UK approach to the Arctic: Lords committee report

Approximate read time: 12 minutes

On 9 January 2025, the House of Lords is scheduled to debate the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee report ‘Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic’, which was published on 29 November 2023.

1. Where is the Arctic region?

There is no agreement on what constitutes the Arctic region; there is no single definition of its southern boundary.^[1] Definitions of the Arctic include the area within the Arctic Circle, which lies 66° 34´ north of the equator; the area within the July 10°C isotherm, where the average temperature is below 10°C in the warmest month (July); and the area north of the Arctic treeline.

Nevertheless, the Arctic Circle provides a political boundary.^[2] Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States are considered Arctic states by virtue of having territory within the Arctic Circle and are the eight full members of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation in the region among the Arctic states, Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants.^[3] The UK has observer status to the council.

2. Why did the committee launch the inquiry?

The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee launched its inquiry on the Arctic and the UK’s approach to the region in March 2023.

The committee argued that the diplomatic and security context in the Arctic was “rapidly evolving”.^[4] It said that global warming and a fast reduction in ice coverage had potentially made the region and its resources more accessible to external actors. In addition, it argued the region had become more militarised, with the risk of further militarisation increasing following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It said the war in Ukraine had also reduced the prospects for multilateral cooperation with Russia, the largest Arctic state, through the Arctic Council.^[5]

The committee stated that while the UK was not an Arctic state, it is the region’s closest neighbour. Therefore, developments in the region would be “critical to UK interests”.^[6]

Therefore, the committee said its intention was to consider the UK’s strategic and diplomatic interests in the Arctic in light of the changing environment. The aim of the inquiry was to assess the government’s current policy approach and to provide recommendations on how the UK could best advance its interests and those of its allies in the region.^[7]

The UK government has set out its approach and priorities in the Arctic in two policy documents:

• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s (FCDO) ‘Looking North: The UK and the Arctic’ (the ‘Arctic policy framework’) published in February 2023. The framework set out the government’s aim to help ensure the Arctic remained peaceful.^[8] It said that through the framework, the UK would take a whole government approach, and that it would be “dynamic and responsive to changes” in the region. The document set out the government’s four priority areas for its activity: partnering and collaborating, including remaining committed to the Arctic Council as a state observer; protecting the climate, people and environment; preserving security and stability; and promoting shared prosperity in the region, where economic and regional development is achieved in a “safe and responsible” way.
• Ministry of Defence’s ‘The UK’s defence contribution in the High North’ published in March 2022. This policy document set out the UK’s defence approach and objectives in the Arctic in support of its wider aims.^[9] The government said it would guide the UK’s defence efforts in the region over a 10-year period. The main commitments set out in the document included: protecting the UK’s critical national infrastructure and other national interests, and those of the UK’s allies and partners; ensuring the UK’s freedom to navigate and operate across the wider region; reinforcing the rules-based international system; and contesting malign and destabilising behaviours.

3. What did the committee recommend?

In its report on the UK’s strategy towards the Arctic, published 29 November 2023, the committee reaffirmed its belief that developments in the Arctic are of “critical importance to the UK’s security, environment and energy supply”.^[10]

It said that while the region had once been an area of “high co-operation and low tension”, that situation was changing.^[11] It pointed to several factors, including:^[12]

• Reduced sea ice coverage: The committee said global warming in the Arctic was putting at risk the region’s unique ecosystem and the livelihoods of local and indigenous Arctic peoples. It was also making the region more accessible, which would likely lead to increased shipping and maritime activity and resource extraction.
• Geopolitical developments: It suggested the Arctic was “less insulated” from broader international political tensions. The committee argued that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had led the UK and its allies to re-evaluate the security threat posed by Russia, including in the Arctic. It said one of the most important strategic consequences of the war in Ukraine had been Finland and Sweden’s decision to join NATO, “making the security dynamics in the Arctic and northern Europe more interconnected”. The committee also suggested that China was “seeking to expand its footprint” in the region.
• Uncertain future of the Arctic Council: The committee argued that, at a time when the Arctic was becoming “more contested, the space for collaboration with Russia on Arctic affairs [had] shrunk dramatically”. It said one consequence of this was a reduction in cooperation on climate science research, environmental protection and maritime accident response.

The committee focused its recommendations on five areas: the UK’s Arctic strategy; Russia and deterrence in the Arctic; internationalisation of the region; growing economic activity in the Arctic; and co-operation and governance of the Arctic. Key recommendations in each of the areas included:

