for supporting Ukraine:

• to keep military aid flowing into Ukraine, and to keep increasing the economic pressure on Russia
• that any lasting peace must ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and security and Ukraine must be present at any peace talks
• in the event of a peace deal, to boost Ukraine’s defensive capabilities to deter any future invasion
• to develop a “coalition of the willing” to defend a deal in Ukraine and to guarantee peace afterwards^[70]

In addition, Sir Keir announced an additional £1.6bn of UK export finance to buy more than 5,000 air defence missiles for Ukraine.^[71]

However, concerns have been raised about the UK’s military capability in the current global context. For example, concerns have been raised about personnel numbers and recruitment and military equipment stocks.^[72] As the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) put it in July 2024:

The trend of the past 35 years has been to trade numbers for sophistication, but this has overall led to a diminution of total firepower. The UK can do some things well, but not at a particularly impressive scale when the adversary is a state with significant military power of its own which is prepared to suffer losses. Even a recent defence secretary admitted that the forces had been ‘hollowed out’ over a period of years.^[73]

The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee considered the UK’s security and defence position in its September 2024 report, ‘Ukraine: A wake-up call’. In summary, it stated:

[…] the invasion [of Ukraine] has exposed fundamental weaknesses in both the UK’s and NATO’s military strength. Within the UK, it has raised serious questions regarding the preparedness of government, society and the defence industrial base to support conventional warfighting at scale. We are underprepared to respond to the heightened global threat environment and, in particular, meet the growing threat from Russia.

More specifically, we found that the UK’s armed forces lack the mass, resilience, and internal coherence necessary to maintain a deterrent effect and respond effectively to prolonged and high-intensity warfare.^[74]

For example, it said the size of the UK’s army was “inadequate” and that recruitment processes were “burdensome”.^[75] Other concerns included the UK’s ability to deal with attacks on its critical infrastructure and “cumbersome” defence procurement methods. The committee also raised concerns about current alliances, stating that Russia’s invasion raised questions about NATO’s deterrence value. It highlighted Russia’s alliances with countries such as China, North Korea and “key global south countries” (this includes countries across Central and South America, Africa, Asia and Oceania, such as India, South Africa, Brazil and Saudi Arabia). It said that the UK needed to extend its relationships in the global south and also build upon its security partnerships within Europe.

The committee’s report concluded:

In truth, we are a medium-sized regional power, but our commitment to retaining global influence, particularly through our nuclear and maritime capabilities, makes some of our other military aspirations unaffordable. We now lack a coherent model to augment our relatively small armed forces with the capabilities needed to sustain or deter warfighting. Such a comprehensive model should be a key aspiration of the strategic defence review and will undoubtedly rest on an ability to better leverage technology, industry, the reserves, allies and wider society.^[76]

Further information can be found in the committee report itself and the ‘Government response’ (published 27 November 2024). In addition, the House of Lords Library has published a briefing covering the report and government response ahead of a House of Lords debate on 6 March 2025:

• House of Lords Library, ‘Ukraine: A wake-up call—Lords committee report debate’, 13 February 2025

As highlighted in the government’s response to the report, the government is currently carrying out a strategic defence review (SDR). It has described the review as a “root and branch review of UK defence”.^[77]

It is being conducted by three external reviewers, including the lead reviewer Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Labour), a former defence secretary and NATO secretary general. The review’s purpose, as set out in its terms of reference, is to:

[…] determine the roles, capabilities and reforms required by UK Defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century, deliverable and affordable within the resources available to Defence within the trajectory to 2.5%. The review will ensure that Defence is central both to the security, and to the economic growth and prosperity, of the United Kingdom.^[78]

The terms of the SDR require the reviewers to submit their final report to the prime minister, the chancellor of the exchequer and the defence secretary in the first half of 2025.^[79] The government has said it is now expecting the final report in spring 2025.^[80]

In addition, the government has committed to a defence industrial strategy.^[81] Explaining its purpose, the government said:

The strategic aim of the government’s new defence industrial strategy is to make sure the imperatives of national security and a high-growth economy are aligned. A better defence sector that is fit for the future will boost the prosperity of our people, provide resilience and self-reliance for our nation, and ensure the credibility of our deterrence.^[82]

The government highlighted several problems the strategy must address, including “strategic incoherence”, inefficient spending, the pace of innovation and skills shortages. It said the strategy would be developed in line with six priorities, prioritising UK business; creating partnerships; certainty and stability; building for the future; spreading prosperity; and deterrence.

