Approximate read time: 15 minutes 

The House of Lords is due to debate a motion from Lord Collins of Highbury, parliamentary under secretary of state in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), that “this House takes note of the rising tensions in the Horn of Africa” on 29 October 2024. 

For the purposes of this briefing, the Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. 

1. Situation in brief 

 In recent months there have been increased diplomatic tensions between Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa, in response to what has been characterised as Ethiopia’s expansionist policy towards the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[1] In October 2023, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, announced that Ethiopia wanted greater access to a sea port in the region. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland to access one of its ports.[2] However, the international community does not recognise Somaliland and Somalia considers it part of its territory. As a result, the port deal has caused significant tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia and the wider region, and there are concerns that it may escalate into a military conflict. 

In addition, humanitarian conditions in the Horn of Africa have been exacerbated by the impact of a widespread drought across the region from 2020 to 2023.[3] The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-supported Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) has estimated that in September 2024 approximately 17 million people in Ethiopia and 3.5 million people in Somalia required “urgent humanitarian food assistance” due to the effects of current and past conflicts, extreme weather events and economic shocks.[4] 

The region has also been impacted by the ongoing civil war in Sudan. The conflict, which began in 2023, has caused a severe humanitarian crisis in Sudan, with widespread food insecurity.[5] It is estimated that over 2 million people have fled the conflict into neighbouring countries.[6] 

2. Horn of Africa: Regional relations and tensions 

2.1 Ethiopia’s ongoing internal conflicts 

For many years, the Ethiopian government has been in conflict with various armed separatist groups within its borders, particularly the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the northern region of Tigray.[7] Fighting has also occurred with the Fano militia group in the northern region of Amhara and in the central Oromia region against the Oromia Liberation Army. 

Ethiopia’s current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, has been in power since 2018. He was elected following anti-government protests against a ruling coalition that had been dominated by the TPLF. Although originally elected as a member of that coalition, Mr Abiy formed a new Prosperity Party in 2019, which the TPLF refused to join. 

On taking power, Mr Abiy implemented a policy of rapprochement with Eritrea, following years of tensions and border disputes with the country. This culminated in a peace settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018. In 2019, Mr Abiy won the Nobel Peace Prize, in part for his efforts in securing the peace deal with Eritrea.[8] 

However, the deal with Eritrea contributed to a souring of relations between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, which escalated into a full-blown conflict in Tigray between 2020 and 2022.[9] The conflict resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the internal displacement of millions of Ethiopians.[10] 

In 2022, a peace settlement was reached between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF. However, despite the formal cessation of hostilities, there have since been sporadic outbreaks of violence in Tigray and in other regions of Ethiopia. In addition, in August 2023 a state of emergency was declared in the Amhara region, as intense fighting broke out between government forces and the Fano militia.[11] There has been no resolution to that unrest and there continues to be violent clashes in Amhara and Oromia, with peace talks with the militia groups at an impasse.[12] 

Further information on the background to Ethiopia’s internal conflicts and their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country can be found in the House of Lords Library briefing, ‘Ethiopia: Conflict and food insecurity 40 years on from the 1984 famine’ (10 October 2024). 

2.2 Ethiopia-Eritrea relations 

Since Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, relations between the two countries have fluctuated, and there have been ongoing border disputes.  

Between 1998 and 2000, the two countries fought a border war.[13] Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea did improve in 2018, as referred to in section 2.1 of this briefing, when Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopian prime minister and the two countries signed a peace deal. Following this rapprochement, Eritrean forces supported the Ethiopian government in its conflict in Tigray between 2020 to 2022.[14]  

However, since the end of that conflict, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have resurfaced, including allegations that Eritrean troops have remained in the Tigray region and have committed human rights abuses and sexual violence.[15] Mr Abiy has also reportedly accused Eritrea of trying to “derail” the implementation of Ethiopia’s peace agreement with the TPLF.[16] 

Over the last year, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have become further strained due to Ethiopia’s assertive policy towards the Red Sea coast. In response to a speech by Mr Abiy in October 2023, in which he said that Ethiopia wanted access to a port (see section 2.3 of this briefing), the BBC reported that Eritrea had concerns that Ethiopia could target the port of Assab in southern Eritrea. The BBC reported: 

Ethiopia’s most obvious target is the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab, which was part of Ethiopia until Eritrean independence more than 30 years ago. Since the 1998 Ethiopian-Eritrean war and the closure of the border between the two countries, the Assab docks have been rusting away, while Ethiopia’s trade has been channelled through neighbouring Djibouti.[17] 

Although Ethiopia has subsequently signed a deal to access a port in Somaliland, relations with Eritrea remain strained due to Ethiopia’s desire to gain access to the coast.[18] 

2.3 Ethiopia and Somalia: Tensions over Ethiopia’s coastal ambitions 

As a landlocked country, Ethiopia is heavily dependent on neighbouring countries to provide trade access. In 2023, the World Bank said that 95% of Ethiopia’s trade by volume went through Djibouti.[19] 

