Grenfell Tower Inquiry: House of Lords debate

Approximate read time: 45 minutes

On 22 November 2024, the House of Lords is due to debate a motion moved by Lord Khan of Burnley to take note of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Lord Khan is a parliamentary under secretary of state at the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG).

1. Grenfell Tower Inquiry

1.1 Establishing the inquiry

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was set up to examine the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017.^[1] A total of 72 people died as a result of the fire in the 24-storey block of flats. Theresa May, the then prime minister, announced on 15 June 2017 there would be a public inquiry.^[2] The inquiry was formally established as a statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 in August 2017.^[3] The inquiry’s terms of reference were also published in August 2017, having been subject to public consultation.^[4]

1.2 Phase 1

There were two phases to the inquiry. Phase 1 focused on establishing the factual narrative of the events on the night of 14 June 2017.^[5] The inquiry’s phase 1 report was published on 30 October 2019.^[6] The full report is in four volumes, and the executive summary was also published as a standalone document, ‘Grenfell Tower inquiry: Phase 1 report overview’.

The phase 1 report concluded the “primary cause of the rapid spread of fire up, around and down the building was the use of ACM [aluminium composite material] rainscreen panels with a polyethylene core, to which the use of combustible insulation contributed”.^[7] The inquiry found “compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with requirement B4(1) of schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 2010, in that they did not adequately resist the spread of fire having regard to the height, use and position of the building”.^[8] It also found London Fire Brigade’s (LFB) preparation and planning for a fire such as that at Grenfell Tower was “gravely inadequate”, although it also noted that “firefighters who attended the tower displayed extraordinary courage and selfless devotion to duty”.^[9] The response of the other emergency services, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC, the local authority that owned the building) and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO, the organisation that managed the building) was found to be “unsatisfactory”.^[10]

1.3 Phase 2

Phase 2 of the inquiry examined the underlying causes of the fire to identify where mistakes were made and how Grenfell Tower came to be in a condition which allowed the fire to spread in the way identified in phase 1.^[11] It also investigated the response of the authorities to the emergency. The phase 2 report was published on 4 September 2024.^[12] The full report is seven volumes, and the executive summary was also published as a standalone document, ‘Grenfell Tower inquiry: Phase 2 report overview’.

2. Findings of the phase 2 report

2.1 Overview

The inquiry concluded the fire at Grenfell Tower was “the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry to look carefully into the danger of incorporating combustible materials into the external walls of high-rise residential buildings and to act on the information available to them”.^[13] Sir Martin Moore-Bick, chair of the inquiry, elaborated on this in a statement on the day of phase 2 report’s publication. He said:

[…] the simple truth is that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable and that those who lived in the tower were badly failed over a number of years and in a number of different ways by those who were responsible for ensuring the safety of the building and its occupants.^[14]

Sir Martin said this included the government, the TMO, RBKC, those who manufactured and supplied the materials used in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, those who certified their suitability for use on high-rise residential buildings, Studio E (the architects on the refurbishment); Rydon Maintenance Ltd (the principal contractor on the refurbishment) and some of its subcontractors and consultants, the local authority’s building control department and the London Fire Brigade. Sir Martin said they did not all bear the same degree of responsibility, but “all contributed to it in one way or another, in most cases through incompetence, but in some cases through dishonesty and greed”. Findings relating to all these parties are set out further below.

Sir Martin also emphasised in his statement that the fire at Grenfell Tower was “above all a human tragedy in which many lives were lost, families were torn asunder, homes were destroyed and a community was shattered”.^[15]

2.2 Government

The inquiry found that in the years between the fire at Knowsley Heights, an 11-storey tower block on Merseyside, in 1991 and the fire at Grenfell Tower in 2017 there were “many opportunities for the government to identify the risks posed by the use of combustible cladding panels and insulation, particularly to high-rise buildings, and to take action in relation to them”, but it failed to do so.^[16] The inquiry concluded the then Department for Communities, Housing and Local Government was “poorly run”.^[17] It found and that in the years following the fire at Lakanal House, where six people died in a 14-storey tower block in 2009, the government’s deregulatory agenda “dominated” the department’s thinking “to such an extent that even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded”.^[18] During that period, the government was found to have “determinedly resisted” calls from across the fire sector to regulate fire risk assessors and to amend the Fire Safety Order to make it clear that it applied to the exterior walls of buildings containing more than one set of domestic premises.