The government intends for the strategy to be published late spring 2025. Commenting in December 2024, it stated:

The defence industrial strategy will be developed at pace. It will be informed by, but remain separate from, the strategic defence review and will be published in late spring 2025, with a remit extending to 2035. It will be a sector plan as part of the wider government’s industrial strategy.^[83]

As noted above, the government has since said that it will be increasing defence spend to 2.6% of GDP in 2027. In his speech setting this out, Sir Keir Starmer gave an update on the SDR and how it would link to other national security policies to be published by the government:

[…] the strategic defence review is well under way, and across government we are conducting a number of other reviews relevant to national security, it is obvious that those reviews must pull together. So before the NATO summit in June [2025] we will publish a single national security strategy and bring it to this House, because, as I said earlier, that is how we must meet the threats of our age: together and with strength—a new approach to defence, a revival of our industrial base, a deepening of our alliances; the instruments of our national power brought together; creating opportunity, assuring our allies and delivering security for our country.^[84]

Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘UK armed forces operational commitments’, 25 February 2025
• House of Lords Library, ‘Deterrence as part of the UK’s defence policy’, 25 October 2024; and ‘Strategic defence review’, 2 October 2024
• House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘UK defence policy: From aspiration to reality?’, 12 January 2023, HL Paper 124 of session 2022–23
• Royal United Services Institute, ‘The UK’s ambition for defence and security with the EU and NATO’, 5 February 2025
• International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘UK defence: New options for change?’, 12 July 2024

3. Government approach to foreign affairs and influence

In March 2023, the then Conservative government published its ‘Integrated review (IR) refresh’. This updated the UK’s approach to national security and international policy initially set out in the 2021 IR. It said the refresh was needed due to the rapid geopolitical change since 2021, including increased global hostilities from countries such as China and Russia.

Information on these IRs can be found in the House of Commons Library briefing, ‘The integrated review refresh 2023: What has changed since 2021?’ (15 March 2023). However, in brief, the four key policy aims set out in the refresh were:

• Shape the international environment. The UK will actively shape, balance, cooperate and compete to create the conditions, structures and incentives necessary for an open and stable international order and to protect global public goods.
• Deter, defend and compete across all domains. We will strengthen our integrated approach to deterrence and defence, to counter both state threats and transnational security challenges. We will also work to uphold strategic stability, establishing new frameworks and building a new international security architecture to manage systemic competition and escalation in a multipolar environment.
• Address vulnerabilities through resilience. We will develop the UK’s approach to resilience, addressing the economic, societal, technological, environmental and infrastructural factors that leave the UK exposed to crises and hostile actors.
• Generate strategic advantage. We will reinforce and extend IR2021’s focus on strategic advantage—the UK’s relative ability to achieve our objectives compared to our competitors. We will cultivate our national strengths and update our tools of statecraft to maintain the UK’s freedom of action, freedom from coercion and our ability to cooperate with others.^[85]

Along with commitments to investment in defence and national security, the IR refresh set out plans for investment in the UK’s economic security; building the UK’s cooperation and trading relationship with countries in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the Gulf and beyond; maximising soft power (such as through the BBC World Service and the British Council); further focus on developing a strategic advantage in science and technology; and leading on international development.^[86]

The Labour government has set out its foreign policy objectives under the principle of ‘reconnecting’ to the rest of the world. For example, Labour’s 2024 general election manifesto set out its ambition to “reconnect with allies and forge new partnerships to deliver security and prosperity at home and abroad”.^[87] It argued that a “strong and connected Britain” was a necessary response to a “more volatile and insecure” world, exemplified by war having returned to Europe, violence in the Middle East, and geopolitical tensions exacerbated by rapid technological change and a changing climate. The manifesto summarised Labour’s overall approach as follows:

Our commitment to NATO as the cornerstone of European and global security is unshakeable. We will be confident in our status outside of the EU, but a leading nation in Europe once again, with an improved and ambitious relationship with our European partners. We will once again be a good partner for international development, and a defender of the international rule of law. And we will return to the forefront of climate action by creating the green jobs of the future at home and driving forward the energy transition on the global stage.^[88]

Further information is set out in the House of Lords Library briefing, ‘King’s Speech 2024: Foreign affairs and international development’ (12 July 2024). In addition to the strategic defence review, it references government commitments to:^[89]

