UK-EU relationship and the war in Ukraine: Lords committee report

Approximate read time: 10 minutes

On 21 November 2024, the House of Lords is scheduled to debate the following motion:

Lord Ricketts (Crossbench) to move that this House takes note of the report from the European Affairs Committee ‘The Ukraine effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU relationship’ (1st report, session 2023–24, HL paper 48).

Lord Ricketts is chair of the House of Lords European Affairs Committee.

1. Committee report: Recommendations and government response

On 31 January 2024, the House of Lords European Affairs Committee published its report ‘The Ukraine effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU relationship’. The government response was published in March 2024, under the previous Conservative administration.

The committee examined the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on UK-EU relations. The committee’s aim was to focus on the longer-term impact and to “look beyond immediate crisis management”.^[1]

The committee said it broadly welcomed and commended the responses from the UK government and the EU to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The committee stated its recommendations were designed to strengthen the existing approach and to make it “more effective.”^[2] The committee focused its recommendations on four main themes:

• cooperation on sanctions
• UK-EU defence relationship
• reconstruction of Ukraine
• long-term implications for the UK-EU foreign and security relationship

The rest of section 1 of this briefing summarises some of the committee’s key recommendations on these areas and provides an overview of the government’s response to them.

1.1 Cooperation on sanctions

The committee stated it had received evidence that arrangements for cooperation on sanctions between the UK, EU and other international allies against Russia had been “effective overall”.^[3] However, it also heard doubts expressed about how well sanctions were being enforced, and problems caused by divergence between sanction regimes. The committee’s recommendations included:

• The coordination between the UK and the EU should be considered as a model for “pragmatic cooperation that could be replicated in other areas of the EU-UK relationships”.^[4]
• Government should work with international partners to ensure that divergence on imposition and enforcement of sanctions was limited. The committee said it recognised that some “minor differences [could be] justified”.^[5] However, it argued divergence causes loopholes and gaps, “weakening their effectiveness”.^[6]
• The UK and its allies should take decisive action to counter actions taken by Russia to circumvent sanctions.
• Sanctioned assets should be used for the reconstruction of Ukraine. The committee urged the government to work closely with the EU and other international partners to explore how this could be done. It cautioned that any mechanism used must be consistent with international law.
• The government should consult with the EU on an “off-ramp” arrangement through which sanctioned entities could be removed from the sanction list if certain conditions were met.^[7] The committee highlighted that unlike the UK, the EU periodically reviews its individual sanctions regimes.
• The government should establish a regular working arrangement between the UK and the EU on sanctions policy covering other regimes as well as Russia and Belarus. The committee said one option would be to agree a memorandum of understanding with the EU on sanctions cooperation.^[8]

The government said that it agreed that its cooperation with the EU and other partners on sanctions had been effective.^[9] It said it could “reassure” the committee that this approach was already being applied in other areas such as in the Middle East and China and on issues such as cyber.

The government said it was committed to working with its international partners to mitigate against risks of divergence.^[10] It said UK-EU coordination included regular engagement at all levels with the EU. The government highlighted what it said was a “regular” sanctions coordinators forum, which brought together senior officials from the EU and G7.

The government stated it was open to exploring new models for long-term working arrangements between the UK and EU on sanctions policy.^[11] However, the government said it had “not seen evidence that a memorandum of understanding would make a significant difference”. Nevertheless, it said it would like to reassure the committee that its work with the EU on sanctions extended beyond Russia and included policy and frameworks on human rights, Iran, Myanmar and the Middle East.

The government also said it was committed to working with allies to “explore all lawful avenues through which immobilised Russian sovereign assets” could be used to support Ukraine.^[12]

1.2 Defence regime

The committee commended the government’s policy on supplying Ukraine with military support:

We welcome the leading role of the United Kingdom as the second largest supplier of military support for Ukraine, amounting to £7.1bn overall at the time of writing, and the encouragement that the government has provided to other European countries to provide support.^[13]

However, the committee said it was “concerned about challenges to sustaining the current levels of support in the medium and longer term”.^[14] Its recommendations on what the government’s approach should be included:

• The government should continue to work with the EU and allies in providing military aid to Ukraine for “as long as it takes to reverse Russian aggression”.^[15] The committee said close EU-UK cooperation was of particular importance “in the case of a policy change by a future US administration”.^[16]
• The UK should engage with the EU’s process of developing its defence industrial regime. On the issue of European defence fund projects, the committee argued it was a “a matter of regret that the current rules are a major obstacle to third-country participation, even when UK-EU strategic objectives are so closely aligned”.^[17] It said the government should continue to collaborate with individual EU member states on bilateral and multilateral projects and that it should seek to complement existing coordination “through an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency”.
• Any UK-EU cooperation on defence must be complementary with NATO’s objectives. The committee argued that NATO remained the leading organisation for defending Europe.

The government agreed that a “robust pipeline of military aid” to Ukraine was necessary.^[18]

On the issue of cooperation on defence projects, it said UK government ministers and officials continued to raise concerns about the terms of participation by non-EU third countries in EU defence initiatives.^[19] It said it would continue to encourage “fairer terms”. However, the government argued the UK had “steadily increased defence engagement” with the EU and committed to continuing to look for areas to strengthen UK-EU security including on countering disinformation, terrorism and cyber.