2.3 Product manufacturers

The report identified that “one very significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible materials was systematic dishonesty on the part of those who made and sold the rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products”.^[19] They were found to have “engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market”. Arconic, the manufacturer of the Reynobond 55 PE ACM rainscreen panels used in Grenfell Tower’s external walls, was found to have “deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger of using Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form, particularly on high-rise buildings” from 2005 until after the Grenfell fire.^[20] Celotex, the manufacturer of RS5000 combustible foam insulation, “embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market” about the suitability of the insulation for use on high-rise buildings. Another insulation manufacturer, Kingspan, “knowingly created a false market in insulation for use on buildings over 18 metres in height” by making claims it knew to be false about the test results of its K15 insulation.^[21] Although only around 5% of the insulation used in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment was K15, the inquiry found that the way in which K15 was tested and marketed “created conditions that encouraged unethical practices in the supply of insulation for use on high-rise buildings”.^[22]

2.4 Certification and testing bodies

The inquiry found that the manufacturers’ dishonest approach to marketing was “compounded by the failure” of the British Board of Agrément (BBA) and Local Authority Building Control (LABC), two bodies that provided certificates to certify products’ compliance with the Building Regulations and statutory guidance.^[23] The inquiry found that BBA’s “lack of robust processes and reluctance to enforce the terms of its contracts enabled it to become the victim of dishonest behaviour on the part of unscrupulous manufacturers”.^[24] Similarly, LABC was found to be “vulnerable to manipulation because its processes were not implemented rigorously enough” and to be “willing to accommodate the customer [product manufacturers] at the expense of those who relied on the certificates”.^[25]

The Building Research Establishment (BRE) was originally established as a government body to carry out research into and testing of construction methods.^[26] It was privatised in 1997. The inquiry found that “from 1991 much of the work it carried out in relation to testing the fire safety of external walls was marred by unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, a lack of effective oversight, poor reporting and a lack of scientific rigour”.^[27] The inquiry said it had seen evidence of “a desire [from BRE] to accommodate existing customers and to retain its status within the industry at the expense of […] considerations of public safety”.

2.5 TMO and RBKC

The inquiry found that from 2011, relations between the TMO and many of the residents of Grenfell Tower were “increasingly characterised by distrust, dislike, personal antagonism and anger”.^[28] The TMO was found to have “lost sight of the fact that the residents were people who depended on it for a safe and decent home”. The deterioration of the relationship with residents was found to reflect “a serious failure on [the TMO’s] part to observe its basic responsibilities”. Managing fire safety at Grenfell Tower was the joint responsibility of the TMO and the local authority, RBKC. However, the inquiry said there was a “persistent indifference” to fire safety in both organisations.^[29] RBKC’s oversight of the TMO’s performance was found to be “weak” and fire safety was not subject to any key performance indicator. The inquiry found “the demands of managing fire safety were viewed by the TMO as an inconvenience rather than an essential aspect of its duty to manage its property carefully”.^[30]

The inquiry also found RBKC’s building control department did not properly scrutinise the design or choice of materials for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, and failed to satisfy itself once the work was completed that the building would comply with the Building Regulations.^[31] Consequently, the inquiry determined RBKC “bears considerable responsibility for the dangerous condition of the building immediately on completion of the work”.^[32] The inquiry also attributed a share of blame to the TMO for failing to ensure a fire safety strategy was completed for the building once it had been refurbished and failing to take sufficient care in its choice of architect.^[33]

The inquiry described the initial response of RBKC and the government to the tragedy as “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal”.^[34] RBKC’s systems and leadership were found to be “wholly inadequate to the task of handling an incident of such magnitude and gravity”. Owing to a lack of planning and training, RBKC was “ill-equipped to deal with a serious emergency”, and this was not due to lack of financial resources. However, the inquiry commended teams from the TMO “for their willingness to become directly involved and for the efforts they made at what was a very difficult time”.^[35]

2.6 Firms involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower

The inquiry found the choice of combustible materials for the cladding of Grenfell Tower during its refurbishment “resulted from a series of errors caused by the incompetence of the organisations and individuals involved”.^[36] It said Studio E (the architects), Rydon (the main contractors) and Harley (a subcontractor) all “failed to identify their own responsibilities for important aspects of the design and in each case assumed that someone else was responsible for matters affecting fire safety”. This included a belief on the part of everyone involved in the choice of materials for the external wall “that responsibility for their suitability and safety lay with someone else”. The inquiry concluded “none of those involved in the design of the external wall or the choice of materials acted in accordance with the standards of a reasonably competent person in their position”.^[37] Exova Warringtonfire Ltd, a fire engineer consultant, was also found to bear “considerable responsibility for the fact that Grenfell Tower was in a dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment”.^[38] The inquiry criticised Exova’s failure to produce a final version of the fire safety strategy for the refurbished building and to draw that to the attention of the design team.

2.7 London Fire Brigade

The phase 2 report concluded that failures by LFB were “attributable to a chronic lack of effective management and leadership, combined with undue emphasis on process”.^[39] It said that LFB had failed to address shortcomings in its ability to fight fires in high-rise buildings that were brought to light by the Lakanal House fire in 2009. The inquiry identified deficiencies in the organisation and management of the control room, the training of control room officers and in the commissioning and delivery of training to operational crews, particularly in relation to incident command.^[40] There were also deficiencies in the collection of information needed to enable crews to prepare effectively to respond to fires in individual buildings.

3. Recommendations of the phase 2 report

3.1 Overview

The phase 2 report made a total of 58 recommendations. These are set out in full in ‘Grenfell Tower inquiry: Phase 2 report overview’. This briefing focuses mostly on those recommendations that are directed at the government or propose changes to legislation.