• “rebuild” relationships with the US, Europe and use its “unique position in NATO, the UN, G7, G20 and the Commonwealth to address the threats we face, and to uphold human rights and international law”
• conduct an audit of the UK’s relationship with China and further develop relationships and trade partnerships with India, Africa and the Gulf
• use the UK’s diplomatic network to attract foreign direct investment and boost exports
• lead on climate change collaboration, including through the development of a clean power alliance^[90]
• strengthen diplomatic influence, including through the use of soft power via the UK’s creative and cultural institutions
• “rebuild” Britain’s international development reputation, including by restoring spend to 0.7% of GNI when fiscal circumstances allowed and developing a “new approach based on genuine respect and partnership with the global south to support our common interests”

On 9 January 2025, Foreign Secretary David Lammy gave a speech on UK foreign policy.^[91] The speech highlighted developments since Labour came to office, including the defence agreement with Germany, talks with China and the EU, UK engagement with the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, and the launch of the clean power alliance. Looking ahead, David Lammy stressed the UK’s focus would be on:

• developing closer global engagement with allies in the United States, Europe and the Five Eyes, strategic partnerships in Japan and South Korea, and “all those committed to the principles of the UN charter”
• increasing defence funding
• forging new partnerships in the global south

He also spoke about the importance of UK diplomats, economic growth and cooperation, soft power, and technological innovations, such as AI. In addition, Mr Lammy highlighted other strategic reviews the government had launched on:^[92]

• the UK’s global impact
• how to maximise the benefits of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s joint integrated development diplomacy model in our development work
• our economic capability in diplomacy

At the time of writing, the results of these reviews had not been published. However, further information on them can be found in the government’s press release: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Foreign secretary launches expert reviews to strengthen UK’s global impact and expertise’, 9 September 2024.

Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘Forthcoming strategic defence review: Frequently asked questions’, 29 November 2024
• House of Lords Library, ‘UK’s role in the world: Implications for foreign policy’, 27 April 2023
• Council on Geostrategy, ‘How can Britain make its foreign policy more impactful?’, 29 November 2024

3.1 UK soft power

As noted above, one aspect of the UK’s foreign relations policy is utilising ‘soft power’, described as influencing countries in non-coercive ways. The CFR explains the term as follows:

In the 1980s, political scientist Joseph Nye Jr coined the term soft power, defining it as a country’s ability to influence others without resorting to coercive pressure. In practice, that process entails countries projecting their values, ideals, and culture across borders to foster goodwill and strengthen partnerships.

Soft power usually originates outside government in places like schools, religious institutions, and charitable groups. It’s also formed through music, sports, media, and major industries like Silicon Valley and Hollywood. But that doesn’t mean governments are absent from cultivating and wielding soft power.^[93]

The consultancy firm Brand Finance has ranked the UK third in its soft power rankings for 2025, behind the United States and then China.^[94] The index is based on surveys across countries, judging each country through a number of metrics (such as diplomatic influence, arts and cultural reach and technology and innovation) to assess their non-coercive influence on “preferences and behaviours of various actors in the international arena”. Explaining the positioning of China and the UK, Brand Finance stated:

For the first time, China has surpassed the UK to rank second with a score of 72.8 out of 100—its highest ever position. Since 2024, China has recorded statistically significant growth across six of the eight soft power pillars, and in two-thirds of measured attributes, stemming from strategic efforts including Belt and Road projects, an increased focus on sustainability, stronger domestic brands, and post-pandemic reopening to visitors.

At the same time, the United Kingdom’s drop to third place behind China reflects a period of stagnation in its nation brand perceptions. While scores remain relatively stable, a lack of progress across key pillars—especially business and trade, down to sixth, and governance, down to third, are an argument that the UK should bolster its soft power strategy.

David Haigh, chairman of Brand Finance, commented: “China has invested heavily in enhancing its soft power, and now we’re seeing the result as it ranks higher than the United Kingdom for the first time in the six years Brand Finance has released the global soft power index. The 2025 rankings reflect China’s sustained efforts to enhance its economic attractiveness, showcase its culture, and boost its reputation as a safe and well-governed nation. The UK needs to keep up and the establishment of the UK Soft Power Council is a step in the right direction”.^[95]

As noted in the above comments, the UK recently launched a Soft Power Council. This was announced in partnership between the FCDO and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in January 2025. In a press release about the launch, the government stated:

The UK ranks in the top three across all major soft power indices, with global affinity for our culture and creative industries, sport, education and institutions. The soft power which these represent are a hugely important driver of UK economic growth and security. They deepen our relationships, build alliances and enhance our global influence. But, until now, there has been no mechanism to coordinate and amplify these sectors’ impact.

