Civil war in Sudan: Is there a path to peace?

Approximate read time: 20 minutes

On 13 September 2024, Lord Collins of Highbury, parliamentary under secretary of state at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, is due to move that the House takes note of the situation in Sudan.

1. Two years of war

Sudan’s civil war is now into its second year. The conflict, driven by a power struggle between the Sudanese armed forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and paramilitary group the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, has already seen the deaths of around 15,000 people.^[1] These are conservative estimates. Some say the conflict has killed 150,000 to date. A further 10.2 million have been displaced, both internally and to unstable areas in neighbouring Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, overrunning existing refugee camps.^[2]

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, fighting has been widespread throughout Sudan, a nation three times the size of France. Much of Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, now reportedly “lies in rubble” and other cities have been besieged or destroyed.^[3] In a country still grappling with the legacy of events in Darfur two decades ago, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said both sides in the conflict are guilty of war crimes.^[4] The RSF is accused of atrocities against civilians, including killing, rape and pillage, while SAF aircraft have reportedly bombed civilian targets and critical infrastructure.^[5]

Even before the current conflict, Sudan was also home to more than 1 million refugees—the second-highest refugee population in Africa.^[6] Now, alongside the impact of climate change on food security, the World Food Programme estimates the civil war has left half of the country—some 25 million people—in need of humanitarian assistance, creating the “world’s largest hunger crisis”.^[7]

Despite the growing urgency of the humanitarian situation, hopes for an imminent resolution to the war reportedly remain “slim”, particularly given the SAF did not send any representatives to recent US-backed ceasefire talks in Switzerland.^[8] Instead, concerns are growing that the conflict will continue to deteriorate, pushing millions into famine and potentially seeing the violence expanding to neighbouring states such as Chad and South Sudan.^[9] This could drive a further, large-scale exodus of refugees from the region.

2. Background to the conflict

The current conflict was arguably long in the making. In the first half of the 20th century, Sudan was a joint protectorate of Egypt and the United Kingdom. Since its independence in 1956, the country has been riven by internal conflict, particularly between the country’s wealthier northern region, which was majority Arab and Muslim, and its less-developed southern region, where most people were Christian or animist.^[10] This divide was at the heart of two earlier civil wars, the second of which, from 1983 to 2005, would ultimately see the secession of South Sudan in 2011.

For 30 years, from 1989 to 2019, Sudan was ruled by President Omar al-Bashir. He seized power in a coup following his service in the Egyptian military and later served as an SAF officer. As president, he oversaw most of the second Sudanese civil war, which saw the deaths of an estimated 2 million people and well-documented accusations of genocide, particularly in the Darfur region. In Darfur, militias armed by Omar al-Bashir’s government allegedly conducted systematic and deadly attacks against non-Arab populations, using the tactics of sexual violence, kidnapping, and other means to terrorise communities including the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups.

One of the key players in the current conflict, the RSF, originated in the Janjaweed militia of Darfur, which the US State Department accused of direct responsibility for the genocide.^[11] As the most powerful armed group outside the army to come out of the Bashir era, between 2003 and 2019 the RSF were employed by the Sudanese government in a variety of roles. Reportedly, these included as a border guard force, a source of mercenaries for the Saudi coalition in the Yemeni war, and a hired security force to repress popular uprisings.^[12] RSF leader Hemedti, a former Janjaweed commander, also allegedly became one of Sudan’s wealthiest men by seizing control of gold mines—with the Bashir government’s blessing—during the RSF’s campaigns.

3. 2019 coup and hopes for a democratic transition

Before 2019, President Bashir hired the RSF to protect him from coups and attempts on his life. However, the RSF ultimately participated in the 2019 coup that saw President Bashir removed from power. In the aftermath, the RSF worked alongside the SAF to set up a transitional government and a new constitution. SAF leader General Burhan led the Transitional Sovereignty Council with RSF leader Hemedti as his deputy. The council also included other military leaders and civilians.

Abdalla Hamdok, an economist and development expert, was selected to be Sudan’s prime minister. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that Mr Hamdok spent his brief time in office attempting to “mitigate Sudan’s extreme economic turmoil and project stability to the outside world”.^[13] Yet in October 2021, Mr Hamdok was deposed and arrested following another coup orchestrated by the SAF and RSF, who also suspended Sudan’s constitution.

The response from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was to pause debt relief to Sudan. Mass demonstrations were held demanding a return to civilian government. Mr Hamdok was briefly reinstated in November 2021 but resigned in January 2022 following further protests and violent crackdowns by security forces. Since his resignation, Sudan has had no effective civilian leadership. General Burhan operates as de facto head of state.

Further negotiations did take place throughout 2022 over the future of Sudanese governance. This culminated in a December 2022 deal laying the groundwork for a two-year transition to civilian leadership and national elections.^[14] However, unrest over that time and the plan to allow the security sector to keep some state powers post-transition led to more protests and violence. There were also significant internal tensions within Sudan’s ruling factions, including over the role of Hemedti and the RSF. The transition deal sought to elevate Hemedti from deputy to Burhan’s equal. It also called for the RSF’s integration into Sudan’s legitimate armed forces and for both the SAF and the RSF to be placed under civilian leadership. It did not specify a deadline for the RSF’s integration. However, continued tensions over Hemedti’s and the RSF’s roles reportedly led to a missed deadline in early 2023 to determine conditions for the agreement’s implementation.