In the October 2023 speech referred to above, the Ethiopian prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, said Ethiopia wanted greater access to a sea port.[20] Mr Abiy said this was an “existential matter” for Ethiopia and that he wanted to open a dialogue with the other countries in the region about access to a port, even if it involved a co-investment or leasing deal. Although Mr Abiy stressed that he wanted to access a port through negotiation, it has been reported that Mr Abiy separately told a meeting of business leaders that his government was “considering all options” to achieve the objective.[21] 

On 1 January 2024, Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia were strained when Ethiopia announced that it had signed an agreement with Somaliland for access to one of its ports on the Gulf of Aden.[22] Somaliland is a self-proclaimed country, comprising the territory of the former British Protectorate of the same name. However, Somaliland is not formally recognised as a sovereign country by the international community and Somalia considers it part of its territory. Ethiopia has agreed to begin a process of formally recognising the sovereignty of Somaliland in return for naval and commercial access to a strip of land around Somaliland’s port at Berbera.[23] 

In response, the government of Somalia called the agreement an act of “aggression” by Ethiopia and said it would recall its ambassador to Ethiopia.[24] The Guardian reported that a “senior advisor” to the Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, had also said that Somalia was willing to go to war with Ethiopia over the deal: 

We are pursuing all diplomatic options and I think Ethiopia will come to its senses, but we are ready for a war if Abiy wants a war.[25] 

 On 18 January 2024, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a trade bloc of eight countries in eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa, convened an emergency meeting to discuss the situation in Sudan and the diplomatic tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia because of the port deal. The communiqué published at the end of the meeting said it was “deeply concerned” by the breakdown in relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.[26] It also reaffirmed the “cardinal principles of respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity” of Somalia, and it called for the two countries to “de-escalate tensions and instead engage in constructive dialogue”. 

However, there was no immediate improvement in relations, and in June 2024 Somalia announced that it would expel thousands of Ethiopian troops by the end of the year unless Ethiopia scrapped the port deal with Somaliland.[27] Ethiopian troops are stationed in Somalia as part of an African Union peacekeeping mission to combat Al-Shabaab terrorist groups, which are affiliated to Al-Qaeda. 

In July and August 2024 two rounds of talks between Ethiopia and Somalia, mediated by Turkey, failed to reach an agreement on settling the dispute over the port deal.[28] Also in August 2024, Somalia signed a security pact with Egypt, under the terms of which Egypt began sending arms supplies to Somalia.[29] Egypt has had its own long-running dispute with Ethiopia over a hydroelectric dam that Ethiopia has built on the Blue Nile. Since the security pact was signed, Egypt has continued to send consignments of arms to Somalia, and it has offered to send troops to Somalia to replace the Ethiopian forces in the African Union peacekeeping mission.[30] The BBC reported that Ethiopia has “expressed its concern” that the arms shipments “could exacerbate the security situation” in Somalia. 

An assessment by the Institute for the Study of War think tank in September 2024 contended that Egypt’s military support for Somalia could destabilise the region and hinder operations targeting Al-Shabaab terrorists in Somalia:  

Growing external military engagement with Somalia has increased the risk that the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia could escalate into a direct or proxy armed conflict and exacerbated the conflict to the detriment of counterterrorism efforts against […] Al-Shabaab.[31] 

On 10 October 2024, the leaders of Eritrea, Egypt and Somalia met in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, in a summit the BBC described as an “axis against Ethiopia”.[32] It reported that a statement issued after the summit referred to “respect for the sovereignty […] and territorial integrity of the countries in the region”. The BBC said this has been interpreted as a “pointed reference” to Ethiopia’s coastal ambitions. However, the BBC also quoted the Somali information minister, Daud Aweis, who said that the summit was only concerned with cooperation between the three countries, and he denied that Ethiopia was a direct target of the summit. 

3. UK government policy 

Since the new Labour government took office, Anneliese Dodds, minister for development at the FCDO, made an official visit to Ethiopia in August 2024. She met Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Taye Atske-Selassie, and they discussed “UK support for peace and security across Ethiopia and the wider region”.[33] Specifically on internal conflicts in parts of Ethiopia, the FCDO press release stated that Ms Dodds: 

 […] raised concern about the devasting impact of conflict in Amhara and Oromia on civilians. The UK continues to urge all parties to the conflicts to de-escalate and engage in peaceful and inclusive dialogue.[34] 

On 7 October 2024, Baroness Chapman of Darlington, parliamentary under secretary of state at the FCDO, was asked in the House of Lords what assessment the government had made of tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia.[35] She said that the government was concerned by the situation and that it continued to “urge all parties to avoid escalation and actions that threaten stability”. She said that members of the government had raised the matter with their counterparts in the Ethiopian and Somali governments, and with their counterparts at the UN General Assembly. 

On the status of Somaliland, Baroness Chapman told the House of Lords on 10 October 2024 that the UK government does not recognise the unilateral declaration of independence of Somaliland.[36] She said its status was a matter for Somalia and Somaliland to decide “through a consultative process and dialogue”. 