In his statement accompanying the phase 2 report, Sir Martin said the inquiry panel believed that the implementation of their recommendations would improve fire safety, particularly in high-rise buildings, ensure that dangerous materials cannot be used in construction in the future, and improve the efficiency of fire and rescue services nationally.^[41]

3.2 Regulation of the construction industry

The inquiry’s first group of recommendations related to the construction industry. The inquiry said the system of regulating the construction and refurbishment of high-rise residential buildings that existed at the time of the Grenfell fire was “seriously defective” in a number of respects:^[42]

The statutory guidance in Approved Document B [the fire safety volume of the ‘approved documents’ guidance produced by the government on the Building Regulations] was poorly worded and liable to mislead designers into thinking that complying with its terms would inevitably ensure that the building would comply with the legal requirements of the Building Regulations. The government department responsible for the Building Regulations failed actively to monitor the performance of the system and failed to ensure that dangers of which it became aware were communicated to industry. It was not sensitive to the need to make urgent changes to the statutory guidance if conditions required it.^[43]

The inquiry also said regulatory arrangements had become “too complex and fragmented”, with multiple government departments, local authorities, Trading Standards and commercial organisations all responsible for different aspects, creating “inefficiency and an obstacle to effective regulation”.

The inquiry therefore recommended that the government:^[44]

• appoint a single construction regulator to oversee all aspects of the construction industry, including regulation, testing and certification of construction products, regulation and oversight of building control, licensing of contractors to work on higher-risk buildings, monitoring the operation of the Building Regulations and statutory guidance, research and information-sharing on fire safety and accrediting fire risk assessors
• bring responsibility for the functions relating to fire safety currently exercised by the MHCLG, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade under a single secretary of state
• appoint a chief construction adviser to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry
• appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process, and whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority
• establish a system of mandatory accreditation for fire risk assessors

The inquiry also made recommendations relating to amendments to current legislation and statutory guidance, and new legal requirements that should be introduced, including:

• The definition of a “higher-risk building” in the Building Safety Act 2022 should be reviewed urgently. The inquiry said the existing definition—a building that is at least 18 metres in height (or has at least seven storeys) and contains at least two residential units—was “essentially arbitrary” and not satisfactory.^[45]
• Statutory guidance generally, and ‘Approved Document B’ in particular, should be reviewed and a revised version published as soon as possible.^[46]
• The revised version of the guidance should contain a clear warning in each section that the legal requirements are contained in the Building Regulations and compliance with the guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with the Building Regulations.^[47]
• It should be made a statutory requirement for building control applications for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building to be accompanied by a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer, a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the Building Regulations and a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations. The fire safety strategy would also have to be reviewed and re‑submitted at the stage of completion.^[48]
• Manufacturers should be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products. Manufacturers should also be required to provide the construction regulator with the full testing history of the product or material to which the conformity certificate relates and inform the regulator of circumstances that may affect its performance.^[49]
• The profession of fire engineers should be recognised and protected by law, with an independent body to regulate the profession and its standards. Alongside this, the government should take actions to speed up the creation of a body of professional fire engineers by increasing the number of places on accredited masters-level courses, convening a group of practitioners and academics to define standards for a competent fire engineer, and develop courses in the principles of fire engineering for construction professionals and fire and rescue services staff.^[50]

The inquiry said its investigations had revealed that important fire safety recommendations had been ignored by the government in the years leading up to the Grenfell Tower fire. It found it “unsatisfactory” that there was no system for keeping track of recommendations or the government’s response to them.^[51] It therefore also recommended it should be made a legal requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response. It said the government should record its reasons where it decided not to accept a recommendation. The government should be required to report annually on this to Parliament.

3.3 London Fire Brigade

The inquiry’s second group of recommendations related to LFB. It welcomed a proposal from the Conservative government, set out in a white paper in 2022, to create an independent College of Fire and Rescue.^[52] The inquiry recommended the government should establish such a college immediately and resource it to provide training, education, research, the development of equipment, policies and procedures, and the setting of managerial standards nationally.^[53]

The inquiry also recommended that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) should inspect the LFB as soon as reasonably possible to assess the effectiveness of the control room and the extent to which it had been integrated into the organisation (areas where the inquiry had made recommendations in its phase 1 report), the training and competence of incident commanders, and LFB’s arrangements for collecting, storing and distributing operational risk information.^[54] Other recommendations in this section were directed at LFB specifically in relation to implementing lessons learned from previous incidents, and to all fire and rescue services in relation to improving communications equipment and providing training on the water supply.^[55]

3.4 Response and recovery

The inquiry noted the Grenfell Tower fire “severely tested” the arrangements for responding to civil emergencies and “in many respects [they] did not perform as well as expected”.^[56] It welcomed the fact the Conservative government had published a new ‘UK Government resilience framework’ in December 2022 which was intended to put in place a new strategic approach to resilience. However, the inquiry made some recommendations in areas where it considered further improvements were needed.

