Threat posed by Hezbollah

Approximate read time: 10 minutes

On 5 November 2024, the House of Lords will consider the following question for short debate:

Lord Godson (Conservative) to ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the threat from Hezbollah to the United Kingdom (1) since the group was proscribed in its entirety in 2019, and (2) since the assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, on 27 September.

1. Who is Hezbollah and why did the UK government proscribe them in 2019?

Hezbollah (or ‘Hizballah’, as they are termed by the UK government) was established during the Lebanese civil war and in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is a Shiite/Shia non-state actor/armed group which wields significant power in Lebanon, where it operates as both a political party and militant group.^[1]

Hezbollah is committed to armed resistance to the state of Israel and aims to seize all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from Israel.^[2] The UK government reports that Hezbollah supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian territories. It continues to amass an arsenal of weapons in Lebanon, in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions 1701 and 1559, which the UK contends puts the security of the region at risk.

Hezbollah receives international backing from Iran. Analysts note that it has helped Iran project power across the Middle East and train other militant groups (reportedly including Hamas).^[3] Hezbollah’s fighting strength is difficult to assess, particularly given the losses it has suffered in the recent conflict with Israel. In 2021, Hezbollah leaders claimed the group had 100,000 fighters, although analysts say this could have been an exaggerated figure.^[4] Analysis from the US State Department in 2022 suggested the group had “tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide”.^[5] Other more recent analysis has put the number at roughly 40,000 to 50,000.^[6]

The UK government proscribed Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation in 2001.^[7] Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the home secretary may proscribe an organisation if they believe it is concerned in terrorism and it is proportionate to do so.^[8] It is a criminal offence to belong to a proscribed organisation in the UK or overseas or to support one in ways specified in the Terrorism Act 2000. The decision to proscribe an organisation is subject to parliamentary approval.^[9]

In 2008, the proscription was extended to include the whole of Hezbollah’s military apparatus the Jihad Council, and all the units reporting to it. In 2019, the UK government extended this provision to the entirety of Hezbollah, stating that it could no longer distinguish between the group’s military and political wings.^[10] Speaking at the time, then home secretary Sajid Javid said he had decided to proscribe the group in its entirety because Hezbollah was “continuing in its attempts to destabilise the fragile situation in the Middle East”.^[11] Mr Javid also drew a direct link to the UK’s own security:

My priority as home secretary is to protect the British people. As part of this, we identify and ban any terrorist organisation which threatens our safety and security, whatever their motivations or ideology which is why I am taking action against several organisations today.^[12]

2. Current conflict between Hezbollah and Israel and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah

Since October 2023, Hezbollah has launched missile attacks against Israel in support of Hamas in Gaza. Israel has conducted various air strikes in response.^[13] The Armed Conflict and Location Data Project (ACLED) estimated that the number of cross-border attacks between Israel and Hezbollah totalled 7,000 from October 2023 to June 2024.^[14] The UN reported on 25 September 2024 that exchanges of fire along the UN-patrolled line of separation between Lebanon and Israel had “expanded in scope, depth and intensity”.^[15]

On 27 September 2024, the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in an Israeli airstrike.^[16] Mr Nasrallah helped found Hezbollah in the 1980s and had led the group for more than 30 years. Indeed, analysts credit him with moulding Hezbollah into “the most formidable non-state fighting force in the region, and Iran’s most powerful anti-Israel proxy”.^[17] In the days following Mr Nasrallah’s death, Israel launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, aiming to drive Hezbollah from the border region and allow displaced Israelis to return home. At the present time, reportedly four divisions of Israeli forces have been mobilised for what the Israeli military has described as “limited, localised, and targeted ground raids” in south Lebanon.^[18] However, fears remain that the conflict will continue to escalate.

3. What next for Hezbollah?

On 23 October 2024, it was confirmed that Hashem Safieddine had also been killed in an Israeli airstrike.^[19] He was the head of Hezbollah’s executive council, a cousin of Hassan Nasrallah and had widely been expected to take over the group’s leadership following Mr Nasrallah’s death. Several other senior leaders and top commanders have been killed and wounded since mid-September 2024.^[20] Uncertainty had already been created by Mr Nasrallah’s death and how Hezbollah would respond. Writing on 1 October 2024, prior to Mr Safieddine’s death, Bilal Y Saab, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, said that Nasrallah was “the brain, the spinal cord, and the beating heart of Hezbollah”.^[21] He said that without him “it is very hard to see how Hezbollah will think, move, and inspire the way it did before”.