• UK’s Arctic strategy: The committee argued that it was questionable whether the UK’s long-term goal to return the Arctic to a state of low tension was “achievable”.^[13] It said the UK’s strategy needed to reflect the “new reality” that the region was becoming an area of “competition and potential confrontation”.
• Russia and deterrence in the Arctic: The committee suggested that, while it was not in Russia’s interests to conduct a conventional war in the region, sub-threshold activity was a “significant and growing threat”.^[14] This includes GPS jamming, military exercises simulating attacks on its neighbours, maritime sabotage, cyber-attacks and information warfare.^[15] The committee called for the UK and its allies to prepare contingency plans to “detect, deter and respond”.^[16] The committee argued that close cooperation between the state and the private sector, which operates most subsea cables and pipelines, was key. It called for the government to establish partnerships with businesses to combat threats to critical infrastructure. The committee also expressed concern that the UK had insufficient key military assets, such as submarines and maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft, to support an increased focus in the Arctic.^[17] It argued it was “essential” that the UK continued to train sufficiently with its NATO and Nordic allies.^[18]
• Internationalisation of the Arctic: The committee suggested that China had shown a “strong interest” in contributing to research and environmental protection in the Arctic.^[19] It said the UK should continue to engage with China in those areas. However, the committee also expressed concerns about China’s investment in the Arctic and whether its long-term intentions in the region were “legitimate”. It suggested the UK government was “correct to identify the deepening partnership between Russia and China as an area of particular concern”. The committee said it was “essential” the UK government paid close attention to Sino-Russian collaboration in the region, and that UK scenario-planning should consider the possibility that China could seek to establish a military presence in the Arctic.
• Growing economic activity in the Arctic: The committee argued that as the sea ice recedes the area will become vulnerable to large-scale commercial fishing.^[20] It called for the government, in partnership with the Arctic states, to advocate for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the region and the establishment of marine protected areas. It also urged the government to take a leading role in negotiating a new polar code, including reviewing the effectiveness of the code and how it should be strengthened to mitigate risks to safety and the environment.^[21] The polar code is an international code of safety for ships operating in polar waters. It was developed by the International Maritime Organisation and is mandatory under both the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL).^[22]
• Cooperation and governance in the Arctic: The committee said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had led to questions over the long-term future of the Arctic Council.^[23] However, the committee argued that the council’s continued operation was in the UK’s interests and that re-engaging Russia at a working group level could help resume “vital scientific co-operation and data exchanges” on climate change and pollution. Nevertheless, the committee said the UK government should prepare for the possibility that the council may cease to function. It argued the UK needed to prepare for significant change and that there was a “high likelihood” that the government would need to give the region greater attention in the future. The committee therefore called for increased ministerial focus. It also recommended the government establish an Arctic ambassador or envoy to assist the government minister responsible in coordinating a cross-government approach to the Arctic.^[24]

Commenting on the report, chair of the committee, Lord Ashton of Hyde, said that the UK’s current policy was “well-calibrated”.^[25] However, he said the UK needed to prepare for “scenarios in which the Arctic becomes much more contested and subject to conflict”.

4. What was the previous government’s response?

The government response was published on 26 January 2024, under the previous Conservative government.^[26]

The government said its long-term strategic objective remained for the Arctic to be a peaceful and stable region, as set out in the Arctic framework.^[27] It said it would participate in multilateral cooperation across the region “when appropriate”. However, it stated it would also work with Arctic partners and allies to “contest malign and destabilising behaviours and activity” in the region. The government said it remained vigilant over Russia’s activity in the Arctic and its increased militarisation in the region.^[28]

On China’s interest in the region and Sino-Russian collaboration, the government said it was monitoring the situation “closely” and that it was “alert to the possibility of Chinese military investment in the Arctic”.^[29] However, the government said it would also engage “constructively” with China on “shared priorities” in the region.

The government said it was committed to the Arctic Council and would play its role in the sustainable management of fisheries in the region and continue to advocate for adherence to the polar code.^[30] However, regarding the committee’s recommendation that the UK establish an Arctic envoy, the government said it believed responsibility “best sits with the UK’s minister for the polar regions” within the FCDO.^[31]

5. What is the current government’s strategy towards the Arctic?

The current Labour government has confirmed the ‘Arctic framework policy’ would continue to guide its approach.^[32] The government’s plans towards the region were laid out in a speech to the Arctic Circle Assembly by Stephen Doughty, the minister of state for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories. Mr Doughty said the government would continue to update and develop the framework, “guided by science and indeed the strategic challenges that we face”.

In the speech, Mr Doughty said that internationalism and multilateralism would be at “the heart of all” that the UK did.^[33] He said the UK would continue to engage with the Arctic Council in its role as a state observer and that its commitment to NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Northern Group, and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable was “ironclad”.^[34] The minister also announced that the government would be committing further funds to collaborations with Arctic Council working groups, helping to enhance understanding of climate impacts.

On the role of Russia in the region, Mr Doughty said the UK government recognised the country’s rights and role as an Arctic state.^[35] However, he said the UK would not “tolerate attempts to wreck regional stability, disrupt critical infrastructure or restrict freedom of navigation”.

6. Read more

• House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, ‘The UK and the Arctic Environment’, 13 October 2023, HC 1141 of session 2022–23
• House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, ‘UNCLOS: The law of the sea in the 21st century’, 1 March 2022, HL Paper 159 of session 2021–22
• House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘On thin ice: UK defence in the Arctic’, 15 August 2018, HC 388 of session 2017–19

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