Challenges to a rules-based international order

Approximate read time: 15 minutes

On 16 January 2025, the House of Lords will debate the following motion:

Baroness Northover (Liberal Democrat) to move that this House takes note of the challenges to a rules-based international order, and their impact on global cohesion, stability and security.

1. What is meant by a rules-based international order?

The concept of a rules-based international order is broadly understood to mean the framework of political, legal and economic rules established following the second world war.^[1] For example, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has described it as a “system of laws, agreements, principles and institutions that the world came together to build after two world wars to manage relations between states, to prevent conflict, to uphold the rights of all people”.^[2]

John Ikenberry, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, posits a multilayered model, which is based on environmental conditions, international commitments and the principle of national sovereignty and self-determination:

[…] open rule-based order [is a] set of commitments by states to operate according to principles, rules and institutions that provide governance that is not simply dictated by who is most powerful. So, it’s a set of environmental conditions for doing business—contracts, multilateral institutions—and it comes in many layers. At the deepest level it’s really the system of sovereignty. It’s the belief that the world has a kind of foundation built around self-determined states that respect each other.^[3]

Professor Ikenberry contends that these layers of treaties and institutions arguably culminate in the United Nations system, “building rules and principles around aspirations for the inclusion of all peoples and societies”. Atop that sit the “more work-oriented” rules and institutions that came out of the second world war based on problem-solving and regulating interdependence, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Health Organization. For Professor Ikenberry, the rule-based order also “does have a kind of western liberal democracy component on top of those more basic fundamental institutions, sovereignty and global multilateralism”. He contends:

You have the old democratic stakeholders who have placed themselves in a kind of organising position as the kind of patrons and curators of a system where we have gone beyond what existed in earlier eras.^[4]

However, some scholars dispute that there is a single rules-based international order, or any kind of rules-based global order at all.^[5] For example, in a report for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Professor Malcolm Chalmers, deputy director general of RUSI, argued there is not one rule-based international system but several, all of which include “power-based” bargains between their members. He argued the perception that there were some actors who ‘obey the rules’ and some who do not was based on an oversimplification:

[A]though the relative peace the world has enjoyed since the end of the second world war has been reinforced by international norms and treaties, the shorthand assumption that there is a single, universally acknowledged order, or that the world is now divided between those who obey the rules (ourselves) and those who do not (the others) has always been an over-simplification. For the UK and other western states, the challenge should not be whether they are in favour of ‘the rules-based system’. Rather, it lies in identifying how rules-based systems can be used to help pursue national interests and values, including whether these need to be developed or replaced as circumstances change.^[6]

Professor Chalmers contended there was also strain between different parts of the international system. In particular, he highlighted tension between what he called the universal security system (USS)—which includes the right of self-determination for former colonies and the prohibition of aggression between states—and what he called the western system, and in particular the international institutions and norms embodied by predominately US-led international institutions. He argued that these elements have been at odds since the end of the cold war:

Post-cold war attempts to make the western rules-based system the dominant element in the global system have—at least for now—failed. It therefore continues to live in uneasy coexistence with the USS, episodically pursuing human security over state security, and claiming that the US and its allies have the authority to decide how to pursue the former, rather than the UN Security Council where both Russia and China have a veto.^[7]

2. A rules-based international order in UK doctrine

The UK government has long recognised the concept of a rules-based international order. Writing for the Foreign Policy Centre, Dr Nicholas Wright observed:

The maintenance and enhancement of the international rules-based system (IRBS) has been an essential British interest in the 75 years since the end of the second world war. Having contributed significantly to its construction throughout this period, the UK has been able to secure for itself a position enabling it to punch above its weight internationally. Indeed, the importance of the IRBS to the UK has only increased in a period marked by its own relative decline in power as it withdrew from empire and the era of superpower rivalry began.^[8]

In 2015, the then Conservative government’s ‘National security strategy and strategic defence and security review’ defined the rules-based international order as “founded on relationships between states and through international institutions, with shared rules and agreements on behaviour”.^[9]

The Conservative government’s 2023 refresh of an earlier integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy priorities committed the UK to working to:

[…] shape an open and stable international order of well-managed cooperation and competition between sovereign states on the basis of reciprocity, norms of responsible behaviour and respect for the fundamental principles of the UN charter and international law.^[10]

The former foreign secretary, Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, was questioned on the UK’s commitment to a rules-based international order in the House of Lords in January 2024:

My Lords, an open and stable international order is in our interest. We use it to deliver on issues of domestic and global importance, such as the Bletchley AI safety declaration. We invest in it, as the fifth-largest UN budget contributor. We support reform of it to ensure that it benefits everyone, and we hold to account those who undermine it, including through steadfast support to Ukraine, sanctions against Russia and ensuring maritime security in the Red Sea. In a dangerous and uncertain world, this stable international order is more essential than ever.^[11]