Despite these events, Hezbollah’s surviving officials remain defiant. Naim Qassem, who has now been named as Mr Nasrallah’s successor,^[22] said in a televised speech on 7 October 2024 that “the longer the war continues, the more difficult impasse Israel will face”.^[23] He added:

We are striking the enemy and expanding the range of fire. We will reach any place at the time we decide according to our plan. We are steadfast, and we will emerge victorious.^[24]

Nicholas Blanford, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, notes that Hezbollah appears to have significantly increased the number of operations it carries out each day in recent weeks.^[25] Most of the attacks use stand-off munitions such as mortar rounds and anti-tank missiles to target Israeli troop movements. However, on 17 October 2024 Hezbollah announced that it intended to “transition to a new and escalating phase in the confrontation with the Israeli enemy”. Mr Blanford contends that Hezbollah’s primary war objective appears to be preventing the Israeli government from sending Israeli evacuees back to their homes in the north, where it may have the advantage of time. Provided it can weather Israeli attacks, Mr Blanford argues that Hezbollah can maintain the flow of rockets into northern Israel and confront Israeli troop movements on the ground. For Mr Blanford, such action may force Israel into a negotiated solution or a significant escalation of the conflict. Others note, however, that Hezbollah is also under domestic and international pressure to agree a resolution.^[26]

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, also points to Israel’s military successes to date, including the high-profile assassinations and airstrikes which Israeli officials claim have destroyed a significant portion of Hezbollah’s missile stockpiles.^[27] He also notes the difficulties Hezbollah may face in rebuilding from these setbacks. However, he contends that Iran’s support for Hezbollah will remain, and that Hezbollah could seek greater control in Lebanon as it rebuilds. He also warns of the dangers of the conflict continuing to grow in severity, particularly for civilians in Lebanon.

Other analysts also warn of the dangers of an escalation in the fighting. Daniel Byman et al, writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies on 4 October 2024, argued that the number of clashes between Israel and Hezbollah was likely to grow.^[28] They also warned the geography of the conflict could expand to include a larger swath of Lebanon and Israel as well as potentially Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Byman et al contend that without a resolution there is a “serious risk of all-out war between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran”.

4. UK assessment of the threat posed by Hezbollah and of a widening conflict

Speaking in July 2024, Foreign Secretary David Lammy said that he had discussed the situation on the border with both Lebanese and Israeli leaders.^[29] He said he had reiterated that Israel has the right to defend itself in line with international humanitarian law. Mr Lammy also welcomed statements from the Lebanese government condemning violence against civilians. He warned against an escalation of the conflict and called for a diplomatic solution:

A widening of the conflict is in nobody’s interest. Indeed, the consequences would be catastrophic. That is why we continue to press for a diplomatic solution based on UN Security Council resolution 1701, which called for a long term solution based on the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, no foreign forces in Lebanon without its government’s consent, and no armed forces, other than the UN and the Lebanese government troops, deployed south of the Litani river, near the border with Israel. It is why, even in the face of serious provocation, our counsel is restraint. […]

We continue to support the Lebanese armed forces, and the UK has provided more training and equipment to four of Lebanon’s land border regiments. We are working intensively with the United Nations and our partners, including the United States and France, to encourage de-escalation.^[30]

Prime Minister Keir Starmer made a call for an “immediate ceasefire to provide space for a diplomatic settlement” at a meeting of the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2024.^[31] The UK has also issued statements alongside G7 foreign ministers calling for the “full implementation of UNSCR [UN Security Council] 1701” which urged “all relevant actors implement immediate measures towards de-escalation”, and alongside the EU and states such as Saudi Arabia calling for a diplomatic solution and 21-day ceasefire.^[32]

Speaking in the House of Commons on 22 October 2024, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office minister Hamish Falconer reiterated calls for a resolution in line with prior UN Security Council resolutions and said that Hezbollah’s actions remained without justification:

[…] this situation needs to be resolved in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. If the right hon. gentleman is asking me whether we think what Lebanese Hezbollah is doing across the blue line is correct or justifiable, my answer is that it is not. We call on it, as we have always called on it, to stop. We have proscribed the organisation domestically and have absolutely no truck with it whatsoever. Iran’s malign influence in Lebanon must stop, and we are taking actions to try to effect that.^[33]

5. Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘Israel-Hezbollah conflict 2023/24: UK and international response’, 9 October 2024
• US Congressional Research Service, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, 20 September 2024
• Council on Foreign Relations, ‘What is Hezbollah?’, 29 October 2024
• Bilal Y Saab, ‘Hezbollah faces an uncertain future after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah’, Chatham House, 1 October 2024

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Cover image by Kyle Glenn on Unsplash