Politicisation of the civil service

Approximate read time: 20 minutes 

On 28 November 2024, the House of Lords will debate the following motion tabled by Lord Butler of Brockwell (Crossbench), a former cabinet secretary:  

To move that this House takes note of the case against politicisation of the civil service. 

1. Role of the civil service and the civil service code

The civil service is an integral part of the government of the United Kingdom. It supports the government of the day in developing and implementing its policies, and in delivering public services. Civil servants are accountable to ministers, who in turn are accountable to Parliament.  

The conduct of civil servants is governed by the civil service code.^[1] The code includes several provisions on the questions of ethics and propriety. They include that civil servants are appointed on merit on the basis of fair and open competition, and are expected to carry out their roles with dedication and a commitment to the civil service and its core values: integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.  

The code defines those values as follows:  

• ‘Integrity’ is putting the obligations of public service above your own personal interests. 
• ‘Honesty’ is being truthful and open. 
• ‘Objectivity’ is basing your advice and decisions on rigorous analysis of the evidence. 
• ‘Impartiality’ is acting solely according to the merits of the case and serving equally well governments of different political persuasions.^[2] 

The code maintains that these core values support good government and ensure the achievement of the highest possible standards in all that the civil service does. In turn, the code contends that this helps the civil service gain and retain the respect of ministers, Parliament, the public and its customers. 

2. Defining politicisation in the context of the civil service

In order to examine whether the civil service has become more politicised, and the extent to which that is desirable or otherwise, it is first necessary to examine how such politicisation can be defined. 

In his report on civil service governance and accountability published in 2023,^[3] former Conservative Cabinet Office minister Lord Maude of Horsham drew upon various definitions and commentary, including the following offered by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR):  

Opinion is divided about the consequences of pushing too much in favour of responsiveness. ‘Politicisation’ is a term that gets bandied around, but very rarely defined. Those that worry about the threat of ‘politicisation’ argue that attempts to make the civil service more responsive to ministers will diminish the ability of officials to ‘speak truth unto power’, turning bureaucrats into helpless sycophants. On the other side are those who argue that it is a democratic necessity that officials do all that is in their power to prosecute the agenda of an elected government.^[4] 

The IPPR drew on two definitions identified in the academic literature to frame its discussion of politicisation in overseas jurisdictions. The first was the “the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service”.^[5] The second was the following three-fold typology:  

• Partisan politicisation: appointing people with well-known partisan connections who will be clearly unacceptable to a future alternative government. 
• Policy-related politicisation: appointing people with well-known commitments to particular policy directions that may render them unacceptable to a future alternative government. 
• Managerial politicisation: replacing incumbent public servants, particularly on a change of government, when there is no good reason to question their competence and loyalty but simply in order to facilitate imposition of the government’s authority (particularly if the incumbents are dismissed rather than retained with similar status and remuneration).^[6] 

Having reviewed the evidence, the IPPR also drew a distinction between ‘politicisation’ and ‘personalisation’. It argued that while the former emphasises the role of political criteria, the latter refers to a “desire on the part of ministers to appoint individuals on the basis of their ability, personal style and approach (irrespective of their politics)”. 

In his review, Lord Maude also contended that impartiality should not be confused with ‘neutrality’. He offered a similar definition of impartiality as contained within the civil service code in that civil servants should be able to serve an incoming government of a different political complexion with the same degree of commitment and enthusiasm shown to the incumbent government. However, he contended that both political appointees and civil servants should be expected to provide robust independent advice to ministers and senior civil servants. In contrast Lord Maude described neutrality as “being indifferent to the programme of the incumbent government”, which he contended could be detrimental to delivering those objectives.^[7] Lord Maude’s views on politicisation are covered in more detail below in section 3 examining the case for and against such influences.   

3. A renewed focus on impartiality? 

The political impartiality of the civil service has become a focus of attention following several recent developments which have taken place under both previous Conservative administrations and the current Labour government, as explored below. This is not an exhaustive list, but it illustrates recent events which have provoked significant discussion on the question of how best the civil service can perform its role.  