4. Current state of the complex conflict

In early 2023, the power struggle between the RSF and SAF continued to impede transition efforts. Both sides began mobilising their forces, and by April SAF troops were lining the streets of Khartoum and RSF soldiers had been deployed throughout Sudan. On 15 April 2023, a series of explosions took place in the capital along with heavy gunfire, marking the country’s descent into civil war.

Given the country’s history of coups, many initially believed that the conflict would be short-lived.^[15] However, the SAF found a formidable, and battle-tested, adversary in the RSF. By December 2023, the RSF had seized most of Khartoum and Jazeera state, known as the country’s breadbasket, as well as much of Darfur. Currently, the SAF holds much of the east. The RSF controls much of the west including the capital and is pushing eastward and south.^[16]

Foreign support, funding, and fighters have increased the conflict’s complexity. There have been numerous reports that Chad and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have provided funding and weapons to the RSF. Husam Mahjoub, a Sudanese journalist, contends that Sudan is key to the UAE’s strategy in Africa and the Middle East.^[17] He argues that since 2015 the UAE has sourced fighters from both factions to join the conflict in Yemen. He also notes that the UAE is the primary importer of Sudan’s gold and that it reportedly has multibillion-dollar plans to develop ports along Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Mr Mahjoub contends that the UAE has established a logistics network to send weapons to the RSF, and that RSF business, finance, and public relations operations are conducted from the UAE. The UAE has continued to deny involvement in the conflict. This is despite a UN panel of experts finding reports of the UAE and Chad providing support to the RSF were “credible”.^[18]

Soldiers from the Wagner Group—mercenaries with close ties to Russia—have also reportedly been actively backing the RSF. However, recent reports have suggested that Russia may be switching its support to the Sudanese military, providing weapons and ammunition in return for enabling it to establish a naval logistics base on the Red Sea.^[19] Iran is also reportedly supplying drones to SAF forces.^[20]

Sudan’s geopolitical importance stems in large part from its location. Situated in the north-east corner of Africa, it has 800km of coastline on the Red Sea and is a gateway to the Sahara, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The Gulf States are relatively close neighbours across the Red Sea. Indeed, the Economist notes that Port Sudan—the coastal city where the SAF are based—is closer to Abu Dhabi and Tehran than it is to N’Djamena, the capital of Chad, Sudan’s western neighbour.^[21] As a consequence, analysts have noted that nations across the region, from the Gulf States to other African powers such as Egypt, are exerting influence in the country in support of one side or the other. The result is a multifaceted conflict, and fears have grown that the country could be split into regional factions backed by different international coalitions as has arguably already occurred in Libya.^[22] Noting the destabilising effect of the Libyan situation across the Sahel, and the resulting proliferation of armed militias, terrorist groups and organised crime in the region, Cameron Hudson, former US National Security Council director for African affairs, contends: “to get a sense of what state collapse looks like in Sudan, look at Libya—now multiply that by ten”.

5. Humanitarian impact: Devastation and famine

The conflict has severely affected civilians in Sudan. The country is facing extreme shortages of food, water, medicine and fuel. More than 25.6 million people are facing acute food insecurity, including 8.5 million of them at emergency levels.^[23] The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee has recently concluded that famine conditions are prevalent in parts of North Darfur.^[24] Areas are classified in IPC phase 5: famine when at least one-fifth of people or households have an extreme lack of food and face starvation and destitution, resulting in extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and death.

More than 10.2 million people have also been displaced.^[25] This includes 7.9 million within Sudan and 2.1 million who have fled to neighbouring countries. Of these, Chad has received the largest number (around 0.6 million), followed by Egypt, South Sudan, Libya, Uganda and Ethiopia. In South Sudan, most of those arriving are returning nationals who had been living in Sudan as refugees. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) states that, without a resolution to the crisis, hundreds of thousands more people will be compelled to flee.

The UNHCR highlights the impact of the conflict on women and children. According to UN estimates, before fighting broke out more than 3 million women and girls in Sudan were at risk of gender-based violence.^[26] UN aid teams have described “horrific” ordeals being faced by forcibly displaced women and girls when fleeing Sudan. In addition, attacks on healthcare facilities, equipment and workers are further depriving women and girls of lifesaving care. Nearly three-quarters of health facilities are out of service. Diseases, including cholera, measles and malaria, are spreading at a time when two-thirds of the population lack access to health care. The conflict has also deprived millions of Sudanese children of an education. In total 19 million children in Sudan are out of school. More than 7.4 million Sudanese children do not have access to safe drinking water and nearly 2 million are in urgent need of lifesaving vaccines.