The inquiry noted the government’s powers in sections 5 and 7 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 are “far-reaching”, but also concluded that “they do not enable it to intervene promptly or decisively when a category 1 responder is failing to rise to the challenge”. Category 1 responders include local authorities, police and fire and rescue services, the NHS and the Environment Agency.^[57] The inquiry therefore recommended the government should consider amending the act to grant a designated secretary of state the power to carry out the functions of a category 1 responder for a limited period of time.^[58]

Other recommendations in this section were aimed at ensuring better coordination between category 1 responders (for instance, between London boroughs) and improved training and emergency planning within local authorities.^[59]

3.5 Vulnerable people

The phase 2 report recommended that further consideration be given to the recommendation made in the phase 1 report about personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs). The phase 1 report had recommended that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building should be required by law to prepare PEEPs for all residents whose ability to evacuate the building without assistance may be compromised (such as people with reduced mobility or impaired cognition).^[60] The phase 2 report also recommended guidance in the Local Government Association guide on ‘Fire safety in purpose-built blocks of flats’ should be reconsidered. The inquiry noted this guidance said it was usually unrealistic to plan for the evacuation of disabled and vulnerable residents living in general needs blocks of flats in the event of a fire.

In the version of the guide currently available on the government website, the paragraphs in question have been redacted and replaced with a note to say that the government intended to respond in due course to a consultation on PEEPs which closed in July 2021.^[61] A note at the beginning of the document stated that the Home Office was working on a revised version of the guide which it intended to publish in 2024. In 2022, the Conservative government said the consultation had raised significant issues around practicality, proportionality and safety, which meant it was unable to mandate PEEPs in high-rise residential buildings.^[62] It opened a second consultation on alternative proposals to support the fire safety of residents who would need to evacuate in an emergency.

3.6 Areas where no further recommendations were made

The inquiry panel said that, given changes introduced by the Building Safety Act 2022, it saw no need to make further recommendations about the responsibilities of clients commissioning building work.^[63] Regulations made under the Building Safety Act 2022 require a Building Regulations compliance statement made or approved by the client to be provided at the time of an application for building control approval. The inquiry panel also said that shortcomings of the kind it had identified in the TMO would have led it to make recommendations to ensure they were not repeated.^[64] However, as the Social Housing (Regulation) Act 2023 had enabled the Regulator of Social Housing to play a more active role in setting and enforcing standards, the panel decided not to make any additional recommendations in this area.

4. Responses to the phase 2 report

4.1 Labour government

On the day the phase 2 report was published, Prime Minister Keir Starmer made both written and oral ministerial statements. He said the government would carefully consider the report and its recommendations to ensure that such a tragedy could not occur again.^[65] He expressed the hope that those outside government would do the same. Responding to the report’s findings about central government, Mr Starmer apologised on behalf of the state to all bereaved families, survivors and the Grenfell community, acknowledging the tragedy “should never have happened”.^[66] He said he was “deeply sorry” the country had “failed to discharge its most fundamental duty” to protect people the government was there to serve. He declared the publication of the phase 2 report must “lead to a day of justice” and a moment to “reflect on the state of social justice in our country”.

Mr Starmer said in light of the inquiry’s findings, it was “imperative that there is full accountability, including through the criminal justice process” and that this must happen swiftly. He said the government would write to all companies found by the inquiry to have been part of the “horrific failings”, as the first step to stop them being awarded government contracts. He acknowledged some important reforms had taken place under the Conservative government in the seven years since the fire, including banning combustible cladding, new oversight of building control, a new safety regime for all residential buildings over 18 metres, new legal requirements on social landlords and making sure that fire and rescue services are trained and equipped to handle large-scale incidents. He promised the government would look at all 58 of Sir Martin’s recommendations in detail and respond in full within six months, with annual reports to Parliament on every commitment the government makes in response to the recommendations.

In response to one specific recommendation, Mr Starmer said the government was already addressing the recommendation from the phase 1 report to introduce a new PEEP policy for anyone whose ability to evacuate could be compromised. Rushanara Ali, parliamentary under secretary of state for building safety and homelessness, announced on 2 September 2024 that the Home Office would bring forward proposals in the autumn to entitle residents with disabilities or impairments living in high-rise and higher-risk residential buildings in England to a “person-centred risk assessment” to identify appropriate equipment and adjustments to aid their fire safety/evacuation, and to a “residential PEEPs statement” that would record what vulnerable residents should do in the event of a fire.^[67] Ms Ali said the government had committed funding next year for social housing providers to deliver residential PEEPs to their renters, and future years’ funding would be confirmed at the spending review.

Mr Starmer also promised to “take the necessary steps” to speed up the rate at which unsafe cladding is being removed from buildings.^[68] He said his government would be willing to “force freeholders to assess their buildings and enter remediation schemes within set timescales, with a legal requirement to force action if that is what it takes”. He said the government would set out further steps on remediation in the autumn. He also promised to “reform the construction products industry that made this fatal cladding” and “ensure that tenants and their leaseholders can never again be ignored, and that social landlords are held to account for the decency and safety of their homes”.