The government also said its policy was to promote greater NATO-EU cooperation around the defence industry to help ensure the “fewest possible barriers within the transatlantic industrial base”.^[20]

1.3 Reconstruction of Ukraine

The committee argued the reconstruction of Ukraine will be a “colossal undertaking, regardless of the outcome of the conflict”.^[21] The committee contended that work on rebuilding could not wait until the war had ended. It called for the UK government to:

• Work closely with the EU and other international partners to avoid duplication and to ensure there was a “coherent programme that best meets Ukraine’s needs”.^[22] The committee welcomed the UK’s actions to date, including hosting the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London in June 2023. The committee called for this to be an annual event.
• Take “full advantage” of its strong reputation in Ukraine for its expertise in several sectors essential to reconstruction, such as private sector investment and the insurance industry. The committee said the UK government should work closely with the EU, its member states, and other partners.
• Work closely with the EU to ensure assistance to the Ukrainian government “serves the shared objective of bringing Ukraine into Western institutions”.^[23] The committee said this should include providing support to Ukraine in meeting the EU’s accession criteria.^[24]
• Take a leading role with the EU and its other partners to support Ukraine in its work to tackle corruption and strengthen its public institutions.^[25]

In its response to the committee report, the government said coordination with its international partners on Ukraine’s reconstruction was a “top priority”.^[26] It said the UK-Ukraine Agreement on Security Cooperation, signed in January 2024, set out the UK’s reform expectations for the government of Ukraine, “aligning with priority reforms areas set by NATO, the EU, [International Monetary Fund] IMF, and our G7 partners”.^[27] The government said the agreement made clear the UK would continue to provide security assistance.

On the issue of the role of the private sector, the government said it hosted several sector-specific engagements with private businesses as forums to develop and coordinate action. Work the government highlighted included:^[28]

• UK-Ukraine Private Finance Partnership: explores how UK-based firms can support the development of Ukraine’s capital markets.
• UK-Ukraine Infrastructure Taskforce: works to highlight business opportunities and investment environments in Ukraine for UK businesses.
• UK Strategic Trade and Industry Group: supports the UK’s engagement with senior business representatives on doing business with Ukraine.
• TheCityUK’s “City-Ukraine Hub” platform: offers technical support from UK financial and related professional services.
• UK-Ukraine TechBridge: supports the rollout of industry-led initiatives around capacity building, facilitating research and development, and accelerating investment.

1.4 Long-term implications for the UK-EU foreign and security relationship

The committee argued that in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, the EU had demonstrated an ability to play a more geopolitical role. However, it contended that it “remain[ed] to be seen whether developments over the past two years represent a durable change in the EU’s approach”.^[29] The committee highlighted the EU’s approach to events in the Middle East, suggesting that its response had not been as “clear and united”.

The committee suggested any change in the EU’s approach to Ukraine would have implications for the UK, and cautioned that reduction in US support to Ukraine would be a challenge for all of Europe.^[30]

To address these challenges, the committee’s recommendations included:

• The UK government should continue to monitor the evolution of EU external policies when considering its foreign and security policy.
• The UK and the EU should consider whether any of the informal arrangements operating outside of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which had been finalised in December 2020, should be made permanent.
• The UK government should approach the EU with the purpose of establishing more “regular, forward-looking formats for cooperation on major foreign and security policy issues”, such as on China.^[31]

The government agreed that the evolution of the EU’s external policies was important for the UK.^[32] The government argued there was “scope for us to work with the EU as a close and likeminded partner in an increasingly volatile international space”.

The government contended the 2023 integrated review refresh (IRR) made “clear” the UK would work in coordination with its allies, including the EU. The government said the IRR set out its commitment to work with its international partners to:

[…] build and maintain robust, reliable international relationships to uphold global norms, defend global rules, and build global economic resilience in Europe and further afield^[33]

On the issue of more formal arrangements for cooperation, the government said that its informal but regularised engagement with the EU was delivering on areas of mutual interest.^[34] While it said it was “open to different options”, the government maintained that it did not currently consider that “bringing [cooperation] within a formalised structure would lead to more effective coordination”.

2. Labour government policy on UK-EU cooperation on security

In its 2024 general election manifesto, the Labour party said that a Labour government would seek:

[…] a new security agreement with the EU to ensure access to real-time intelligence and enable our policing teams to lead joint investigations with their European counterparts.^[35]

The manifesto stated under a Labour government there would be “an improved and ambitious relationship with our European partners”.^[36] Labour also committed to working with its allies to enable the “seizure and repurposing of frozen Russian state assets to support Ukraine”.^[37]

In October 2024, Foreign Secretary David Lammy attended the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg. The government said the UK’s attendance at the meeting would be part of “more regular engagement, with plans for closer working on international affairs and to strengthen the UK-EU partnership on security matters”.^[38] Ahead of the meeting, the foreign secretary argued:

UK security is indivisible from European security. This government is determined to reset our relationships and deepen ties with our European partners in order to make us all safer […] This visit is an opportunity for the UK to be back at the table, discussing the most pressing global issues with our closest neighbours and tackle the seismic challenges we all face.

The government has also launched a strategic defence review (SDR), which is expected to report in the first half of 2025.^[39] One of the themes to be covered by the SDR is the UK’s international partnerships and alliances, and how these can be strengthened in the cause of collective security and deterrence. Further information on the SDR can be found in the House of Lords Library briefing ‘Strategic defence review’ (2 October 2024).

3. Read more

• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘UK support to Ukraine: Factsheet’, updated 21 October 2024
• Debate on ‘Ukraine’, HL Hansard, 25 October 2024, cols 839–902
• House of Lords Library, ‘UK and Europe: Cultural, diplomatic and security relations’, 1 October 2024
• House of Lords Library, ‘War in Ukraine: Update October 2024’, 16 October 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘Sanctions, international law, and seizing Russian assets’, 7 November 2024

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Cover image from Freepik.