The violence has severely constrained humanitarian access. The United States has accused the SAF of impeding major humanitarian aid crossings from Chad into Darfur.^[27] According to the International Rescue Committee, the intense conflict and movement restrictions on humanitarian actors continue to prevent the delivery of aid, especially in the south of Sudan where needs are highest.^[28] The Adré border crossing between Chad and Darfur has recently reopened for a three-month period, however, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid.^[29] Related diplomatic efforts to reopen emergency aid deliveries to famine-stricken portions of Darfur via the Dabbah Road from Port Sudan also continue.

6. How has the international community, including the UK, responded?

The UN has made several appeals for help in Sudan. These include both requests for urgently needed aid funding and for assistance from UN Security Council members in getting humanitarian aid access in Sudan “across borders, across battle lines, by air, by land”.^[30] On 8 March 2024, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of violence in Sudan. This was followed by a period of indirect negotiations between the SAF and RSF mediated by Libya and Turkey.^[31] These talks soon broke down. The UN has reportedly received only one-third of the $2.7bn in aid it has requested for Sudan.^[32].

The UK is one of several countries working to resolve the current crisis. It has issued several joint statements alongside the US and Norway. The UK is also the ‘penholder’ on Sudan at the UN Security Council. This means it leads the council’s activities on the country. The UK provided £38mn in aid in the 2023/24 financial year.^[33] The Conservative government had committed to doubling this to £89mn in 2024/25. The new Labour government has pledged an additional £15mn of assistance to Sudan, South Sudan and Chad in the current financial year to support vulnerable people forced to flee violence and seek safety.^[34] Ministers state that this would see the UK’s official development assistance to Sudan rise to £97mn this financial year, “most of which is vital humanitarian aid”.^[35] The aid package also brings the total UK spend on the three countries of Sudan, South Sudan and Chad to over £220mn in this financial year.

New foreign secretary David Lammy said he had raised Sudan at a meeting of G7 foreign ministers in his first days in office.^[36] Responding to an urgent question on Sudan in the House of Commons on 3 September 2024, development minister Anneliese Dodds said she had visited South Sudan to assess the situation in Sudan, meeting families forced to flee “horrendous violence”.^[37] She decried the lack of access for aid workers to the hardest hit regions in Sudan, arguing the country was battling a man-made and senseless famine:

We now have confirmation that the senseless war between the Sudanese armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces has brought famine to Sudan. In the Zamzam internally displaced people camp in northern Darfur, which hosts more than half a million people, 100 people are dying from starvation every day. We have to be clear that these conditions exist across Sudan. We should be discussing a more damning assessment today, but a sustained tactic of denying access to the hardest-hit areas of the country is making many people and their suffering invisible. The famine facing Sudan is almost entirely man-made and a direct consequence of the deliberate efforts by both warring parties to block aid getting to those most in need. The warring parties must remember their obligations under international humanitarian law. Access must not be arbitrarily denied and starvation must not be used as a weapon of war.^[38]

Ms Dodds did welcome the recent decision to reopen the Adré border crossing between Chad and Darfur for humanitarian assistance for three months. She added, however, that the SAF must act to remove any unnecessary restrictions on trucks moving through Adré, and the RSF must urgently facilitate movement into areas under their control.

7. Is there a path to peace?

The most recognised effort to achieve peace is what has been named the ‘Jeddah platform’: multiple rounds of talks organised by the US and Saudi Arabia. However, the SAF and RSF have consistently failed to honour previous commitments to ensure civilians are protected and international humanitarian law is respected.^[39] Nor have they abided by several agreements for ceasefire, facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, or confidence-building measures, such as vacating civilian houses occupied by RSF combatants. The SAF declined to send representatives to the most recent talks in August 2024. General Burhan has reportedly told his SAF troops that “[w]e will not retreat, we will not surrender and we will not negotiate”.^[40] The RSF also subsequently withdrew from the negotiations.^[41]

The apparent breakdown of talks has led to further concerns about both the conflict’s continuation and its escalation, particularly to neighbouring states. US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said the conflict in Sudan risked becoming a “forgotten war”. He added the “continuation of [the] conflict and the introduction of additional actors and additional negative elements [referring to reports of international interference] only takes the situation into a more destabilising direction”.^[42]

There are also growing fears that because the crisis in Sudan is failing to attract significant international attention, and therefore the resolve and pressure needed to achieve a resolution, there will be consequences which extend far beyond the country’s borders. The Economist has described the situation in the country as a “geo-political time bomb”, describing the possibility that it could unleash instability in Africa and beyond:

Sudan is a chaos machine. The war sucks in malign forces from the surrounding region, then spews out instability—which unless the conflict is halted will only get worse. As the country disintegrates, it could upend regimes in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It could become a haven for terrorists. It could send an exodus of refugees to Europe. And it could exacerbate the crisis in the Red Sea, where attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis have already contorted global shipping.^[43]

Indeed, the Economist singles out the potential impact of a worsening of the crisis on the Suez Canal, which carries around a seventh of world trade, mainly between Europe and Asia. Those issues, combined with fears of an increased exodus of refugees noted above, have led to some observers such as Endre Stiansen, Norway’s ambassador to Sudan, saying this is a war which is already “impacting severely on three continents”.^[44]

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Cover image © United Nations