Labour’s manifesto for the 2024 general election had promised to “take decisive action to improve building safety, including through regulation to ensure we never again see a repeat of the Grenfell fire”.^[69] It said Labour would review “how to better protect leaseholders from costs” and “take steps to accelerate the pace of remediation across the country”, with a “renewed focus on ensuring those responsible for the building safety crisis pay to put it right”.

In the budget on 30 October 2024, the government said investment in remediation of unsafe housing in response to the Grenfell Tower fire would rise to over £1bn in 2025–26.^[70] This figure included new investment intended to speed up the remediation of social housing. The government said it would set out further steps on remediation later this autumn.

4.2 Conservative party

Responding to the oral statement in the House of Commons, Rishi Sunak, who was Conservative leader when the phase 2 report was published, extended his deepest apologies to the families and victims of the Grenfell Tower tragedy, saying that the state must never let them down again.^[71] He described the phase 2 report as “a damning indictment of over 30 years of successive state failures”, stretching back to the Knowsley Heights fire in 1991. He said the work to remediate and identify new at-risk buildings must continue to meet Theresa May’s pledge that no such tragedy must happen again. He said the Conservatives’ cladding safety scheme had ensured an additional £5.1bn was available to support building remediation work, funded through developer contributions and a building safety levy. He called on the new government to give due consideration to any further requests for funding.

Mr Sunak also referred to two pieces of legislation the Conservatives passed in response to the Grenfell Tower fire:

• The Fire Safety Act 2021 clarified that ‘responsible persons’ with responsibility for blocks of flats must also consider a building’s structure, external walls and flat entrance doors in their fire risk assessments. The act imposed additional duties on responsible persons, including a duty to share fire safety information with residents and, in blocks 11m high or taller, to regularly check fire doors. For further information, see: House of Commons Library, ‘Fire safety rules for blocks of flats since the Grenfell Tower fire (England)’, 14 May 2024.
• The Building Safety Act 2022 established the Building Safety Regulator, and gave the regulator and local authorities further powers to take enforcement action against violations of the Building Regulations. It also created a new regime for ‘higher-risk’ buildings, overseen by the Building Safety Regulator. This requires developers to obtain approval from the regulator to build new higher-risk buildings and make changes to existing ones. ‘Responsible persons’ for high-rise blocks of flats have duties to share floor and building plans with local fire and rescue services. Higher-risk buildings must have an ‘accountable person’ who must assess and manage building safety risks (risks to people’s safety from the spread of a fire or the collapse of a building). For further information, see: House of Commons Library, ‘Building regulations and safety’, 8 July 2024.

Mr Sunak said these two pieces of legislation had “comprehensively reformed” the fire safety and building regulation regimes and created a new regulator, but they were “stepping stones” towards a regime that would remain “persistently fit for purpose”.^[72] He therefore called on the prime minister to pay special attention to the inquiry’s recommendations on more regular updating of Approved Document B; a single regulator; a sole secretary of state responsible and a new chief construction adviser. He said the Conservatives would “work collegiately” with the government to deliver any new legislation required to “support proportionate and necessary measures to protect the public, while protecting leaseholders from excessive cost”.

4.3 Community groups

Justice4Grenfell, a community-led organisation focused on obtaining justice for bereaved families, survivors and the local community, said the inquiry’s recommendations were “conciliatory”, but suggested that was “inevitable” given that the terms of reference “excluded considerations of social housing, discrimination and social inequality”.^[73] The group suggested it was “hypocritical, and even futile” to make recommendations directed at the same organisations that had “played roles in the horrific events at Grenfell” and expect them to “oversee and rectify the ‘chain of failures’ that led to the disaster”. Justice4Grenfell expressed regret that the report’s recommendations “do little to empower or give agency to the community”, and suggested there was not enough focus on the 72 people who lost their lives and those left behind who remained deeply traumatised. The group also argued that individuals who were responsible for the events that led to the fire should face justice with “no corporate or state veil to hide behind”.

Similar points were raised by Grenfell United, a group representing survivors and bereaved families. It said the publication of the phase 2 report was a “significant chapter”, but had not delivered justice.^[74] The group said the Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) must “ensure that those who are truly responsible are held to account and brought to justice”. It also urged people not to forget that the loss of 72 lives was what was at the heart of the inquiry and agreed with Sir Martin Moore-Bick’s conclusion that “every single loss of life was avoidable”. Grenfell United also focused on the government’s “fundamental failure to perform the most basic duties of care”. It said the report’s recommendations were “basic safety principles that should already exist”, and the fact they did not highlighted “how the government’s roles, duties and obligations have been hollowed out by privatisation”. Grenfell United called on the government to “exert control” over the construction sector, “to prevent further dismantling of public safety” and to ensure that profit was not put before people. It called on the government to implement all the inquiry’s recommendations and to ban Arconic, Kingspan, Celotex and Rydon from central and local government procurement processes.