For example, as noted by the House of Lords Constitution Committee, it has been widely speculated that recent senior civil servant departures may have taken place on political or ideological grounds.^[8] In its inquiry into the appointment and removal of senior civil servants, which reported in October 2023, the committee pointed to the following examples:^[9] 

• Professor Dennis Grube, professor of politics and public policy, University of Cambridge, suggested that the former permanent secretary of the Department for Education, Jonathan Slater, departed from post in August 2020 because a view had been formed that somebody needed to take responsibility for several exam-related policy mishaps during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
• Sir Mark Sedwill (now Lord) departed as cabinet secretary in September 2020 following briefings that tension had emerged with senior members of then Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s team. 
• Lord Sedwill told us that former National Security Adviser Sir Stephen Lovegrove was dismissed “without merit” when he departed his post in September 2022. He was moved to the position of ‘defence industrial adviser’. 
• Some suggested that Sir Tom Scholar was removed as permanent secretary to the Treasury in 2022 by then Prime Minister Elizabeth Truss and then Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng to make a statement about the new government’s intention to depart from “Treasury orthodoxy”. Lord Macpherson [former Treasury permanent secretary] described the move as “a pre-emptive strike designed to demonstrate to the rest of the Treasury that, if you wanted to thrive and prosper under the Kwarteng regime, you had to tell them what they wanted to hear; namely that unfunded tax cuts would have no consequences in the market.” Simon Case [the cabinet secretary] confirmed there was no question of underperformance in Tom Scholar’s case. 

The committee argued that the “critical point” about both Sir Tom Scholar and Sir Stephen Lovegrove’s departures was the short time frame in which the decisions were made, which the committee contended would not have allowed for any meaningful process to be followed. The committee drew attention to evidence from Lord Sedwill, the former cabinet secretary, who said that these individuals would not have had the opportunity “to demonstrate to the new administration that they would serve them with the same loyalty and capability they had served previous administrations”. The committee said that due process was not followed and gave rise to questions about impartiality and may, in Lord Sedwill’s view, have been a “deliberate signal to Whitehall that political alignment with the new government’s views was the key criterion and that capability, loyalty and performance were not”.^[10]

In its response to the committee, the government said it shared the committee’s belief that the “impartiality—and perceived impartiality—of the civil service is a central tenet of our constitution”.^[11] It also agreed that the current level of ministerial involvement in recruitment struck the right balance. When it came to issues around departures, the government did not agree with the committee that there was a role for the Civil Service Commission in ensuring due process was followed when senior civil servants were dismissed on conduct or performance grounds. The government welcomed the committee’s conclusion that “the small number of recent high-profile removals of senior civil servants on what appeared to be political or ideological grounds does not amount to a trend”. It also agreed with the committee’s conclusion that broad political alignment should not be a relevant consideration in the appointment of civil servants.

The resignation of the former deputy prime minister, Dominic Raab, also provoked debate. In his resignation statement, Mr Raab claimed that “activist civil servants” were trying to block the work of government.^[12] Mr Raab had been found to have engaged in “intimidating” and “unreasonably persistent and aggressive” behaviour towards civil servants by Adam Tolley KC, who was appointed by the then prime minister to investigate complaints against Mr Raab.^[13] The FDA union, which represents civil servants, argued that Mr Raab was promoting “conspiracy theories” that risked undermining the impartiality and integrity of the civil service.^[14] A response from the cabinet secretary, Simon Case, and the civil service’s then chief operating officer, Alex Chisholm, to civil servants did not reportedly mention any allegation of bias or politicisation.^[15] It said the affair was something the government should “reflect upon” but that it would not detract from the “constant efforts to address the priorities of the government working in partnership, demonstrating professionalism and integrity”.

The decision of Sue Gray—a senior civil servant who led the investigation into the violation of lockdown rules in Downing Street—to resign her position to take a position with the Labour Party also raised questions about whether this could be perceived as an infringement on civil service impartiality. Then Cabinet Office minister Jeremy Quin contended that Ms Gray’s failure to disclose contact with Labour officials was a “prima facie” breach of the civil service code.^[16] In contrast, the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) said it found no evidence Ms Gray’s ability to remain impartial was impaired while she remained in her civil service role, though under the business appointment rules it advised there should be a number of conditions and a waiting period before she took up her role with the Labour Party to mitigate any “potential risk to the perceived impartiality of the civil service”.^[17] Giving evidence to the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, the cabinet secretary, Simon Case, said whilst Ms Gray had not disclosed contact from the Leader of the Opposition’s Office, no evidence had been found that Ms Gray’s work had been “coloured by party political views or such factors”.^[18] Mr Case also added that the civil service code, whilst being clear on impartiality, had “been written with other things in mind” such as civil servants moving to elected office rather than special advisor roles. He said he had recommended to ministers that the guidance be reviewed as a result.^[19]

As per the civil service code, appointments to the civil service must be made on merit after fair and open competition. Recent press coverage has also examined appointments to the civil service under the Labour government made under the exceptions provided for by the Civil Service Commission’s recruitment principles, which allow these competition rules to be waived in certain circumstances.^[20]

Exceptions made for appointments at and above the pay band 2 level (in other words, appointments to the highest grades in the civil service) require the prior approval of the Civil Service Commission.^[21] Data published by the Civil Service Commission reveals the following use of such exceptions over the period of the current and previous governments (to posts at and above pay band 2):^[22]

Please note this data has been adjusted to reflect where postholders have had their contracts renewed to carry out a particular post, to ensure they are not counted multiple times.  