The newly established council will identify opportunities across the sectors and industries represented where closer working with government can advance our broader growth and security objectives. It will drive greater impact through government campaigns and a systematic approach to the global foreign policy, cultural and sporting calendars.^[96]

In addition, the government highlighted its investment in cultural organisations and creative businesses to support this agenda.^[97]

The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee also launched an inquiry on UK soft power in January 2025. It explained it would likely run across the parliament, with multiple outputs, and would consider:

• What advantages soft power brings to the UK.
• The UK’s soft power strengths, including a focus on diplomacy, post-conflict reconstruction, commitment to the rules-based international order, culture and media, education and trade and the economy and education.
• How the UK’s soft power might be compared to allies and “adversaries” around the world. The committee noted that China, India, Russia and Turkey had invested significantly in their soft power offerings and the inquiry would therefore consider what the UK’s “USP” (unique selling point) might be.^[98]

Committee chair Dame Emily Thornberry (Labour) commented:

The UK is a world leader when it comes to soft power, punching well above our weight. The UK is largely seen as a force for good, and a fair and balanced voice on the world stage. Many of our artistic and cultural institutions are well-loved and widely recognised. The British values of liberalism, tolerance and respect for the rule of law are emulated across the world.

While soft power is one of the UK’s greatest strengths, we can’t afford to be complacent. Countries such as China, Russia and India are building up their soft power offer in the form of diplomatic, educational and cultural exchanges, and have shown they will fill any gaps left by the UK and other like-minded countries moving on. While the UK has successfully made the case for democratic values in the past, new, competing narratives seek to undermine this.^[99]

In 2014, a House of Lords committee on soft power made similar points, stressing:

In this hugely changed international context, soft power has become vital for modern nations’ security and prosperity. We have concluded that successfully communicating the attributes, values and outputs that gain for the UK both attractiveness and respect in the eyes of people abroad will be vital in maintaining the UK in positions of influence. The mindset of those who shape the UK’s foreign policy must reflect this. Many other nations are rapidly grasping this agenda: the UK’s traditional rivals are enhancing their foreign policy capabilities and styles on every front, including strengthening their cultural diplomacy institutions. China, Russia and other nations are also investing vast sums in supporting their strategies of power and influence assertion through softer and newer methods.^[100]

The committee made a number of recommendations for the then coalition government to increase its focus on soft power. These can be found in the full committee report: House of Lords Soft Power and the UK’s Influence Committee, ‘Persuasion and power in the modern world’ (28 March 2014, HL Paper 150 of session 2013–14). However, in summary, recommendations included:^[101]

• strengthening the UK’s embassy network and its network among countries, such as the Commonwealth
• analysing how soft power can link with ‘hard power’ (defence) and the UK’s work on post-conflict reconstruction in countries such as Afghanistan
• linking soft power deployment and support to UK exports, enterprise and other innovative capacities

Read more

• British Council, ‘Global Britain: The UK’s soft power advantage’, July 2021
• UK Soft Power Group, ‘Future of UK soft power: Building a strategic framework’, 2023

3.2 UK international development assistance

Statistics on UK overseas development assistance (ODA) for 2023 can be found in the FCDO publication: ‘Final UK ODA spend 2023’ (published September 2024). Key findings included:^[102]

• ODA spend was £15,344mn, an increase of £2,558mn (20 percent) on 2022. This represented 0.58% of GNI.
• £4,273mn (28 percent) of UK ODA was spent on support to refugees or asylum seekers in the UK or other donor countries.
• Africa was the largest recipient of UK region-specific bilateral ODA, accounting for £1,229mn. The second largest recipient region was Asia, at £864mn.
• The top three recipients of UK country-specific bilateral ODA were Ukraine (£250mn), Ethiopia (£164mn) and Afghanistan (£115mn).