4.4 Product manufacturers

The manufacturers criticised in the phase 2 report all issued statements in response to its publication. They all expressed sympathy with those affected by the fire and sought to set out the actions they had taken in response. Arconic said it had acknowledged the role of its subsidiary Arconic Architectural Products SAS (AAP) as a supplier of materials for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment.^[75] It said it had cooperated fully with the work of the inquiry, would continue to engage with further legal processes and had made financial contributions to settlements for people affected and to a restorative justice fund. It maintained that it sold sheets of ACM as specified in the design process. It rejected any claim that it had sold an unsafe product. It said reports on its materials by third-party testing bodies were all publicly available and had been made available to its customers. It said AAP had not concealed any information from or mislead any certification body, customer or the public.

Celotex said it was considering the inquiry report “with care”.^[76] It said it had conducted its own review of the circumstances in which its RS5000 product had been tested, launched and marketed. It said independent testing following this review “demonstrated that the cladding system described in the Celotex RS5000 marketing literature met the relevant safety criteria”. It said that system was “substantially different to that used at Grenfell Tower” and decisions about the design, construction and materials for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment had been made by construction industry professionals.

Kingspan said the inquiry report explained clearly and unambiguously that the principal reason for the fire spread was the ACM cladding, which was not made by Kingspan.^[77] It said it had long acknowledged the “wholly unacceptable historical failings that occurred in part of our UK insulation business” but these were “in no way reflective of how we conduct ourselves as a group” and “while deeply regrettable, they were not found to be causative of the tragedy”. Kingspan said it had implemented “extensive and externally-verified measures to ensure our conduct and compliance standards are world-leading”.

4.5 Certification and testing bodies

BRE said it welcomed the publication of the report and supported the processes of ensuring another such tragedy could never happen.^[78] It stated it would be reviewing the report and its recommendations and would “continue to work constructively with government to ensure the new building safety and testing regime delivers on the findings of the inquiry’s report and is fit for purpose”.

LABC also welcomed the report.^[79] It said the inquiry’s conclusions “entirely coincide” with the conclusions LABC had reached following its own internal investigations into historic activities within LABC. LABC acknowledged there were “justified criticisms about some of our actions at the time”. It said it had embarked on “a period of radical change as an organisation” even before the inquiry started and, taking the inquiry’s conclusions “extremely seriously”, would continue the process of reform within the LABC itself and the promotion of new standards.

BBA said it would take time to review the report in detail.^[80] It said the findings were “vital” for it to “assimilate and reflect on” and would continue “to serve as a significant focus” for the organisation. It said the victims of the fire continued to be in its thoughts as it developed as an organisation.

4.6 TMO and RKBC

Elizabeth Campbell, the leader of RBKC council, published an open letter to the bereaved and survivors of Grenfell on the day the phase 2 report was published.^[81] On behalf of the council, she apologised “unreservedly and with all [her] heart” to those who survived, those who lost loved ones and the local community for the council’s “failure to listen to residents and protect them”. She said RBKC “could, and should, have done more to keep people safe in their homes and to care for all of our residents in the aftermath of the fire” and the council’s responsibility was not “diluted by the large number of companies and organisations involved”. She promised RBKC would “learn from every single criticism in the report”. She said the council would take time to study it further, listen to local communities and publish a full, formal response in the autumn.

On 16 September 2024, RBKC published a report summarising the main implications of the inquiry report for the council.^[82] The report was intended to set out key considerations for further discussion with council officers, elected members, the bereaved, survivors and residents. It set out several guiding principles, including that RBKC accepts the inquiry’s findings as the truth. The bereaved, survivors and residents have taken part in sessions in the community to discuss the inquiry’s findings and what they mean for RBKC.^[83]

RBKC published a draft outline response to the inquiry phase 2 report on 5 November 2024.^[84] This sets out a suggested structure for what RBKC’s formal response to the inquiry should cover, but it is not a full draft of the contents of the response. RBKC’s leadership team has been asked to comment on the draft outline response to assist in the preparation of the final response, which is due to be considered at a meeting of the full council on 27 November 2024.^[85] A full account of all actions that have been, or will be, taken to implement the inquiry recommendations that are relevant to RBKC is due to be included in that final response.^[86] The draft outline response was accompanied by another document in which RBKC has set out evidence of failings identified in the inquiry report, improvements it has made since 2017, remaining areas for improvement and suggested actions across a number of headings such as “being a better landlord”, “rebuilding trust” and “building control and safety standards”.^[87]

The TMO now exists only for the purpose of supporting the Grenfell Tower Inquiry and any other legal proceedings.^[88] It relinquished its role as a housing provider in February 2018, with day-to-day management of the housing services it previously provided returning to RBKC. The TMO said it accepted it had contributed to the terrible impact the tragedy had had on the bereaved, the survivors, their relatives and the broader Grenfell Tower community, and for this it was “deeply sorry”. It expressed its hope that the findings of the report would lead to safer homes for all those in social housing.