David Lammy, the foreign secretary, has made similar comments about the changing international dynamics the UK and other nations now face:

The past 10 years have seen the most significant geopolitical shifts at least since 1989. The jeopardy of the rules-based order, on which Britain depends, [is] collapsing. This is an historic inflection point. A moment crying out for energetic diplomacy to match it.^[12]

The Labour government have launched a number of reviews of foreign affairs and defence policy in which consideration of the international order is expected to play a part. They include the new Strategic Defence Review and reviews of Britain’s diplomatic relationships, aid development work, and marrying foreign policy to economic and trade ambitions.^[13]

3. New challenges to the rules-based order?

Writing in 2019, Professor Malcolm Chalmers contended that there was already growing strain in the international rules relating to economic governance that have underpinned trade liberalisation.^[14] He argued that support for economic globalisation was being eroded by growing inequality and nationalism within western states, and was also under threat from the re-emergence of competition with major non-western powers, and with Russia and China in particular.

Such themes were also explored by the House of Lords International Affairs Committee in its 2018 report ‘UK foreign policy in a shifting world order’.^[15] The committee drew on evidence from Sir Mark Lyall, former UK national security adviser, who said the world had experienced a ‘golden era’ of the rules-based international order from 1989 to 2009. During this period, he said:

We suddenly saw the UN Security Council unblocked, a number of new UN peacekeeping missions […] the International Criminal Court, the Human Rights Council, a flourishing of women’s rights and LGBT rights, a whole series of new institutions and new normative developments, particularly at the United Nations. What is striking about those developments is that they all went in a liberal direction.^[16]

However, Sir Mark said the existing system had come under significant strain. Indeed, the committee said the evidence it had taken indicated that the international system was in a state of turmoil and upheaval:

The most visible features are new centres of world power and influence, increased populist and nationalist pressures, far-reaching networks of crime and terror, new and empowered networks of political dissent and assertions of identity, extreme polarisation of political viewpoints, the rise of non-state actors and movements, the disruption, and in some cases destruction of established industries, the distortion and corruption of news and views on a worldwide scale, and mass movements of migrants and refugees. As to the root causes of this radical transformation, many explanations have been offered, and no single one suffices. But it is clear that the influence of the ongoing digital revolution and the accompanying global connectivity on an unprecedented scale, affecting every sphere of modern existence, plays a central role in this turbulent scene.^[17]

A similar viewpoint was presented by Robert Hannigan, former director of GCHQ, in his evidence to the committee. Mr Hannigan said there had been “a trend of states behaving in a way that suggests that they simply do not care about things they cared about 10 or 15 years ago”.^[18] He added there had been “a degree of predictability” about international relations and “certain red lines which most states stuck to in their own interests”. He said this had been eroded, and that although the world was “not necessarily at some great tipping point […] there is fragmentation and fraying of that system”. Former foreign secretaries Lord Hague of Richmond and Jeremy Hunt also noted the dramatic pace of change in their respective evidence.^[19]

Many commentators would argue these issues have only multiplied in recent years. Writing for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Stefan Lehne has argued there are increasing signs of global fragmentation and a retreat from democratic norms and values:

Under the pressure of geopolitics, the global economy shows signs of fragmentation amid a surge of protectionism in many places and the widespread weaponization of economic relations. And the hope for further progress in the spread of democratic governance has been disappointed, as international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are now reporting 18 years of democratic backsliding and rising authoritarianism in many parts of the world.^[20]

The author highlighted the findings of the 2022 US national security strategy, which spoke of the rise of actors acting against democratic norms, particularly Russia and China:

The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behaviour that poses a challenge to international peace and stability—especially waging or preparing for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of international order. Many non-democracies join the world’s democracies in forswearing these behaviours. Unfortunately, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) do not.^[21]

Similar findings were given by the Council of Europe’s Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, which argued that the effectiveness of the rules-based international order is “being increasingly challenged by a shift towards multipolarity, with groups of countries coalescing around diverging approaches and visions as regards values, systems of governance and the international order itself”.^[22] The committee said this process was being accompanied by the rapid rise of authoritarianism, nationalism, isolationism, unilateralism and pure power politics.

The committee noted that the world is currently facing the highest number of conflicts since the end of the second world war, and said that the UN Security Council was “struggling to fulfil its primary responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security due to the irreconcilable positions and interests of its permanent members”. The committee also drew attention to the war in Ukraine and the ongoing crisis in the Middle East as examples of failures in the rules-based order:

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine marked the most brutal violation of the rules-based international order in recent history, with Russia trying to change the territorial borders of a neighbouring sovereign state, using violence against civilians as an instrument of war and threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the international community has proved incapable of stopping the escalation of violence in the Middle East, which began with a shocking terrorist attack by Hamas and other militia groups against Israel on 7 October [2023] and has escalated into a major regional conflict, resulting in more than 40,000 deaths and a humanitarian crisis of apocalyptic proportions in Gaza.^[23]

Challenges to a rules-based international order are likely to increase. The committee highlighted the result of the 2024 presidential election in the United States, where President-Elect Donald Trump has threatened to enact further protectionist economic policies. Similarly, the continued growth of China’s assertiveness in the Pacific region and the impact of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the impact of climate change and environmental degradation, global health risks, food and energy crises, and terrorism and violent extremism, have also prompted concern.