It also reported that, among specified donor countries (those of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)), the UK was the fourth largest donor, behind the United States (£53.1bn), Germany (£29.5bn) and Japan (£15.8bn).^[103]

As noted in previous sections of this briefing, Labour’s manifesto committed to return aid spending to 0.7% of GNI when fiscal circumstances allowed.^[104] It also prioritised aid spending to tackle global poverty and instability:

To counter the growing influence of malign actors and boost efforts to combat threats like climate change, the UK’s development work must be closely aligned with our foreign policy aims, coordinated to tackle global poverty, instability, and the climate and nature crisis. Our mission statement will be ‘to create a world free from poverty on a liveable planet’ as a signal of our commitment to greater multilateral action, and our intention to lead on this agenda.^[105]

On 6 February 2025, the then minister for international development, Anneliese Dodds, issued a statement in the House of Commons on the UK’s aid strategy and allocations for 2024–25. In doing so, she stated:

ODA is central for delivering the government’s mission to help create a world free from poverty on a liveable planet, working in a modern, genuine partnership with the global south. FCDO’s ODA spending will be used to achieve better development outcomes as part of a coherent international approach, with a strong focus on poverty reduction and accelerating progress on the sustainable development goals. Our approach to development will deliver inclusive growth, tackle the climate crisis and address irregular migration. Plans to reduce asylum costs are creating more space in the ODA budget to spend on our international development priorities overseas.^[106]

However, the prime minister announced on 25 February 2025 that the government would reduce aid spending to 0.3% of GNI in 2027 to allow for the planned increase in defence spending. Addressing this, Sir Keir Starmer stated:

I want to be clear to the House that this is not an announcement that I am happy to make. I am proud of our pioneering record on overseas development, and we will continue to play a key humanitarian role in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza, tackling climate change and supporting multinational efforts on global health and challenges like vaccination. In recent years, the development budget was redirected towards asylum backlogs, paying for hotels, so as we are clearing that backlog at a record pace, there are efficiencies that will reduce the need to cut spending on our overseas programmes. None the less, it remains a cut, and I will not pretend otherwise. We will do everything we can to return to a world where that is not the case and to rebuild a capability on development. But at times like this, the defence and security of the British people must always come first. That is the number one priority of this government.^[107]

Subsequently, on 28 February 2025 Anneliese Dodds quit her role as international development minister citing the planned reductions in aid spending. She said it would “remove food and healthcare from desperate people—deeply harming the UK’s reputation”.^[108]

Romilly Greenhill, chief executive of Bond (the UK network for organisations working in international development and humanitarian assistance), was deeply critical of the planned aid reductions, stating:

This is a short-sighted and appalling move by both the prime minister and Treasury. Slashing the already diminished UK aid budget to fund an uplift in defence is a reckless decision that will have devastating consequences for millions of marginalised people worldwide.

Following in the US’s footsteps will not only undermine the UK’s global commitments and credibility, but also weaken our own national security interests. Instead of stepping up, the UK is turning its back on communities facing poverty, conflict and insecurity, further damaging its credibility on the global stage.^[109]

Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘UK aid: Spending reductions since 2020 and outlook from 2024/25’, 12 February 2025
• House of Lords Library, ‘Importance of foreign aid programme’, 24 June 2021
• Independent Commission for Aid Impact, ‘How UK aid is spent’, 26 February 2025

4. UK economy and trade

According to the World Bank, the UK ranked sixth for total GDP value in 2023, behind the United States, Germany, China, Japan and India.^[110]

The Department for Business and Trade also estimated that the UK ranked fourth globally for both the value of imports and exports of goods and services in 2023.^[111] Its top six export markets in the four quarters running to the end of September 2024 were the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, France and China. Its top three import markets were the same, but with France then in fourth, followed by China and Spain. Total value of UK trade in 2024 was £1,703.4bn.

The UK has trade partnerships and agreements with a range of countries, including the EU, Japan, Australia and Singapore. It is also in the process of negotiating agreements with other countries including India, Canada, Mexico and the Gulf Cooperation Council bloc (which includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). Details on these agreements can be found at the Department for Business and Trade and Department for International Trade webpage, ‘UK’s trade agreements’, updated 25 February 2025.

The government highlighted the UK economy’s global strengths and opportunities in its 2024 industrial strategy consultation. It highlighted the UK’s:^[112]

• “high quality” research institutions and innovative firms, claiming the UK produced 57% more academic publications than the US and six times more than China, in per capita terms, in 2020
• global connections, including its trading significance, transport links and language
• comparative advantage in sectors such as financial and business services, life sciences and advanced manufacturing
• diverse and highly skilled workforce
• “global, urban powerhouse” of London, which it stated attracts global talent and hosts Europe’s “most competitive financial centre”
• foreign direct investment (FDI) rates, claiming it was one of the top destinations for FDI stock in the world

Setting out the UK’s approach to international partnerships in this context, the paper stated:

The UK’s multilateral and bilateral economic partnerships with other countries are crucial to increasing growth—opening up investment and export routes, tackling barriers to trade, and partnering to create shared markets. The UK works closely with international partners to tackle issues affecting the global economy and shared economic resilience, including cooperating to reduce critical dependencies. Alongside partners in the G7, the UK has agreed to enhance resilient supply chains through partnerships around the world, especially for critical goods such as critical minerals, semiconductors, and batteries.