4.7 Firms involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower

Neither the contractor Rydon nor its subcontractor Harley appear to have issued a statement in response to the inquiry report.^[89] Architects Studio E went into voluntary liquidation in 2020, but reportedly will not be fully wound up while investigations into the Grenfell fire continue.^[90] Exova said it acknowledged the report and the inquiry’s “comprehensive and significant” recommendations, including those specifically related to Exova’s role during the refurbishment.^[91]

4.8 Fire services

LFB said it accepted all the inquiry recommendations directed to the brigade and fire and rescue services and supported the other seven recommendations in the ‘London Fire Brigade’ section of the phase 2 inquiry report.^[92] In October 2024, LFB also published a document setting out the progress it had made towards implementing each recommendation.^[93] LFB said that by March 2024, it had implemented all the recommendations directed towards it specifically from the phase 1 inquiry report and this had led to “deep institutional change across the brigade” and the adoption of new policies, improved training and new equipment.^[94] HMICFRS inspected LFB in June 2024. LFB said the outcome was expected to be published in the autumn.^[95]

The National Fire Chiefs Council said it would “carefully consider” every recommendation in the inquiry report and give them its full attention.^[96] Like LFB, it said that fire and rescue services were better prepared to respond to fires in high-rise residential buildings since the phase 1 report was published, but it said it would continue to learn from the systemic failures that led to the deaths at Grenfell. The Fire Brigades Union called on the government to go further than the recommendations set out in the report.^[97] It argued that “the deregulation of recent decades must be reversed”. It said “systems for delivering building safety must be brought under public ownership and must be given the resources they need”. It said that national standards for fire and rescue services should be set by a statutory body on fire policy.

5. Other investigations into the Grenfell Tower fire

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was conducted in parallel to investigations by the Metropolitan Police and the coroner.^[98] Professor Fiona Wilcox, the coroner for Inner London (West), opened 70 separate inquests between June and November 2017 into those who died in the fire.^[99] She subsequently suspended those investigations pending the conclusion of the statutory inquiry and, if necessary, the police investigation. The inquiry panel said in the phase 2 report that as far as possible they had made findings about the time and cause of death of the deceased.^[100] They said they hoped the coroner would be able to adopt these findings as sufficient to enable her to discharge her duties and thus spare the bereaved a further investigation, but they acknowledged that this would be a decision for the coroner.

The Metropolitan Police said in May 2024 that 180 officers and staff were investigating whether criminal offences had been committed in relation to the Grenfell Tower Fire.^[101] They had identified 19 companies or organisations and 58 individuals as suspects. The Metropolitan Police stressed that its investigation was independent of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, but detectives would need to fully consider the inquiry report’s findings in the context of the criminal investigation. The police force believed it would take 12–18 months—until at least the end of 2025—for the investigation team to fully assess the report once it was published and complete evidential files to present to the CPS for charging decisions. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Cundy said the Metropolitan Police had submitted eight out of 20 early investigative advice files to the CPS, each of which examined a full range of offences including corporate manslaughter, gross negligence manslaughter, fraud, and health and safety offences.

Following publication of the phase 2 report, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Cundy repeated that examining the report line-by-line alongside the police evidence would take at least 12–18 months.^[102] He promised the police would be thorough and diligent in the investigation while moving as swiftly as possible. The CPS confirmed it was working closely with the Metropolitan Police and said it did not expect to be making any charging decisions before the end of 2026.^[103]

Commenting on this, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (Crossbench), a former director of public prosecutions, warned that delays in the criminal justice system could mean that any criminal trials might not begin until two or three years after a charging decision was taken, so not until 2028 or 2029, with verdicts possibly not reached until the 2030s.^[104]

6. Remediation of other buildings affected by unsafe cladding

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report did not make any findings or recommendations about the remediation of other buildings affected by unsafe cladding, but this remains a significant issue for those concerned.

The National Audit Office (NAO) published a report in November 2024 on the progress made so far in remediating dangerous cladding. It summarised the government’s approach since 2017 as follows:

The government has significantly changed the types of buildings within scope for its programmes, and its approach to remediation, as the scale and impact of the cladding problem has become clearer. MHCLG initially focused on identifying high-rise buildings with unsafe ACM cladding. From 2018, as concerns mounted about the pace of remediation, fire safety risks in other types of cladding, and the unaffordable bills that residents faced, MHCLG introduced financial support. By March 2021, it had made £5.1bn available to support remediation of high-rise buildings with ACM and other types of unsafe cladding across the private and social sectors. In 2020, government advice began to stress the importance of assessing the fire safety risk of external wall systems on all buildings, irrespective of height. In 2021, MHCLG announced a long-term loan for leaseholders in affected medium-rise buildings [11–18m high] to pay for remediation works, along with measures to make industry pay. In 2022, it decided not to progress with the loan, promised to protect leaseholders in buildings over 11m from remediation costs, and adopted a more proportionate approach towards its assessment of building safety […] These changes have tried to clarify who will pay but introduced more uncertainty over the number of buildings in scope for government programmes and how much remediation will cost.^[105]

The NAO reported that it was taking the MHCLG longer than expected to identify buildings with dangerous cladding and bring them into the government’s ‘portfolio’.^[106] The ‘portfolio’ consists of five different remediation programmes:^[107]