The Civil Service Commission announced it was going to review appointments that were made by exception at grades below pay band 2 (what they call delegated grades) in July and August 2024.^[23] The first civil service commissioner, Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston, wrote to all departments on 30 August 2024 outlining the terms of that review.^[24] The results of that review were published on 20 November 2024.^[25] The review found that “fewer exceptions were made in this period [between July and August 2024] than is typical in a similar length of time”. Their usage varied by number and appointment length across civil service departments and organisations. The review also said that it had identified a range of good practice and some areas that required improvement, adding:

The commission was largely satisfied with processes in place within departments to apply, consider and approve exception requests. Occasionally, appointments were not fully justified according to the terms of the commission’s recruitment principles or appeared to lack justification for their length. Some departments appeared to lack central tracking systems. The review identified two ‘technical’ breaches of the recruitment principles relating to record keeping issues.^[26]

The review made a set of recommendations to support greater consistency and improvements in practice. It did not ‘re-decide’ any individual appointment decisions. The Civil Service Commission said that it will work with departments to ensure compliance with these recommendations and will monitor implementation on an ongoing basis through its audit.

4. Arguments for and against a more politicised civil service 

4.1 Calls for greater politicisation/less neutrality

Several public figures have called for varying degrees of greater politicisation of the civil service. In his review of civil service accountability, the former Cabinet Office minister Lord Maude argued that democracies are inherently political, and governments could be better served by civil servants with a more political background who better understand ministers’ motivations. However, he said those individuals’ political leanings were the least important part of that process compared to understanding how to get things done and give honest and well-informed advice:

This is a democracy, and government is meant to be political. Most ministers would infinitely prefer to be served by civil servants who respect the role of politics in a democracy and the mandate that it confers, and who understand the motivations of ministers even if that official subsequently turns out to have political leanings different from their own. A civil servant with a political bent different from the minister is much more likely to serve that minister well than one who has turned elegant detachment, or “studied neutrality”, into an art form. It is what officials do that matters, not what they believe. Ministers want officials who give honest and well-informed advice, and who understand how to get things done, and ministers will generally be more concerned about these qualities than about any political antecedents.^[27] 

Similarly, Jonathan Slater, former permanent secretary in the Department for Education, contended that civil service performance would improve when “emotional detachment is called out and rejected for what it means in practice in Whitehall—not really caring whether or not your efforts achieve anything positive at all”.^[28] 

Writing in the Observer prior to the publication of his findings, Lord Maude said:  

We also need to be more robust and less mealy mouthed about “politicisation”. Again, other systems deal with this better. In France, permanent civil servants often have overt political affiliations, and it causes few problems. In Australia, permanent civil servants in ministers’ private offices are released from the obligations of political impartiality, and can take part in party political activity. We don’t need to go that far, but the key, as always, is transparency and pragmatism.^[29] 

In his proposed reforms, Lord Maude argued that ministers should be given greater discretion and influence over some civil service appointments:  

The arrangements for the appointment of civil servants should be revisited to allow ministers a greater role in some appointments while strengthening the public interest in maintaining a permanent politically impartial service able to give robust and objective advice to ministers.^[30] 

Lord Maude also contended that the “public interest” in having a permanent politically impartial civil service, able to serve any democratically elected government effectively and to give ministers well-informed and robust advice, “is not well assured due to the absence of systematic external scrutiny”.^[31] As a result, his proposals for change also included the external auditing of advice given by civil servants to reward those deemed to have performed most effectively.  

In an article for the Daily Telegraph, former secretary of state for defence Liam Fox also argued in favour of ministers being able to bring “more experts into office with each respective, elected government”.^[32] He argued that this could reduce churn in the civil service and add stability:  

Being able to bring in greater experience, in required areas, could bring added stability and wisdom to the system, especially at a time when a welcome diversity in civil-service recruitment is increasing the number of younger entrants.^[33] 

He added:  

We do not need a US-style model where the sheer number of political appointees can produce messy transitions between administrations, but there are plenty of other models. Canada, Australia and Germany have systems where, to varying degrees, there is political control over the top jobs. This hybrid approach could be a template for us.^[34] 

4.2 Arguments against the politicisation of the civil service

Others have rejected the view that increased politicisation would bring benefits to the civil service. The House of Lords Constitution Committee said that the impartiality—and the perceived impartiality—of the civil service were of “key constitutional importance”.^[35] The committee explicitly rejected the suggestion that broad political alignment should be a relevant consideration in the appointment of senior civil servants, arguing that:  