4. UN General Assembly’s ‘Pact for the future’

In response to the world’s changing dynamics, in September 2024 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/79/1, called a ‘Pact for the future’.^[24] The resolution said that the world was in a time of “profound transformation”:

We are confronted by rising catastrophic and existential risks, many caused by the choices we make. Fellow human beings are enduring terrible suffering. If we do not change course, we risk tipping into a future of persistent crisis and breakdown.

However, the resolution also said there was reason for hope:

Yet this is also a moment of hope and opportunity. Global transformation is a chance for renewal and progress grounded in our common humanity. Advances in knowledge, science, technology and innovation could deliver a breakthrough to a better and more sustainable future for all. The choice is ours.^[25]

To seize these opportunities, the resolution called for a recommitment to international cooperation based on respect for international law. It also called for a strengthening of multilateral institutions and pledged “a new beginning in multilateralism”:

We recognize that the multilateral system and its institutions, with the United Nations and its charter at the centre, must be strengthened to keep pace with a changing world. They must be fit for the present and the future—effective and capable, prepared for the future, just, democratic, equitable and representative of today’s world, inclusive, interconnected and financially stable.

Today, we pledge a new beginning in multilateralism. The actions in this pact aim to ensure that the United Nations and other key multilateral institutions can deliver a better future for people and planet, enabling us to fulfil our existing commitments while rising to new and emerging challenges and opportunities.^[26]

Actions were pledged by the resolution in the following areas:^[27]

• Peace and security, including the “most progressive and concrete commitment to Security Council reform since the 1960s” redressing the historical underrepresentation of Africa as a priority, as well as agreement to strengthen international frameworks that govern outer space, and steps to avoid the weaponization and misuse of new technologies, such as lethal autonomous weapons.
• On sustainable development, climate and financing for development, including agreement on the need for reform of the international financial architecture so that it better represents and serves developing countries, and accelerating measures to address the challenge of climate change.
• On digital cooperation, including the global digital compact, annexed to the pact, the “first comprehensive global framework for digital cooperation and AI governance”.
• Youth and future generations, including the first-ever declaration on future generations, to take account of future generations in decision-making.
• Human rights and gender, including strengthening work on human rights, gender equality and the empowerment of women.

The resolution was adopted without a vote. However, an amendment motion submitted by the Russian Federation claimed that “no one is happy with this text”.^[28] Russia proposed the addition of language relating to the UN’s intervention in “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” and to avoid certain duplication of effort. The Republic of the Congo subsequently proposed a motion that no action be taken on Russia’s draft amendment, which was adopted by 143 in favour to seven against (Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, Sudan and Syria), with 15 abstentions.

Addressing the General Assembly the following day, Foreign Secretary David Lammy said the pact offered the world a key opportunity:

The ‘Pact for the future’ and this summit offer a chance for member states to show responsible global leadership, to engage with the rapid changes of our age, and go further in meeting the needs of everyone—especially the most vulnerable.

As I know all too well, countries of the global south suffered great injustices in the past. And I have heard repeatedly how frustrated partners are by the unfairness of the global system. We cannot ignore these frustrations. We must act.^[29]

Mr Lammy called for greater collective efforts to prevent and end conflict, including upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty, urging an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, and supporting an end to the fighting in Sudan. He said this would also mean “robustly challenging” member states who violated the charter and “rejecting a world in which might makes right”.^[30] He also called for urgent action on the climate and nature crisis, and for a modernised approach to development.

5. Read more

• LSE Ideas, ‘International order strategies: Past and present’, November 2024
• Dr Julinda Beqiraj et al, ‘The rules-based international order: Catalyst or hurdle for international law?’, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, March 2024
• Paul Gewirtz, ‘China, the United States, and the future of a rules-based international order’, Brookings, 22 July 2024
• Council of Europe Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, ‘The need for a renewed rules-based international order’, 11 December 2024
• Chatham House, ‘Ideas for modernizing the rules-based international order’, 10 June 2019
• House of Lords International Affairs Committee, ‘UK foreign policy in a shifting world order’, 18 December 2018, HL Paper 250 of session 2017–19
• Oral question on ‘Rules-based international order’, HL Hansard, 16 January 2024, cols 316–19

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Cover image by Kyle Glenn on Unsplash.