• ACM programme: Grant funding to support remediation of buildings over 18 metres with ACM cladding. Funding included £400mn for the social housing sector (2018) and £200mn for the private sector (2019). This may soon close to new applications.
• Building safety fund (BSF): Grant funding to support remediation of high-rise buildings with non-ACM flammable cladding. Funding consisted of £1bn in March 2020 for tranche 1 and £3.5bn in February 2021 for tranche 2. The BSF is now closed for new applications outside London.
• Cladding safety scheme (CSS): Grant funding to support remediation of buildings over 11m outside London and 11–18m inside London. This scheme was launched in July 2023 and is designed and managed by Homes England.
• Developer remediation programme: To oversee self-remediation by developers. This includes the developer remediation contract which the government first asked developers to sign in January 2023 and the responsible actors scheme established in July 2023.
• Social housing programme: To monitor self-remediation in the social housing sector. This was established in summer 2023.

The MHCLG expects the portfolio to cover all the 9,000 to 12,000 residential buildings over 11m that, as at February 2024, it estimated would need remediating. By August 2024, 4,771 buildings were in a remediation programme, representing 39% to 54% of the total that MHCLG estimates will require remediation work, leaving up to 60% of buildings still to be identified.^[108] Of those buildings identified, the NAO reported that remediation work has yet to start on half and has completed on around a third.^[109] Of all the buildings that may be in scope, work has completed on only 12–16%.

In terms of costs, the MHCLG estimates that the total cost of remediation will be between £12.6bn and £22.4bn, with a central estimate of £16.6bn.^[110] By August 2024, MHCLG had spent £2.3bn on the remediation of buildings with unsafe cladding.^[111] MHCLG will provide funding for qualifying buildings at a current forecast cost of £9.1bn (ranging from £6.5bn to £13.4bn), with the remainder funded by developers, private owners or social housing providers.^[112] To remain within its £5.1bn cap in the long run, the NAO said MHCLG intends to recoup £700mn from developers refunding costs for remediating buildings for which they have now accepted responsibility, and the balance (currently forecast at £3.4bn) through the new building safety levy. The levy will be paid by developers on new developments, though MHCLG is yet to confirm payment mechanisms. It does not expect collection to start until autumn 2025 at the earliest.

In its report, the NAO highlighted the effects on individuals affected:

The impacts of dangerous cladding have extended far beyond the immediate victims of the Grenfell fire, with many people suffering significant financial and emotional distress. As well as living with the fear of fire and costly bills for remediation, some residents in affected buildings have paid for ‘waking watches’ to patrol buildings while waiting for cladding to be removed […] While the Building Safety Act 2022 now protects most leaseholders from paying for remediation costs, many have experienced increases in insurance premiums (some as high as 500%, passed on through service charges), struggled to access mortgage finance, and been unable to move.^[113]

While the NAO acknowledged that the MHCLG had taken steps to help make affected buildings mortgageable and insurable, it also found that “many people do not yet know when their building will be made safe”.^[114] Modelling by MHCLG in February 2024 indicated that 2035 was the date by which all eligible buildings over 11m with unsafe cladding would be remediated—18 years after the Grenfell fire. However, the NAO concluded that remediation of buildings over 11m “is not currently on course to complete by 2035 and there are significant challenges to overcome”.^[115] Overall, the NAO concluded that:

Seven years on from the Grenfell Tower fire, there has been progress, but there also remains considerable uncertainty about the number of buildings needing remediation, the cost of remediating them, and how long it will take to fix them and to recoup spending in the long run.^[116]

The End Our Cladding Scandal campaign group has called on the government to implement all the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s recommendations in full and without delay.^[117] It said that “hundreds of thousands of people are still living in homes with the same risk that there was in Grenfell seven years ago” and urged that this “must change quickly”. The group also wrote to the government in September 2024 arguing that the previous government’s approach was “too complicated” with “several funding schemes, layers of unequal leaseholder protections, complex building ownership structures, self-interested stakeholders arguing over liability and ongoing disputes over safety risks”.^[118] It criticised a “merry-go-round of buck-passing” and the “glacial” pace of remediation. It set out actions it would like the new government to take, including:

• protecting all leaseholders from costs to fix all fire risks, not just cladding.
• creating one body to assess, fund and sign off all fire-risk remediation.
• consolidating all funding schemes into the Homes England cladding safety scheme.
• coordinating enforcement to speed up work and creating new legal powers to recover more money
• deploying allocated funds rapidly and making industry pay
• giving state backing to buildings insurance to address the situation where “more people across the country are being forced to pay crippling costs”

7. Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘General debate on building safety and resilience’, 10 September 20243
• House of Commons Library, ‘Building regulations and safety’, 8 July 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘Fire safety rules for blocks of flats since the Grenfell Tower fire (England)’, 14 May 2024
• House of Commons Library, ‘Leasehold high-rise flats: Who pays for fire safety work?’ 23 October 2023
• House of Commons Library, ‘The cladding external wall system’, 5 June 2023

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Cover image by the blowup on Unsplash