The role of the civil service is to provide honest, objective and impartial advice to the government. After advice has been provided and a secretary of state makes a decision, it becomes the job of the civil service to implement that decision. If a civil servant fails to implement the secretary of state’s decision it is a performance issue and should be dealt with according to the processes […]. Introducing a criterion of broad political alignment between the secretary of state and the permanent secretary unhelpfully complicates the existing duty on civil servants to serve the government of the day to the best of their ability regardless of their own political beliefs. It risks undermining senior civil servants’ ability to establish the confidence of future secretaries of state and governments of different dispositions.^[36] 

The committee also drew attention to the role of senior civil servants as accounting officers, which the committee argued relied upon “the impartiality of permanent secretaries and their ability to ‘speak truth to power’”. The committee contended that any shift towards a system of senior civil servant appointments or departures with a greater degree of ministerial influence would “risk having a chilling effect on accounting officer functions to the detriment of the public interest”.^[37] 

Christian Schuster, co-director of the UCL Policy Lab and professor in public management, has also argued that expanding the scope of political appointments could lead to several downsides, including greater “collusion” between ministers and civil servants:  

Political appointments can undermine the competence of the civil service by prioritising political loyalty over expertise. It can also lead to the rewarding of political supporters with jobs in government rather than promoting better governance. Perhaps the most alarming potential outcome is greater collusion between politicians and civil servants. Those in high-level positions owe their jobs to politicians, making them more responsive to their demands, whether they are in the best interest of citizens or not. Ultimately, this could erode checks and balances in the government.^[38] 

Hannah White, director of the Institute for Government think tank, has argued that politicisation of the civil service is the “wrong answer to the wrong question”.^[39] Dr White contends that civil service reform requires ministers to work with officials, not to “claim that they are being deliberately undermined by a politically motivated civil service”. She argues that many of the proposed benefits of an increasingly politicised civil service would be outweighed by the disadvantages:  

The assumption is that politically affiliated civil servants would pursue their roles with greater zeal, be less risk averse and have more direct accountability to ministers. But these benefits are not as self-evident as is claimed, and this solution of greater politicisation does not price in the downsides of abandoning impartiality—in terms of diluting promotion on merit, disincentivising truth to power and shortening policy horizons.^[40] 

In conversation with the lord speaker, Lord McFall of Alcluith, for the House of Lords podcast, Lord Ricketts (Crossbench), former permanent secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, said a degree of politicisation of the civil service had already taken place in recent decades, with ministers seeking a greater role in the appointment of senior officials and their ministerial office staff as well as special advisors.^[41] However, he said the UK remained far removed from examples like the United States where high levels of appointments are made on a political basis (and thus change with each administration). He advocated against moving in such a direction, saying: 

Any trend towards ministers wanting to pick the official that they think will be most comfortable for them is in my view a dangerous trend, because then you tend to get people picking those with the same kind of outlook and view. You begin to lose the challenge that the civil service ought to represent.^[42] 

Former cabinet secretary Lord Butler of Brockwell has also advocated against the politicisation of the civil service, arguing that the impartiality of the civil service was an “essential part” of the UK political system.^[43] In the debate on the Constitution Committee’s findings in the House of Lords, Lord Butler said that politicians and civil servants were separate but complementary professions, and he warned that a balance had to be achieved between the needs of ministers and an impartial civil service:  

The civil service and elected politicians are separate professions, both serving the crown. Civil servants and ministers should form a unity in working for the country under the leadership of ministers, who have earned that right to lead by virtue of their election. However, the two professions are separate, and the obligations that they have differ in some respects. On the one hand, ministers have a right to be served by people in whom they have confidence and they have a right, therefore, to have a strong voice in appointment, but the head of the civil service also has a responsibility to build for the future an impartial civil service competent to serve governments of different colours, and my noble friend the first civil service commissioner has a duty to preside over a process that reconciles these two obligations.^[44] 

He added that, as recognised by the committee, the recruitment principles formulated by the Civil Service Commission struck a good balance in reconciling these two sets of interests. 

5. Read more

• UK Civil Service, ‘The civil service code’, updated 16 March 2015 
• HM Government, ‘Independent review of governance and accountability in the civil service’, updated 13 November 2023 
• House of Lords Constitution Committee, ‘Permanent secretaries: their appointment and removal’, 20 October 2023, HL Paper 258 of session 2022–23 
• Hannah White, ‘Civil service politicisation is the wrong answer to the wrong question’, Institute for Government, 3 May 2023 

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Cover image by Can Pac Swire on Flickr. 

This briefing was updated on 21 November 2024 to reflect the publication on 20 November 2024 of the Civil Service Commission’s review into appointments by exception into delegated grades, and to clarify a quote from Lord Maude.