In support of the industrial strategy, the government will enhance the UK’s already strong bilateral relationships by building on previous agreements and partnerships such as the UK-US Atlantic Declaration and the UK-Japan Hiroshima Accord. The government is also developing new agreements, such as the UK-Germany treaty, and delivering an agenda of strengthened cooperation with the EU, as agreed by the prime minister and the president of the European Commission. Strategic investment partnerships, such as with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, will also support economic links, capital flows, and longer-term investment pipelines.

The UK has strong foundations, but there is more that government can do to ensure that its work with other countries brings tangible benefits for sectors at the forefront of growth. To deliver the industrial strategy, the government will build international partnerships that support growth-driving sectors, and help to manage the geopolitical risks and opportunities affecting growth. The UK’s overseas trade and diplomatic network—one of the largest in the world—will proactively support international business to invest in the UK, and UK companies to export and find new markets.^[113]

The government intends to publish the final industrial strategy in spring 2025 alongside the multi-year spending review.

5. Chatham House commentary on the UK’s global standing

Chatham House regularly publishes articles and reports on the UK’s role in the world. These can be found on its webpage, ‘UK’s global role’ (accessed 4 March 2025), with many focusing on specific themes, such as the UK’s international reputation on climate change or the rule of law.

In May 2024, in advance of the general election, Chatham House published a paper suggesting the foreign affairs priorities for the next government. It stressed the need for “realistic ambition”, stating:

[…] the UK should be practical about its resources and limits, but it should not retreat from international affairs, which are critical to its own interests, values and prosperity, nor downplay its obvious strengths. The UK has played a decisive role in European security, and has significant defence, diplomatic, cultural and scientific assets to offer. The proliferation of problems overseas, and their implications for the UK’s fortunes, are all the more reason for an agile, active foreign policy.^[114]

It recommended three long-term priorities for the government’s foreign policy agenda, namely:^[115]

• Navigating unpredictable great power dynamics. It highlighted the expected difficulties managing relations with countries such as China and the US. For example, it said engagement with China would be essential to the UK on trade and desirable on global problems such as climate change, technology and developing-country debt. However, the paper highlighted the problems balancing this against protecting the UK, and suggested investment in more China specialists and the UK’s defence against cyberattacks. On the United States, it predicted trading difficulties. Therefore, it said that, rather than continue to pursue a comprehensive free trade deal, the UK should instead focus on sectoral agreements and partnerships.
• Improving the UK’s relations with Europe. The paper highlighted how the UK’s ongoing support for Ukraine had improved European relations following Brexit: “The Conservative government’s vigorous support of Ukraine, maintained through three prime ministers since Russia’s 2022 invasion and echoed by the Labour opposition, has given the UK a prominent voice in the defence of Europe. This support has strengthened the UK’s conversation with EU countries about common risks, in turn opening up the chance for more constructive discussion of post-Brexit relations”. It saw opportunities to improve the UK-EU trade and cooperation agreement (the TCA) and cooperation on regional defence/security, energy security and emissions.
• Strengthening the UK’s role in global governance and international development. Although Chatham House described the UK as a “mid-sized power”, it nevertheless believed the UK had a lot to offer in terms of defence, diplomacy and foreign policy. It continued: “Its alliances and membership of multilateral institutions provide foreign policy leverage. Given these strengths, the UK should play a consistent role on global issues where it has credibility—particularly on climate change, international development, arms control and technology governance. More broadly, it should advance principles of international law and order”. It said the UK had a long history of association with these principles, but also stressed that its own behaviour—both at home and abroad—needed to adhere to these standards.

The paper backed the principle of moving towards spending 3% of GDP on defence.^[116] However, it also stressed the importance of aid spending, recommending a move back towards 0.7% of GNI spend or—at least—more predictable and clear aid spending priorities.

Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘UK in a volatile world’, 16 July 2024
• House of Lords Library, ‘Challenges to a rules-based international order’, 9 January 2025; ‘US election 2024: How will Donald Trump’s return impact the UK’s global future?’, 16 December 2024; and ‘UK government policy towards China’, 12 December 2024
• Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘UK foreign policy in a changing world’, 7 February 2025
• Council on Geostrategy, ‘To what extent is Britain still a great power?’, 13 September 2024

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