Also on 10 October 2024, the FCDO announced that Lord Collins of Highbury had made a visit to the Tigray region of Ethiopia.[37] To support reconstruction efforts in the region following the 2020 to 2022 conflict, the announcement stated that the UK would provide “£16mn to help 75,000 Tigrayan military personnel return to civilian life with cash, medical and mental health support” and £6.9mn over three years to support “Ethiopia’s textiles and garments sector”. The FCDO also stated that during the visit, Lord Collins would meet Abiy Ahmed to discuss “economic cooperation, internal conflict, regional security, and the humanitarian situation in the country”. 

4. Read more 


Image credit- NormanEinstein, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

The boundaries shown on this map do not imply endorsement by the House of Lords Library. 

References

  1. International Crisis Group, ‘The stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal’, 6 March 2024. Return to text
  2. Faisal Ali, ‘Ethiopia and Somaliland reach agreement over access to ports’, Guardian, 1 January 2024. Return to text
  3. House of Lords Library, ‘Horn of Africa: Projections of a famine in 2023’, 18 January 2023. Return to text
  4. Famine Early Warning Systems Network, ‘Food assistance outlook brief’, September 2024, p 3. Return to text
  5. House of Lords Library, ‘Civil war in Sudan: Is there a path to peace?’, 6 September 2024. Return to text
  6. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Sudan crisis explained’, August 2024. Return to text
  7. House of Lords Library, ‘Ethiopia: Conflict and food insecurity 40 years on from the 1984 famine’, 10 October 2024. Return to text
  8. Nobel Prize, ‘The Nobel Peace Prize 2019’, accessed 21 October 2024. Return to text
  9. House of Lords Library, ‘Conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia’, 11 November 2022. Return to text
  10. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Ethiopia humanitarian crisis’, accessed 8 October 2024. Return to text
  11. Guardian, ‘Ethiopia declares a state of emergency in Amhara amid increasing violence’, 4 August 2023. Return to text
  12. All Africa, ‘News: Intense fighting continues to rattle Amhara cities, towns—vicinities of Debark town become latest targets’, 22 October 2024; and Ethiopia Peace Observatory, ‘Ethiopia weekly update (15 October 2024)’, 16 October 2024. Return to text
  13. Europa World, ‘Eritrea: Recent history’, accessed 21 October 2024. Return to text
  14. Foreign Policy, ‘Are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the path to war?’, 7 November 2023. Return to text
  15. See: Europa World, ‘Eritrea: Relations with Ethiopia’, accessed 21 October 2024; and Wanofi Solomon, ‘Eritrea expands hold on Irob, Gulomahda amid Tigray political feud, federal inaction’, The Reporter, 21 September 2024. Return to text
  16. Foreign Policy, ‘Are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the path to war?’, 7 November 2023. Return to text
  17. BBC News, ‘Ethiopia PM Abiy Ahmed eyes Red Sea port, inflaming tensions’, 8 November 2023. Return to text
  18. Europa World, ‘Eritrea: Relations with Ethiopia’, accessed 21 October 2024. Return to text
  19. World Bank, ‘Addis-Djibouti corridor to get major upgrade that is key to unlocking connectivity and trade for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa’, 20 July 2023. Return to text
  20. Addis Standard, ‘Feature: “A population of 150 million can’t live in a geographic prison” PM Abiy Ahmed’, 14 October 2023. Return to text
  21. Addis Standard, ‘Ethiopia’s quest for alternative ports: Negotiations or force on the table?’, 7 September 2023. Return to text
  22. BBC News, ‘Ethiopia signs agreement with Somaliland paving way to sea access’, 2 January 2024. Return to text
  23. As above. Return to text
  24. BBC News, ‘Somalia calls Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement act of aggression’, 2 January 2024. Return to text
  25. Fred Harter, ‘‘We are ready for a war’: Somalia threatens conflict with Ethiopia over breakaway region’, Guardian, 13 January 2022. Return to text
  26. Intergovernmental Authority on Development, ‘Communiqué of the 42nd extraordinary assembly of IGAD heads of state and government’, 18 January 2024. Return to text
  27. Reuters, ‘Somalia to expel Ethiopian troops unless Somaliland port deal scrapped, official says’, 3 June 2024. Return to text
  28. Reuters, ‘Second round of Somalia-Ethiopia talks in Turkey ends with no deal but progress made’, 13 August 2024. Return to text
  29. Reuters, ‘Egypt sends arms to Somalia following security deal, sources say’, 29 August 2024. Return to text
  30. BBC News, ‘Egyptian ship delivers weapons to Somalia’, 24 September 2024. Return to text
  31. Institute for the Study of War, ‘External meddling for the Red Sea exacerbates conflicts in the Horn of Africa’, 23 September 2024. Return to text
  32. BBC News, ‘Eritrea, Egypt and Somalia cement ‘axis against Ethiopia’’, 10 October 2024. Return to text
  33. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘UK minister for international development visits Ethiopia’, 22 August 2024. Return to text
  34. As above. Return to text
  35. HL Hansard, 7 October 2024, cols 1824–8. Return to text
  36. HL Hansard, 10 October 2024, cols 2099–102. Return to text
  37. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘UK announces support to drive stability and growth in Ethiopia’, 10 October 2024. Return to text